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Abstract
This thesis consists of three empirical papers on French colonial trade patterns: Chapter 1 presents
an original database on colonial trade statistics from French archives. Its main purpose is to de-
scribe the construction of this dataset and to present some stylized facts about the dynamic and
trend of French sectoral trade with French and non-French colonies and well as with other sovereign
countries for the period starting 1880 until the eve of the WWI. The statistics highlight a common
stylized fact regarding French trade with French colonies. In particular, we found that French trade
with its colonies was mainly based on imports of primary products and exports of manufactured
goods meaning that the Empire was used as the main dispenser of French exports and their main
provider of natural resources. Statistics also emphasize that the event of colonization was followed
by an increase in trade between France and its own colonies, while colonization from Britain and
other metropolis did not impact trade between France and British/ other colonies. The chapter fi-
nally reveals that trade with French colonies was unbalanced and unidirectional, they do not reveal
any advantage in favor of those colonies. Chapter 2 investigates how the colonial strategy through
the settlement decision affected French trade patterns. Using a gravity model, results show that
French colonies with more European settlements traded more with France, whereas the opposite
is true for other colonies. The chapter provides a framework to discuss different factors through
which European settlements might have affected the French trade pattern with colonies, namely, the
establishment of formal institutions, the use of common language with Europeans and the duration
of colonization. We find that better formal institutions brought by European settlements had a nega-
tive impact on trade with French colonies, while they promoted French trade with British colonies.
These results are consistent with the extractive nature of French trade relations with its colonies.
As for the use of common language and the duration of colonization, the stronger those ties the
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higher the overall French trade with French colonies but the lower French trade with other colonies
Finally in the last chapter we investigate the relation between the type of goods colonies exported
to France and those economies’ later development. A common explanation for the export-growth
nexus is the quality of institutions established in those colonies during the colonial period. In order
to investigate the impact of colonial trade on current growth through the mediation of institutions,
we apply the Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling. With this method we are able to
simultaneously derive the relative importance of trade and of institutions on growth, while taking
into account multicollinearity between the variables, their measurements errors and small sample
size issues. The results suggest an important joint role for both trade and institutions in determining
economic development in the long run. In particular French colonies who exported raw material
developed extractive institutions, which negatively affected development today, while those who
exported manufactured goods experience better economic performance today. Among British and
other colonies, however, higher exports of both raw materials and of manufactured goods to France
are associated with better institutions, which lead to better economic performance in the long-run.
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Résumé
Cette thèse se compose de trois études empiriques sur le commerce colonial Français. Le pre-
mier chapitre présente une base de données originale sur les statistiques commerciales coloniales
provenant des archives Françaises. Son but principal est de décrire la construction de cet ensemble
de données et de présenter quelques faits stylisés au sujet de la dynamique et de la tendance du com-
merce sectoriel Français avec les colonies françaises et non-françaises, ainsi qu’avec d’autres pays
souverains pour la période étalant de 1880 à la veille de la première guerre mondiale. Les statis-
tiques mettent en évidence un fait stylisé commun du commerce Franco-colonial. En particulier,
le commerce de la France avec ses colonies a été principalement basé sur les importations de pro-
duits de matière première et sur les exportations de produits manufacturés. Cette évidence confirme
que l’Empire colonial a été un débouché principal pour exportations de la France et un réservoir
essentiel de matières premières. Les statistiques montrent également que suite à la colonization des
colonies Françaises, les échanges commerciaux entre la France et ses colonies ont augmenté, tandis
que la colonization de la Grande-Bretagne et des autres métropoles n’a pas affecté le commerce en-
tre la France et colonies Anglaises et Européennes. Le chapitre révèle que le commerce de la France
avec ses colonies ne présentait pas d’avantage comparatif en faveur de ces dernières. Le deuxième
chapitre étudie comment la stratégie coloniale illustrée par le nombre des colons Européens installés
dans les colonies a affecté la structure du commerce Français. On applique un modèle de gravité
dont les résultats montrent que les colonies Françaises ayant plus de colons Français dans leurs ter-
ritoires s’engagent plus dans des relations de commerce avec la France, alors que l’inverse est vrai
pour les autres colonies. Ce chapitre examine en outre des canaux par lesquels l’installation des
colons Européens pourrait avoir affecté les échanges commerciaux entre la France et les colonies:
la mise en place d’institutions formelles, l’utilisation d’un langage commun avec les Européens et
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la longue durée de la colonization. Les résultats montrent que meilleures sont les institutions dans
les colonies Françaises, moins est le commerce avec la France, alors que ces meilleures institutions
facilitent le commerce de la France avec les colonies anglaises. Ces résultats sont cohérents avec
la nature extractive du commerce Franco-colonial. L’utilisation d’un langage commun et la longue
durée de colonization ont un impact positif sur le commerce de la France avec ses colonies, mais
un impact négatif sur le commerce avec les autres colonies. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre, on
étudie la relation entre le type de biens que les colonies exportent vers la France et la croissance
économique ultérieure de ces pays. Une explication commune pour le nexus exportations-croissance
est la qualité des institutions établies dans ces colonies pendant la période coloniale. Afin d’étudier
l’impact du commerce colonial sur la croissance économique par l’intermédiaire des institutions, on
applique l’approche PLS du modèle d’équations structurelles. Grace à cette méthode, nous sommes
en mesure de tirer simultanément l’importance relative et du commerce et des institutions sur la
croissance, tout en tenant compte des problèmes de multicolinéarité entre ces variables, leurs er-
reurs de mesures et des problèmes de taille de petits échantillons. Les résultats évoquent un rôle
commun et important du commerce colonial et de la qualité des institutions en déterminant la crois-
sance économique des pays à long terme. En particulier les colonies françaises qui ont exporté des
matières premières a la France ont développé des institutions extractives, ce qui a affecté négative-
ment leur développement aujourd’hui, tandis que celles qui ont exporté des produits manufacturés
performent mieux économiquement aujourd’hui. Parmi les colonies anglaises et les autres colonies
européennes, les exportations de matières premières et de produits manufacturés vers la France ont
contribué à de meilleures institutions et donc à un meilleur développement économique a long-
terme.
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Introduction
A number of former colonies have struggled to attain high levels of economic development and re-
mained lagging behind other countries. Such disparities were subject to long lasting debates on their
causes. Some explanations attributed them to colonial legacies and what they brought about in terms
of technological advances, human capital (Glaeser et al., 2004), economic exploitation through trade
(Alam, 1994; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Bates and Block, 2010), and, most prominently, institutions
(Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001, 2005). While others attributed those disparities to geo-
biological conditions, initial endowments, and access to natural resources (Engerman and Sokoloff,
1997; Sachs and Warner, 1995).
The explanations mentioned above acknowledge a link between colonial legacies on one hand,
institutions and trade on the other. As a matter of fact, historians report that colonial trade boosted
during the period of colonial expansions by the British and the French (Pakenham, 1992) suggest-
ing that colonial acquisitions had trade motives. Historians further argue that economic exploitation
through trade is associated with the type of institutions introduced by those colonizers. This as-
pect of colonialism had a longstanding influence on current economic disparities among the former
colonies (Acemoglu et al., 2001; 2012 Alam, 1994; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Kwon, 2011;
Lange et al., 2006; Nunn, 2008). However, research on French historical trade statistics prior to
1950 was modest. This was mainly due to the lack of reliable data and to the fact that the focus of
history departments, in most countries, was on social rather than on economic history.
My thesis contributes to the literature by putting together and exploring a new dataset on colonial
French trade that was previously underutilized and only recently is being looked into (Becuwe et
al., 2015), and by investigating the long-term impact of French colonial trade on institutional choice
and economic performance in the former colonies today.
1
Three essays on French colonial trade
In what follows we attempt to highlight the link between colonial French trade patterns, the Eu-
ropeans settlement decisions, and institutions during colonial era and how those factors influenced
economic performance in the colonies today. The thesis also compares French trade patterns with
French colonies to those patterns with other colonies. We finally argue that those factors could par-
tially explain the economic disparities highlighted above. Overall, the conclusions lend support to
the hypothesis that long term economic growth partially depends on institutional colonial legacies
shaped by the trade patterns.
We constructed a new data set with more than 20,000 observations containing information on
the value of French imports and exports with each of its trading partners between 1880 and 1912.
Given the size of the data, the collection and organization of French trade statistics was a challenging
task. The data were collected from "Tableau General du commerce" which is the most complete and
reliable source, as it is the official database of the French Customs. Our data contain information
on the exports and imports of France, dis-aggregated into four sectors: agricultural raw materials,
food, raw material necessary for industry, and manufactured goods.
Throughout the three chapters, this thesis will study French trade patterns with the different
groups of colonies and their key role in institutional and economic development. Our data can
further help economists interested in trade, economic development and early globalization to explore
new questions. We note that some ideas, figures and appendices are repeated across chapters because
each one is a written in the form of a self contained article.
Chapter one provides a comprehensive description on the collection, mining and organization
of French trade statistics. In order to gain some perspective on the French trade patterns with
its various trading partners during the colonial reign, and in an attempt to answer the ambiguity
of whether French colonial trade was solely extractive, this paper presents some stylized facts of
French imports and exports by sector from 1880 until 1912 with French colonies, British colonies,
other colonies, former colonies, European and sovereign non-European countries.
That chapter first describes the data and highlight some quantitative indicators from the statistics
that can give a flavor of whether the nature of trade was extractive or not.
Previous historians tried to understand the impact of colonial trade with France on the colonies.
Jacques Marseilles (1984), for instance, spent a decade and a half trying to dig into the question
of profitability of French colonial policy, concluded that French colonial markets were used as
2
Three essays on French colonial trade
both a buffer to the French trade in times of crisis, and as profitable outlets for French products in
times of expansion. Others argue that European powers viewed their colonies as a way of setting
up trade policies that would favor trade with the metropole (Estevadeordal et al., 2002), ensuring
both favorable and secured markets for trade (Crowder, 1968), expropriating cheap land and labor
(Lenine, 1916), and exploiting natural resources (Alesina, 2002).
More generally, Karl Marx regarded trade as the driving force of mercantilism and imperialism,
and its most visible result, colonialism (Svedberg, 1961). Hobson (1902) and Lenine (1916) sug-
gested that colonization was a mean for the capitalist economies to exploit low wage labor, low cost
land and capital, extracting the full economic profit through the exchange of goods. Furthermore,
Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) argue that, prior to the industrial revolution, colonial acquisi-
tions were continuously sought by imperial powers to complement their growing economies, which
ultimately affected colonial trade.
The opponents of the Marxist theory claim that exploitation could not have been the main rea-
son behind colonization, since the share of colonial trade in the international French markets before
World War I did not exceed 15% (essays from various officials, cited from Marseilles, 1984). How-
ever, the calculation of those percentages does not take into account the size of countries nor their
population, hence only account for the importance of such exchange at the metropolis level but not
at the colony level. Moreover, as Cohen (1968) states, the fact that the empire represented only
a relatively limited source for raw materials and it was not the major recipient of French capital
exports does not prove that expansionism was not motivated by commercial motives.
Our interpretation of those statistics allows us to conclude that, on average, French exports
towards the French colonies grew after the colonization event, whereas colonization did not affect
French trade with other countries. France seem to be the main trading partner of its colonies,
importing their raw agricultural goods and exporting to those colonies their manufactured products.
Statistics also show that the French colonies have a "revealed comparative advantage" in agricultural
goods with France.
Finally, the first chapter of this thesis offers an overview of French trade with each of its trading
partners during the colonial reign, containing many informative figures and stylized facts regarding
French sectoral exports and imports that are compatible -without excluding other explanations- with
Jules Ferry’s extractive policy. Our findings are compatible with those of (Amin, 1971, 1973) and
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(Lavallee Lochard, 2012), who deduced that the French benefited from low-cost imports, especially
agricultural goods, and from some trade agreements that gave large advantages to French exports.
Chapter two explores the idea that colonial trade has been emphasized as one of the main tools
of colonial extraction, while the extraction itself is widely held to have been the driver of coloniza-
tion. European powers established their colonial control by settling in the colonies and exploiting
their resources through trade. This assertion is not new to the literature and can be traced back to
Hobson, Lenin and on down to Marxist thinkers, who regarded trade as the prime cause of imperi-
alist expansion (Kleiman, 1976). French colonization in particular offer a representative example:
French colonizers settled namely in the form of military troops, imposed territorial powers, and set
up trade policies and preferential trade agreements in order to transfer resources from the colony to
themselves and secure favorable markets for their products (Crowder, 1968).
In particular, this second chapter investigates whether the number of European settlers (here-
after ES) in 1900’s in the colonies affected France’s trade values and patterns with those colonies,
as well as whether trade patterns differ if the trading partner were a French colony or other colonies.
Investigating the impact of ES on trade, rather than using just a colonization dummy, may offer new
insights. Colonization as an abstract event cannot be quantified; however, its degree can be measured
through the number of citizens that actually settled in a colony. Settling in their colonies was a way
to concretize colonization. Second, the presence (or absence) of European settlers actually affected
the type of institutions set by the colonial administration and trade patterns of European trading
companies. In some French colonies in Africa, for instance, where production was in the hands of
domestic farmers, European settlers facilitated large companies to lobby the colonial government
and establish a controlled system of marketing based on an oligopoly of firms, and in turn the colo-
nial administration generally supported the activity of trading companies by implementing coercive
institutions (Hopkins, 1973). Differently, in British colonies production was often controlled by the
European settlers who already had a political influence before the colonial government. Hence, the
cost of imposing extractive institutions was higher (Tadei, 2013). Whether production was orga-
nized through small domestic farmers or plantation companies, trade revolved around the activity of
European trading firms whose relation with settlers is necessary. Therefore, colonies with different
levels of settlement were not likely to experience the same degree of control from the empire. The
first part of this chapter hypothesizes that, if the French settled in their colonies for the purpose of
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exploiting their raw materials and using their markets to sell their products, one would expect more
French imports of raw materials and exports of manufactured goods as a result of this settlement.
However, if the British or other Europeans settled in their respective colonies, this would not nec-
essarily increase French imports of other colonies’ raw materials. Those colonies are more likely
to engage in favorable trade with France, that is, trade that is mutually beneficial. Our empirical
investigation was carried on using the same data set on the value of French imports and exports we
have initially constructed.
We find that higher French settlement increased the overall French imports and exports from
French colonies. The impact is stronger with respect to imports of raw materials, suggesting that
French settlements did facilitate the extraction through trade. The British or other European settle-
ments in their respective colonies had a negative impact on the trade of those colonies with France.
The second part of this chapter seeks to identify the channels through which those settlements
impacted French trade patterns with the various groups of colonies. We argue that ES had two
interrelated effects on colonial trade, the first one is related to sharing a common language with
the European settlers and to the duration of colonization. Those two indicators can contribute to
strengthening some networking ties developed through the settlers presence and through the reduc-
tion of transaction cost. For what follows, and for simplicity we will name those two items as
the networking effect. The second effect is related to the type of formal institutions the colonizers
established namely the level of democracy and level of the constraints on the executive.
With respect to the network effect, in a recent study on the causal relationship between migration
and trade, Canavire Bacarreza and Ehrlich (2006) show that the presence of foreign immigrants in
Bolivia and of Bolivian emigrants abroad have positive and significant effects on Bolivian bilateral
trade. A similar argument can be applied to the colonial era. European settlers brought more than
just formal institutions to the New World: they brought informal ones as well in the form of human
and physical capital. Settlers also promoted their language and culture and also got acquainted
with the culture, habits, and traits of the colonies, thereby reducing transaction costs and facilitating
trade.
The other channel we exploit through which ES may impact trade refers to the relation be-
tween ES and the establishment of formal institutions. In their paper on the colonial origins of
development, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (hereafter, AJR) argue that European set-
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tlers established European-style institutions with property rights, checks and accountability for the
governor, and higher levels of democracy. Those institutions persisted and impacted positively the
economic performance of those countries who inherited the "good" institutions. Recent studies, on
their turn, show that a higher quality of institutions exerts significant positive effects on bilateral
trade flows due to the lower transaction cost and higher level of trust they produce (Briant et al.,
2009; De Sousa and Lochard, 2010; De Groot et al. 2004; Linders, 2004).
Combining these two arguments, we claim that the establishment of "good" introduced by the
colonizer would promote favorable trade between the colonizer and the colonies. More specifically,
if, for instance, British settlers introduced good institutions, this would result in favorable trade
between France and British colonies. On the other hand, if French settlements introduced policies
that perpetuated inequality and exploitation, it should increase the level of extractive trade.
We then examine the impact of ES through formal institutions and common language and du-
ration of colonization separately. As argued earlier, common European language and duration of
colonization of the European colonizer are capturing some networking ties, while the formal insti-
tutions are reflected under democracy and constraints of the executive variables. We estimate the
predicted value of ES explained by each of these variables to try and disentangle the part of ES
corresponding to common language and to duration of colonization and the part corresponding to
the formal institutions.
We find that, in French colonies, the worse the formal institutions, the higher the French imports
of raw material and the French exports of manufactured goods from those colonies to France. These
results confirm our hypothesis stated earlier that France was better at exploiting its colonies in the
presence of extractive institutions. On the other hand, higher institutional quality in the British
colonies is associated with higher trade between those colonies and France confirming also that
better formal institutions promote favorable trade in the absence of power imbalance between the
two trading partners.
As for the networking effect (expressed by common language and duration of colonization), we
find that stronger networking between France and its colonies increased French exports and imports
in French colonies, with the highest magnitude attributed to French imports of raw agricultural
goods. In the French colonies, the positive impact of networking effect of ES is complementary to
that of the negative impact of formal institutions in the sense that extractive policies can be more
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easily implemented whenever the colonizer have acquired greater power through longer period of
colonization and sharing some common language. This in turn, would boost extractive trade. We
also find that the longer the British colonized and their respective colonies the more they share a
common language with the indigenous population, the lesser the trade between those colonies and
France.
Chapter three investigates the puzzling phenomenon of "Natural resource curse" that some coun-
tries and regions that specialize in exporting their abundant natural resources and agricultural com-
modities become trapped in their resource advantages, so that such trade have no or even negative
impact on the growth of the country. In particular, we explore the idea that the impact of exports
and the exploitation of natural resources on growth may be mediated by the quality of domestic
institutions introduced during colonial era. Actually, according to Auty (2001), Mikesell (1997)
and Gelb (1988), a negative relation between growth and specialized trade may be the result of the
quality of institutions. A weak governance disables a country to transform its resources into other
productive assets.
In particular, we argue that resource abundant colonies tended to attract extractive institutions
built for the purpose of transferring resources from the colony to the colonizer. Lange et al. (2006)
states that Spain settled in regions rich in minerals and set up complex mercantile systems of mo-
nopolies and trade regulations in order to obtain gold and other valuables; Britain based its decision
to settle (among others) on the natural characteristics of the country that would favor agricultural
production.
To help address this issue, our empirical investigation rests on three premises: First, according
to Sachs and Warner (1995) and to Mehlum et al. (2006), resource abundance is usually associated
with the relative size of primary exports. Empirical evidence provided by Leamer (1984) and Trefler
(1995) confirms that the relative abundance of oil leads to net exports of crude oil and that of coal
and mineral leads to net exports of raw materials. In our empirical analysis, we will study the
colonial exports of primary goods to France, which we argue to be an indicator of the abundance
of natural resources in the colony. Second, there were various types of colonial institutions. At one
extreme, there were the extractive states, which "main purpose was to transfer as much resources
from the colony to the colonizer" (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 2). There were also colonies with
institutions that replicated the European style ones, with constraints and checks over government
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power. In particular, the mix of products that the colonizer imports from the colony is informative
about the type of institutions set by the colonizer. Whenever the colony is rich in raw material, such
as sugar or gold, with potential extraction opportunities, institutions tend to be coercive in order to
facilitate such extraction (Acemoglu et al., 2001). On the contrary, if the country specializes in the
production of manufactures, trade empowers merchants that supported pro-business institutions and
constraints on the executive. Finally, the colonial institutions set during the colonial reign persisted
and had a long-term impact on today’s economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
The relation between French imports from colonies and colonial institutions depend in part on
whether those institutions were necessary to increase the rent extracted from the colonizer through
colonial trade: A negative relation establishes that colonies exporting relatively more to France
developed worse institutions. This result would suggest that the colonizer favors more extractive
institutions to increase the rent from trade. A positive relation, on its turn, would imply that trade
is beneficial to both parties and that good institutions are necessary to increase such trade. For
instance, if domestic merchants and not only the colonizer were gaining from trade with France,
they would push for better institutions.
We apply a new estimation method, namely, Partial Least Square Structural Equation Model-
ing (PLS-SEM), initially proposed by Herman Wold (1966), which is a particular form of Structural
Equation Modeling (SEM). This method, which combines both factor analysis and traditional multi-
variate regression models, has a number of attractive statistical features not present in the traditional
econometric models. In particular, it allows the conduction of several regressions simultaneously
under one model, where the variables used in those regressions could be either observed or unob-
served. This method also deals with multicollinearity issues. Furthermore, this model allows for
comparisons of coefficient results across different groups of colonies and then produces a multi-
group analysis to see whether there are any significant differences among the coefficients of each
colonial group.
We find, at the pooled sample level, that more colonial exports to France, of either primary or
manufactured products, are correlated with better colonial institutions. Moreover, we find that colo-
nial institutions are positively correlated with current institutions, and that better current institutions
are correlated with better economic outcomes. French imports did not have a direct significant im-
pact on economic performance. However, its impact through better institutions was positive and
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significant.
Within the multigroup analysis, we find that, among French colonies, higher colonial exports of
raw material to France is associated with worse colonial institutions, while higher colonial exports
to France of manufactured goods does not affect the type of colonial institutions. These results
confirm the hypothesis that France set up extractive institutions to be able to extract more. Such
impacts are significantly different from the impacts of trade on institutions in British and in other
colonies. Among British colonies, there is no significant effect of French imports on the British
colonial institutions, whereas we find that higher French imports from former/other colonies are
associated with better colonial institutions in those colonies. In all cases, the channel through which
French imports affect current economic performance goes entirely through institutions.
Finally, among the pooled and the colonial group sample, both the indirect effect of colonial in-
stitutions and the direct effect of current institutions on GDP per capita are positive and significant,
meaning that institutions persisted over time and have a positive impact on economic growth. More-
over we quantified the indirect effect of colonial institutions on economic performance through the
channel of current institutions. While using an econometric technique different from the traditional
OLS, our results are still in line with results found in the literature regarding the relation between
institutions and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
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Chapter 1
The French Colonial Trade Patterns:
Facts and Impacts
Abstract
This chapter presents an original database on colonial trade statistics from French archives which
will be explored in empirical studies in the other two chapters of this thesis. Its main purpose is
to describe the construction of this dataset and to present some stylized facts about the pattern and
trend of French sectoral trade with French and non-French colonies, as well as with other sovereign
countries for the period starting in 1880 until the eve of the WWI. We detected some interesting
patterns in our statistics regarding trade of France with its own colonies and with other colonies.
We found that French trade with its colonies was mainly based on imports of primary products
and exports of manufactured goods, which is consistent with the idea that the Empire was used
as the main dispenser of French exports and their main provider of natural resources. Statistics
also indicate that the event of colonization was followed by an increase in trade between France
and its own colonies, while colonization from Britain and other metropolis did not impact trade
between France and those colonies. Finally, French trade with their own colonies was unbalanced
and unidirectional.
1.1 Introduction
"In the area of economics, I am placing before you, with the support of some statistics, the con-
siderations that justify the policy of colonial expansion, as seen from the perspective of a need, felt
more and more urgently by the industrialized population of Europe and especially the people of our
rich and hardworking country of France: the need for exports. [...] Yes, what our major industries
[textiles, etc.], lack more and more are new markets. Why? Because [...] not only are these great
markets (Germany and USA) shrinking, becoming more and more difficult to access, but these great
states are beginning to pour into our own markets products not seen there before. [...] That is an
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extremely serious problem. It is so serious, gentlemen, so acute, that the least informed persons
must already glimpse, foresee, and take precautions against the time when the great South Ameri-
can market that has, in a manner of speaking, belonged to us forever will be disputed and perhaps
taken away from us by North American products. Nothing is more serious; there can be no graver
social problem; and these matters are linked intimately to colonial policy." (Ferry, 1884)
In his speech above, before the chamber of deputies in 1884, Jules Ferry, France prime min-
ister (1880-1881, 1883-1885) lists a variety of reasons for why colonial expansions are necessary
for France. The most prominent one is the need to engage in trade in order to promote their lo-
cal manufactures in new markets. The thrust of his argument was that, while European markets
were becoming harder to access, colonial markets could become a profitable alternative in order for
France to sells its products and to acquire raw materials. He restates the same argument thirty years
later in his speech to the parliament in 1911 "Colonial policy is the "daughter" of industrial policy"
(Brunschwig, 1966, p.80).1
Actually, one infers from Ferry’s speech, that extracting the colonies’ raw materials and se-
curing solvable markets for French products is the real reason behind colonization. To gain some
perspective on the French trade patterns with its various trading partners during the colonial reign, I
constructed a new data set with more than 20,000 observations containing information on the value,
in French Francs, of French imports and exports with each of its trading partners between 1880 and
1912. The data were collected from "Tableau General du commerce" which is the most complete
and reliable database, as is the official data of the French Customs. Our data contain information
on the exports and imports of France, dis-aggregated into four sectors: agricultural raw materials,
food, raw material necessary for industry, and manufactured goods.
The dataset allows the conduction of a comprehensive description of French imports and exports
by sector from 1880 until 1912 with French and non-French colonies as well as with European
and sovereign non-European countries. I compute some trade indicators and derive some stylized
facts from those statistics that help describing the nature of trade between France and its partners.
Through those indicators I try to identify the extractive nature of colonial trade. The main purpose
of this chapter is a descriptive one. The remaining two chapters of the thesis will exploit this dataset
to test the hypothesis that European settlers impacted trade through channels of formal and informal
institutions, as well as whether colonial trade impacted current economic performance through the
1La politique coloniale etait fille de la politique industrielle.
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channel of persisting institutions.
Previous studies, such as Marseilles (1984) and Markovitch (1966) explored French colonial
trade using data on total exports and imports with French colonies (completed with some products).
While more recent studies are also currently exploring French trade statisitics for the same period
(Becuwe et al., 2015). However, the latter studies do not have the bilateral dimension of the trade
data, while the former studies do not have exports and imports data by sector, as in this dataset. The
analysis of those authors could be enriched with our more comprehensive data.
There is an extensive literature on the role of trade in colonization. In particular, Marseilles
(1984) investigated the question of profitability of French colonial policy, and concluded that French
colonial markets were used both as a buffer to the French trade in times of crisis and as profitable
outlets for French products in times of expansion. Others argue that European powers viewed their
colonies as a way of setting up trade policies that would favor trade with the metropolis (Estevade-
ordal et al., 2002), ensuring both favorable and secured markets for trade (Crowder, 1968), expropri-
ating cheap land and labor (Lenine, 1916),2 and exploiting natural resources (Alesina, 2002). The
opponents of this interpretation claim that exploitation could not have been the main reason behind
colonization since the levels of colonial share in the international French markets before World War
I did not exceed 15% (essays from various officials, cited from Marseilles, 1984). However, those
percentages do not take into account the size of the trading partner nor its population, therefore they
reflect the importance of such trade for the metropolis, not the colony. Moreover, as Cohen (1968)
states, the fact that the empire represented only a relatively limited source for raw materials, and
was not to become the major recipient of French capital exports does not prove that expansionism
was not motivated by commercial motives.
Other French officials claim that French colonization was a civilizing mission aiming at cultural,
institutional, and economic transmission to less developed men in the overseas territories (essays
from colonial governors 1914, cited in Marseilles, 1984). Actually, France adopted the policy of
colonial assimilation3 in its colonies "France considered the counties of Papeete and Dakar and
2In his book, Imperialism, supreme stage of capitalism, Lenine criticized France for exercising during the colonial reign "the highest
stages of Capitalism".
3The French Assimilation concept was based on the idea of expanding French culture to the colonies outside France in the 19th
and 20th century. Natives of these colonies were considered French citizens as long as the culture and customs were adopted. This also
meant they would have the rights and duties of French citizens.
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Insulah only as the distant suburbs of Paris" (Betts, 1961, p.32). However, the fact that the groups
advocating imperial expansion were made up predominantly of intellectuals rather than businessmen
does not prove that expansionism was not connected with commercial greed (Cohen, 1968).
Bairoch (1989) states in his book that France did not actually depend on its colonies’ raw materi-
als; the accounts show the other way around: Acquiring a territory incurred more costs then revenues
to the metropolis. According to him, the real reason behind former colonies’ lack of growth today is
because the metropolis spent a lot of easy money on them making them languorous without any in-
centive to industrialize or to grow. However, Huillery (2014) claims that the financial transfers from
the metropolis to French west Africa account for only 0.007 percent of total metropolitan expenses.
On the other hand, Amin (1972) and Lavallée and Lochard (2012) state that the French benefited
from low-cost imports, especially agricultural goods, and from trade agreements that gave large ad-
vantages to French exports. Those papers approached French colonial legacies from different angles
while using different types of data. While (Becuwe et al., 2015), is currently exploiting the same
data, our paper adds to their research project the bilateral dimension that allows us to cover almost
all countries and hence make a comparative analysis of French relations among various groups.
The statistics suggest that, on average, French exports towards the French colonies grew after the
colonization event, whereas such event did not affect French trade with other countries. The French
colonies seem to be the main trading partners of France providing it with the raw agricultural goods
and importing its manufactures. Statistics also show that the French colonies have a "revealed com-
parative advantage" with France in agricultural goods. Our overview of French sectoral exports and
imports with each of its trading partners during the colonial reign reveal trade patterns compatible
-without excluding other explanations- with Jules Ferry’s extractive policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a historical perspective on the link be-
tween colonization and trade. Section 3 explains and describes how the data was constructed. Sec-
tion 4 presents a thorough radiography of the French trade statistics, and the last section concludes.
1.2 Colonization and trade: a historical perspective
Throughout history, it has been known that colonial quests were sought for glory and power
rivalry. Colonial imperialism was not only about economic exploitation but rather about the "rela-
Chapter 1 13
Three essays on French colonial trade
tive importance of the totality of economic concerns and the contending totality of non economic
concerns" (Frieden, 1994, p.562). For instance, Britain may have increased its size, in part, because
it felt threatened – economically, politically, or militarily – by Germany or France’s territorial ac-
quisitions. As a result, France had an urgent desire to become a strong and respected global power
within the "race" among European powers. In less than thirty years, starting from mid 1870’s, most
of Africa was colonized and divided up between the British and the French (Pakenham, 1992). His-
torians have noted that European rivalries were the primary reason why the Great Powers sought
out new colonies during the second half of the nineteenth century (Brunschwig, 1966, Coquery-
Vidrovitch, 1970; Gallagher and Robinson, 1953; Griffiths, 1993). In particular, Brunschwig (1966)
argues that the main motive of French expansionism was the search for national glory, rather than
commercial interests.
However, aside from the geopolitical and ideological reasons that lead to colonization, economic
reasons such as potential investments, search of raw material and extraction of resources have com-
pounded the struggle for new territorial conquests. Karl Marx, for instance, relates colonization to
the relentless search for new markets because of the falling rate of profits, J.A. Hobson to the mald-
istribution of income, and Rosa Luxemburg to the impossibility of a capitalist system to find an
internal market for its products (Griffin and Gurley, 1985).4 It might have been that Ferry’s speech
exalting the commercial advantages of empire building were only meant to appease the business
community and that the underlying reason behind colonization was still political, but "Ferry knew
better" (Brunschwig, 1966). His speeches aimed at showing that, in any case, colonial expansion
exists because France needed a commercial outlet, and in order to meet the imperialist objective,
one had to engage in trade as a "true, wise and economical policy".
As a matter of fact, the Marxist paradigm has traditionally regarded trade as the driving force of
mercantilism and imperialism, and, its most visible result, colonialism (Svedberg, 1961). Hobson
(1902) and Lenin (1916) suggested that capitalist economies used coercive means in order exploit
low wage labor, low cost plant and capital, to extract the full economic rent from the exchange of
goods and capital. This is only applicable in the case of a dependency, hence the urge to colonize.
4Karl Marx was a German philosopher, economist, sociologist, historian, journalist, and revolutionary socialist; J.A. Hobson an
English economist and critic of imperialism; and Rosa Luxembourg was a Marxist theorist, philosopher, economist and revolutionary
socialist of Polish Jewish descent.
Chapter 1 14
Three essays on French colonial trade
By colonizing, the metropoles become a form of a monopoly gaining complete guarantee against all
contingencies in the struggle against competitors and securing favorable markets for their products
to export to under-developed countries. However, in the presence of some internal democracies
within the colonies, full exploitation becomes difficult, and a legitimate way to extract resources
would be through trade. Betts (1961) and Kwon (2011), also relate the expansion of imperial control
to mercantile economic policies, which led to demands for formal political control.
Furthermore, Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) argue that, prior to the industrial revolution,
colonial acquisitions were continuously sought by imperial powers to complement their growing
economies, which ultimately affected colonial trade. Hilferding (1970) also found that colonial
acquisitions expand the national territorial customs leading to a full domination of the financial
capital by excluding any other country from this privilege; Profits will increase and flow solely to
the metropolis. Let us consider few examples. Exports boomed in French West Africa—namely,
in Senegal and the Ivory Coast—between 1897 and 1913. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast
increased by a factor of six in twenty years (Frieden, 2006), as colonial imports of European man-
ufacturers grew. In Indochina (which was under French colonial regime), the area of cultivated
land dramatically increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world
(Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008). The same applies in Algeria, as noted by Louis Faidherbe5:
"In Algeria and Senegal the aim is the same, to dominate the country at as low cost as possible and
through commerce get the highest advantages".
In other colonial territories, Lange et al. (2006) states that Spain settled in regions rich in
mineral wealth and set up complex mercantile systems of monopolies and trade regulations in order
to obtain gold and other valuables; Britain based its decision to settle (among others), on the natural
characteristics of the country that would favor agricultural production. The Belgian colonizers in
the Democratic Republic of Congo transferred many of the colony’s resources to their homeland.
Between 1905 and 1914, 50% of French Dahomey GDP was extracted by the French (Manning,
1982).
Colonial trade was not only the result of extraction, though. A colony’s tendency to trade
with its empire might have been driven by preferential treatments or comparative advantages for
5French general and colonial administrator. He created the Senegalese Tirailleurs when he was governor of Senegal.
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some products favoring such trade, even in the absence of colonial domination. For instance, the
existence, between colonies and the metropolitan country, of some longstanding commercial and
banking connections would make trade more likely between the colony and the metropolis rather
than between the colony and another partner. Indeed, Robinson and Gallagher (1961) state that the
period of British expansion after 1870 represents an essential continuity to the earlier mid-Victorian
era, which was characterized by a belief in the benefits of free trade, and by a conviction that British
informal influence would secure these economic benefits at the lowest possible cost for the British
government. British leaders throughout the nineteenth century thus held the conviction that the gov-
ernment was responsible to intervene in imperial matters only when it was necessary to safeguard
the empire of free trade. Bauer (1976, p.149) also wrote "the establishment of colonial rule in Africa
and Asia has promoted and not retarded material progress [...] the colonial governments encouraged
the inflow of external resources, technical skills and capital."
With our data, we try to build a comprehensive overview of the relation between colonization
and trade. One interesting feature of our data set is that it allows comparing the trade patterns of
France with its own colonies to the other colonial groups. The trend and type of goods traded might
help us understand the nature of colonial trade. For example, if British colonies traded with France,
this indicates that, regardless whether they were forced or not to trade with their own empire, they
were also allowed to engage in favorable trade with external partners such as France.
1.3 Data Construction
In order to have a comprehensive overview of French trade statistics, we constructed a detailed
and new database of annual French sectoral trade from French statistical primary sources. In par-
ticular, we relied on numerous volumes of the "Tableau Général du commerce de la France", the
"Tableau décennal du commerce de la France" and "Annuaire Statistique de la France". The data
include more than 20,000 observations of French bilateral imports and exports from 1880 to 1912
for three main sectors: agricultural raw material, raw materials necessary for industry and manufac-
tured goods. The cross section includes a total of 118 countries, constituted of 27 French colonies,
37 British colonies, 17 other colonies, 17 former colonies, 4 countries that are not European and
were never colonized, and 16 European countries. Table 1.1 presents the names of the countries
included in each colonial group as they are re-partitioned in the year 1900. We chose this year as an
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example since most colonies were acquired by their empires by that period.
The three sectors as originally presented in the primary sources were registered in French as:
"objets d’alimentation, Matières necessaires à l’industrie, and objets fabriqués". When translating
into English, we named the first sector as food products for the exports, and as agricultural raw
material for the imports. We decided to name the sector differently for exports and for imports to
better reflect their content: France’s exports of "objets d’alimentation" consisted mainly of food
products produced in France such as flour, refined sugar, wine among others, while its imports
consisted of agricultural raw material such as corn, wheat, vegetables and fruits. The other two
sectors were translated as raw material for industry and manufactured goods, respectively.
In the "Tableau du commerce général", two values of trade were reported for each observation,
the "commerce général" and the "commerce spécial". The former is the value registered at arrival of
the merchandise and the latter is the portion of that value that enters the country for consumption.
So we use the latter "commerce special", since we would like to exclude the trade that does not enter
the French territory for domestic consumption.6
We chose to start our sample in 1880 because trade, along with colonial quests of the second
French empire, grew substantially starting on 1878. Actually, many historians state that, starting on
1880, French colonial expansion began to grow rapidly and trade figures grew dramatically while
before that year trade was still marginal. In less than 30 years colonial territories jumped from 0.9
millions Square Kilometer to 12 millions Square Kilometer with a population increase from 3 to
50 million (Lenine, 1917; Marseilles, 1984; Bairoch, 1989). This justifies our choice of starting
our sample in 1880 and not before. We stopped one year prior to the beginning of the war because
values of trade in the "tableau général" during those years are discontinuous, with a lot of missing
data.
The trade data as collected from the original source were aggregated by country, colonial group
and geographical region, wherein some countries had different names and borders than nowadays,
and regions comprised groups of countries. The European countries, are all recorded individually,
except for two divisions and one aggregation we had to apply: "Pays bas" that we divided into
Luxembourg and Netherlands, "possessions anglaises de la mediterranee" that were divided into
6Note that difference is not significant in value.
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Gibraltar and Malta, and "mer baltique", "mer blanche" et "mer noire" that we added into Russia.
Europe was also subject to the creation of new countries throughout the sample, namely Bulgaria
(1898), Serbia, Montenegro (1905), and Ireland (1906). Those countries were omitted from our
sample in order to keep the data as balanced as possible.
With respect to the other countries that were part of a region in our original data, we dis-
aggregated the trade value of each region to assign values to specific countries using as weights
the data on population from Mitchell (2007) and Madison (2005). Alternatively, we have also per-
formed the dis-aggregation weighting the values using arable land area from Nunn (2009). The
values on trade for each country using the two different weights were not very different from each
other. We chose to report here the results with the data we constructed using population as weight.
The regions were divided in terms of colonial possessions and geographical location. Note
that, since the composition of colonial possessions changed over time, we had to repeat the dis-
aggregation procedure on a year by year basis as countries were either included or excluded in the
groupings of the original data. We managed to conduct the dis-aggregation as accurately as possible,
making sure that all countries were accounted for without misplacing any country under the wrong
region in any given year. Moreover, in the original data, the countries were grouped in a way that we
cannot mix a French colony in the American continent with a British colony in the same continent.
For example, the American continent is divided in the following manner: Individual countries were
USA, Mexico, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nouvelle Grenade, Venezuala, Brazil, Uruguay,
Argentina, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chili, and the sub-groups were "colonies Anglaises des Antilles",
"colonies Espagnoles des antilles", and "colonies Hollandaises des Antilles". The African continent
contains the following regions: "Etats Barbesques" which were divided into Libya, Tunisia and Mo-
rocco, "Côte Occidentale du Maroc au Cap de la bonne-esperance", reflecting the western coast of
Africa, "Colonies anglaises: Partie Occidentale" and "Colonies anglaises: Partie Orientale (y com-
pris l’ile Maurice)", and "autres pays". For instance, the name of the sub-group "Colonies anglaises:
Partie Orientale (y compris l’ile Maurice)" is geographically and historically self explanatory which
makes it easier for us to divide it into the following countries: Malawi, Tanzania, Kenya, Soma-
lia, Uganda, Sudan and Mauritius. The French colonies were grouped separately and contained
both individual countries like Algeria, Guadeloupe, Martinique, and sub-groups like "Etablisse-
ments Francais dans l’Inde", "Nouvelle Caledonie", "Cochinchine et Tonkin", "Senegal et Golfe
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du Guinée". The sub-groups were dis-aggregated based on the geographical location indicated by
their names. If, in some cases, an African country was already considered an unofficial possession
of the French empire (hence, cannot go under the sub-group of Western African coast excluding
French possessions of the African continent) but not yet an official colony, (hence, it cannot go un-
der the group of French colonies), its share of trade would go under the region called "other African
Countries".
It is worth noting that Lavallée and Lochard (2012) constructed a sample of former French,
British and Other colonies which matches with ours, i.e. Belgium colonies (Burundi, Congo,
Rwanda), Netherlands colonies (Indonesia, Suriname, Netherlands Antilles), Portugal colonies (An-
gola, cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe) French equatorial Africa
(Gabon, Republic of Congo, Central African republic, Chad), which is in line with our construction
procedure. Table A.1 in the appendix presents the dis-aggregation of the countries from the group
level to the individual level for the year 1880 as an example.
Additionally, the time frame of our data falls during the Empire’s expansions, hence the political
statuses of some countries changed over time as new colonies were being acquired. In that case,
countries would change their placement within the sample from one region to another depending
on whether they had become a colony or not, or depending on any other geopolitical change that
they may had been subject to.7 Therefore, in order to take into account, on a yearly basis, those
political and historical events (i.e. colonization, independence, creation of a nation, new groups
entering the sample), we constructed 3 new variables describing the status of the country: the name
of the colonizer, the year of colonization, and the year of independence. Each country’s history
was studied carefully throughout colonization periods and was attributed a dummy variable in the
data set reflecting whether the country was a French, British, other, former colony, non-European
or European country.8
The colonial dummies were constructed based on the Geo CEPII data from Mayer and Zignago
(2011) who made available a large historical data set about colonial reigns transmissions. For the
dates of colonization, we collected information from various historical sources. We defined the year
7Merger or split of countries, or the creation or destruction of countries.
8Table A.1 in the appendix also put forward those political statuses.
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of colonization as the year the colonizer officially established the colony, not the year he acquired
the land. In addition, we considered the year of independence of the colony, to be the year of decol-
onization from the colonizer, not the year where civil or other conflicts ended. If many colonizers
established colonies in the same area, we considered only the most recent one (if established before
1880); otherwise, the colonizers changed from 1880 to 1912 so will the colonial dummy for the
country.
Let us take one illustrative example to understand how some countries move from one section
to another according to the political changes. Mauritania, up until 1895, the year of its colonization
by the French, was part of the sub-group "Western coast of Africa from Morocco to Cap de Bonne
Esperance" (translated by the author). In 1895, this country shifted to French colonies group under
the subcategory of "Senegal et Etablissement Français du golfe du Guinée". Guinea in 1890, Ivory
coast in 1889, Benin in 1892, Gabon in 1885, Congo in 1903, moved from the same African sub-
group to the group of French colonies each under its correspondent subcategory. The same applies
for the British and other colonies and for countries that acquired independence during the sample
period. It is worth noting that whenever French or English colonies are removed from the region of
African west coast, a decrease in the value of trade in this category is paralleled with an increase in
the value of trade in the categories of containing French or other possessions. This gives us insight
that trade was mainly higher with a country that belonged to an empire rather than with indepen-
dent countries. Such insight was empirically confirmed in the results of a paper by Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2008).
Time series analysis requires work on values expressed in constant francs. The INSEE has
published an index of prices for the period 1880 until 1938 in ”Annuaire Statistique de la France,
issue (1966)”. This index, computed from gross prices of 45 products (base 100 in Francs of 1914),
is not the perfect deflator, it actually reflects the average national and imported products. We note
that the share of those two is highly volatile depending on the year and the basket of goods used in
that index, so it does not fully reflect the goods traded in some years. In spite of its limitations, this
is the only available index for that period, hence we use it to deflate our exports and imports.9
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Data Description
In order to accurately describe our data, we made a deep investigation and tried to collect the prod-
ucts traded between France and its trading partners during that period from both Marseilles (1984)
and Markovitch (1966). Taking a closer look at the products constituting each of the three sectors,
we notice that the sectoral division is wide making it less representative of the actual products traded
within each sector. Also, products traded under one sector may not be the same depending on the
identity of the country of origin or of destination. For instance, as mentioned above, the French
exported mainly food products to their colonies (flour, wine, oil) while they mainly imported from
them agricultural raw materials (i.e., wheat, sugar, fruits). In fact, French exports of food account
for more than 80% of French total exports to their colonies (Marseilles, 1984). In the original
dataset, both food and agricultural raw material were reported under the same sector. The raw
materials necessary for industry consist of mining products such as gold, cobalt, phosphate, iron,
wood, and wool. The manufactured goods exported to the colonies consisted of low value products
such as wooden products, while the exchange with the European countries of high value products
such as jewllery and cars, among others. Finally, we were able to differentiate French trade with its
colonies compared to trade with the European countries. We retrieved the following (translated by
the author):
French Exports to their colonies:
• Food: Wheat flour, refined sugar, wine, peanut oil.
Table 1.1: Countries by colonial group
French Colonies British Colonies Other Colonies Former Colonies Non-European Countries European Countries
Algeria, Benin, Burkina
Fasso, Cambodia, Central
African Republic, Chad,
Congo, French Guiana,
French Polynesia, Gabon,
Guadeloupe, Guinea, Ivory
Coast, Laos, Madagascar,
Mali, Martinique,
Mauritania, New Caledonia,
Vanuatu, Niger, Reunion, St
Pierre and Miquelon,
Senegal, Vietnam, Morocco,
and Tunisia
Antigua and Barbuda,
Australia, Bahamas,
Bangladesh, Barbados,
Botswana, Virgin Islands,
Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji,
Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica,
Kenya, Malawi, Malta,
Mauritius, Myanmar, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan,
Saint Lucia, Sierra Leone,
Solomon Islands, Somalia,
South Africa, Sudan,
Tanzania, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uganda, Zambia,
Zimbabwe, Egypt, and India
Angola, Aruba,
Cameroon, Cuba,
DR Congo,
Equatorial Guinea,
Guinea Bissau,
Indonesia,
Mozambique,
Namibia,
Philippines, Puerto
Ricco, Sao Tome and
Principe, Suriname,
Togo, Virgin Islands
(US), and Western
Sahara
Argentina, Bolivia,
Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica,
Dominican
Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti,
Honduras, Mexico,
Peru, USA, Uruguay,
and Venezuela
Turkey, Japan Thailand and
China
Denmark, Belgium,
Russia, Switzerland,
Germany, Italy,
Portugal, Greece,
Romania, United
Kingdom,
Netherlands,
Luxembourg,
Sweden, Spain,
Austria, and Norway
9The index had been used also by Marseilles to deflate his data.
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• Manufactured goods:
1. Textile: Silk fabric, wool, cotton clothes and linen, leather fabric.
2. Metals industry: Iron and steel, machinery and mechanical, carroseries and automobiles,
metallic tools, and articles, paper, soap, chemicals (drugs), tires, cement and candles.
French Imports from their colonies:
• Agricultural raw materials: Grain and rice, cattle, sugar, oil seeds and peanuts, olive oil, palm
oil and palm kernel oil, cocoa, coffee, tea pepper and vanilla.
• Food: wine and alcohol, dry and fresh vegetables, eggs, fruits.
• Raw material necessary for industry:
1. Minerals: Phosphate, iron, ore, tin, nickel, cobalt, lead, copper, zinc.
2. Energy sources: Coal and oil.
3. Textile rawmaterials: Wool, silk, silk wads, cotton, hides and furs, raw wood and rubber.
France exports to European countries:
• Food: Wine, sugar, oil, fruit, salt marshes, molasses, refined sugar.
• Raw material necessary for industry: Iron, steel.
• Manufactured goods: Clothes, paper, glass, crystal, clothing, thistles, brandy, liqueurs hides,
linen or hemp skins prepared articles (tabletterie brush), fabrics, dressed skins, chemicals,
jewelry, paper, watches, collectible articles, musical instrument, wood extracts.
French Imports from European countries:
• Food: cereals, oil seeds, ice, fish
• Raw material necessary for industry: Silk floss rawhide potassium, copper, tar (asphalt), drill,
wood oats, coal.
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• Manufactured good: Skin fabric, jewelry, beer, cardboard, machine tools, metal, pottery,
industry’s meat smoking section, scotched flax, and tow work, rubber, cotton wool, fabric,
coffee, bitumen, straw hat.10
Our database includes bilateral exports and imports covering a large and comprehensive set of coun-
tries on an annual basis. It accounts not only for the total trade values, but is also dis-aggregated
into four sectors: agricultural goods, food, raw materials for industry and manufactured goods. It
contains information on 98 colonies, which includes most existing colonies during the focal time pe-
riod; all have identified colonial status. This detailed and comprehensive data allows comparing the
pattern of French trade with their own colonies, British colonies, other colonies (including German,
Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese), former colonies, European and non-European countries.
1.4 French Trade patterns
1.4.1 Impact of Colonization Event on French Trade
We start by investigating whether the event of colonization impacted trade of France with the dif-
ferent groups of colonies. To that end, let us take a closer look at the evolution of trade between
colonial groups (French, British, and other colonies) and France five years prior to and five year af-
ter the colonization event. The vertical axis in the graphs of Figure 1.1 represents the trade volumes,
whereas the horizontal axis represents time, as set in relation to the year of colonization (i.e. zero
corresponds to the year of colonization, -1 corresponds to one year prior to it, and so on). Figures
1.1a, 1.1b, and 1.1c depict the evolution of imports and exports computed as the average of, re-
spectively, nine French colonies that were acquired between 1885 and 1912, eight British colonies
acquired within roughly the same period, and three colonies from other Empires being one Spanish,
one German and one Belgian. Those figures will give us an insight on whether colonization event
10
"A l’exportation de la France, nous avons retenu 19 articles:
Produits alimentaires: la farine de froment, les sucres raffinés, les vins, l’huile d’arachide. Produits textiles, manufacturés: les tissues
de soie, de laine, de cotton, les vetements et lingerie, les ouvrages en peau et en cuir. Produits en metaux manufacturés: les fer et aciers,
machines et mecaniques, carosseries et automobile, outils et ouvrages en metaux. Produits manufacturés: papiers, applications, savons,
produits chimiques, pneumatiques, ciment et bougies.
A l’importation 32 articles sont retenus:
Matieres premieres agricoles: cereales, riz, vins et alcool, legumes frais et secs, oeufs, fruits de table, bestiaux, sucres, graines
oleagineuses, et arachides, huile d’olive, huile de palme amande de palmiste, cacao, cafe, the, poivre et vanille. Matieres premieres
minieres: phosphate, minerais de fer, etain, nickel, et cobalt, plomb, cuivre et zinc. Sources d’energie: houille et petrole. Matieres
premieres textiles: laines soie et bourres de soie coton, peaux et pelleteries brutes, bois et caoutchouc" (Marseilles, 1984, p.56).
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affected the trade relation between France and those countries. We note, however, that this picture
is not comprehensive in describing whether colonization event affected trade with all the colonies,
since some countries were colonized prior to the beginning of our sample and others after the last
year available in our sample, hence not included in the graphs.
Figure 1.1(a) shows that, within the five years following colonization, French exports to French
colonies were three times greater for manufactured goods and two time greater for food products. As
for the French imports from their colonies, the value of raw agricultural goods did not increase much
during the first four years after colonization, but doubled during the 5th year. The figure also shows
that imports of raw material for industry from French colonies had been progressively decreasing by
a ratio of two third over the five years prior to colonization. At the event of colonization, they started
to increase again, rising above their original value on the fourth year of colonization. Interestingly,
those figures are in accordance with the widespread idea that the main reasons behind colonial
expansions were economic exploitation (through imports) and the use of colonial markets as an
additional outlet to dispense their own products (through exports).
For instance, cocoa exports boomed in the Gold Coast and timber exports from the Ivory Coast
multiplied by a factor of six precisely in in the last twenty years of the nineteenth century, which was
the period of the largest expansion of colonialism (Frieden, 2006). Also, in Indochina (under the
French colonial regime), the land under cultivation dramatically increased, allowing it to become
the third largest producer of rice in the world. Upon colonization, colonies that had manufacturing
ambitions were forced to switch to primary production (Lenine, 1971).
In accordance to our findings, Lenine (1917) explains in his book that colonial expansions took
place precisely when monopolies started to develop in Europe. "It is precisely after that period
that the tremendous “boom” in colonial conquests began, and that the struggle for the territorial
division of the world becomes extraordinarily sharp" (Lenin, 1917, p. 26). The partition of the
world became clear by 1900 as the need of external markets became evident. Once the core capitalist
markets in Western Europe could no longer absorb the output of the European countries, they had
to secure foreign markets, through either colonial expansion or economic domination. By that time,
cartels11 started to develop, dividing the markets among themselves, fixing the quantity of goods to
11Cartel is an association of manufacturers or suppliers with the purpose of maintaining prices at a high level and restricting com-
petition. Historically, it is defined as a coalition or cooperative arrangement between political parties intended to promote a mutual
interest.
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be produced, the prices, and the profits among the various enterprises.
Those stylized facts are compatible with the view that French colonial conquests had an impact
on French trade with those colonies acquired. Interestingly enough, British colonization had no
impact on the bilateral trade relations between British colonies and France as shown in Figure
1.1(b). One can infer from this result that the British were flexible allowing their colonies to continue
trading with France as they used to before the event of colonization. Moreover, we notice that for
the German, Spanish and Belgian colonies, the trade, if any, of their newly acquired colonies with
France decreased to almost null, as shown in Figure 1.1(c). This is an indicator that their colonizer
has deviated their trade away from France, towards empire colony trade. One explanation to this
is that colonial expansions gave some sort of authority to the colonizer to bias trade towards its
own colonies. Actually, metropolitan countries had the power to control the flow of goods traded
into their colonies. Some colonial powers used (or abused) this power to bias trade towards those
colonies, some others pursued a more liberal policy.
1.4.2 French Exports and Imports
In this section we will describe the evolution of French trade with the different groups of countries.
From the statistics of total French trade, we have that the share of trade with French, British, other
and former colonies in the total French trade did not exceed 20%. The share of trade with Europe,
on its turn, was much higher, accounting for about 70% of total French trade and making of those
countries the main trading partners of France. In this session we are interested in highlighting the
importance of trade with France from the point of view of the economy of the partner country. Even
though trade of France with colonies was much smaller than with European countries, it is likely
that the economic importance of that trade was greater for the colonies, which were poorer, than for
the richer European countries. Hence, for the statistics presented in this section, we computed, for
each partner country, their per capita trade with France, thereby using population size as a proxy for
the partner country’s economic size.
Table 1.2 presents some descriptive statistics of the average French exports and imports per
capita to five different groups of countries: French, British, Other and former colonies and to Eu-
rope. Those figures report the trade per capita for each group, rather than total trade, emphasizing
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in a way the trade intensity from the partner country’s perspective, rather than total values between
France and each of her trading partners. The use of trade per capita also eliminates the bias result-
ing from: the uneven number of countries present in each group (i.e. Europe contains 16 countries
whereas British colonies 37), and the uneven size of each country in each group (i.e. Germany’s
population was around 50,000,000 in year 1913 whereas Benin’s population was around 500,000
around the same year). However, it is important to keep in mind that these shares should be inter-
preted as the relative importance of trade with France for the economy of the trading partner.
The statistics in the table show that, on average, the highest level of per capita trade is for French
colonies, , with a stable and low coefficient of variation not exceeding the 25%. Moreover, French
per capita imports of primary products from French colonies have the highest mean value with
a coefficient of variation between 30 and 40%. The coefficient of variation of trade with French
colonies is not volatile and low in magnitude, indicating that France traded with all the countries
within its empire roughly equally. The share of average French trade per capita with Europe and
with other colonies is lower in magnitude than the one with French colonies, and shows a higher
coefficient of variation for most sectors, meaning that French trade with other groups was more
volatile. France might have been trading a lot with one country in a certain colonial group and not
at all with another country belonging to the same group. Trade was mainly country oriented rather
than colonial group oriented.
Figures 1.2, 1.4 and 1.6 also depict the values of the average exports and imports per capita
between France and different groups of trading partners for each of the four sectors. Figures 1.3,
1.5, and 1.6, on their turn, represent the percentage share for each trading partner in the total French
trade, all measured as imports and exports per capita. Just like the interpretation in the table above,
these shares should be interpreted as the relative importance of trade with France for the economy
of the trading partner.
In a first visual inspection, we notice that the average bilateral imports and exports per capita
between France and its colonies are the highest for most of the sectors compared to the trade with
other partners. This means that trade with France is more important for the economies of French
colonies compared to the other groups of countries. This is particularly true for exports and imports
of food products and agricultural raw material, as shown in Figures 1.2 and 1.3.The share of per
capita French exports of Food products to French colonies, in Figure 1.3, is over 80%, meaning that
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trade was relatively much more important for the economies of those colonies compared to the other
groups of countries. French imports of Agricultural Raw material from its colonies, in Figure 1.3,
were even more important for the French colonies in relation to the other countries, given that their
shares are even higher.
As Figures 1.4 and 1.5 highlight, the relative share of French imports of raw material necessary
for industry is more important for the French colonies compared to the other groups of colonies.
The share of per capita French imports of metal, textile and energy (coal and oil), and raw materials
necessary for industry from its colonies is around 70%. This percentage also depicts the relative
importance of those French imports to the economies of French colonies compared to the other
colonies. We note that mining industries founded in the French colonies reached a share of 42% of
the total industries founded in those colonies (Marseilles, 1984). This is consistent with the increase
of the share of per capita French imports of raw materials for industry from French colonies from
30% in 1887 to 70% in 1894-5 as shown in figure 1.5. The trade of raw material necessary for
industry was also important for European countries and former colonies economies, whose share of
per capita French imports of those materials ranged between 20% and 30%. While French exports of
raw material for industry were low in general, they were mainly relatively important to Europe with
a share of per capita exports of 60%. This important share to the European economies coincides
with the shift of Europe towards manufactures.
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 illustrate, respectively the average per capita value and the percentage share
of French bilateral exports and imports of manufactured goods. We notice that French exports of
manufactured goods to French colonies account for 80% of French total exports of manufactured
goods, in per capita terms. Indeed, by mid 1890’s, France main dispenser of its manufactures was its
own colonies and the statistics show the relative importance of such exports to the French colonies.
Regarding per capita imports of manufactured goods, Figures 1.6 and 1.7 show that their values
are low compared to the other sectors, with the highest average share attributed to Europe (50%)
followed by the French colonies (40%). Such low per capita values mean that the French imports
of manufactured goods from French colonies were not important for those colonies’ economies.
Note that the French imports of manufactured goods from Europe consisted of jewelry, machine
tools, metal, pottery, automobiles, while those from the colonies of lower value manufactures such
as clothing and wood material among others.
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Finally, Figure 1.8 shows the average repartition of French trade by sectors and colonial groups.
Similar to the results above, we see that on average, the most important exchanges between France
and its colonies, with respect to those colonies economies, are French imports of raw material
and exports of food and manufactured goods. Those figures can relate to a very common theory,
namely, the one of complementarity (Lenin, 1917, p): ”In order for the colonizer to pursue his
objective of trade, the economies of colonies must be complementary to the industrial economies
of the imperial powers. That is, colonies must eliminate their manufactures and specialize in the
production of primary goods to export them. The returns from those exports should finance the
imports of manufactured imported from the colonizers’ countries. Usually this complementarity is
forced in a power relation.”
Commenting on the yearly increase of the percentage share of per capita French imports of
raw material necessary for industry from French colonies as described earlier in Figures 1.4 and
1.5, the "Annuaire statistique de la France" also highlights a shift in the domestic production of
France from agriculture to manufactures. Actually, the shift from primary to industrial production
in France, which occurred around the 1880’s during of French colonial expansion, is paralleled by
an increase in the share of French imports of raw agricultural and raw industrial material from their
colonies. Such increase is explained by the metropolis need for raw material in order to increase
its production. Moreover, according to Marseilles (1984), the French empire rose to the second
largest trading partner of France between 1902 and 1908. Starting from the late conquests until the
eve of the first world war, the empire was in the forefront of France trading partners justifying the
hopes of Jules Ferry12 that colonial policy was the daughter of industrial policy. Those findings are
also in accordance with the argument of Svedberg (1961) that the more capitalism is developed, the
more strongly the shortage of raw material is felt, the more intense the competition and the hunt for
sources of those raw material throughout the whole world, the more desperate the struggle for the
acquisition of colonies.
Crowder (1968) also argued that, in order to be able to extract as much as possible from their
colonies, the French developed a system that allowed them to exercise unchallenged control over
their new acquisitions. Furthermore, the high share of manufactured exports towards the colonial
12France prime minister (1880-1881, 1883-1885), as mentioned earlier in the introduction
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market explains the role played by this market during the economic crisis as a “compensator and
amortizer”. Bouteville (1913, p...) wrote: ”As a whole, our colonies are no longer a burden to
the metropolis but a source of profit which importance increases each year. Since 1898 the general
trade of our possessions has continued to develop in a consistent way. This commercial and in-
dustrial activity must be put in forward in order to justify a posteriori the work (conquests) already
accomplished." (translated by the author)
1.4.3 French Trade Patterns Indicators
The previous section highlights some interesting features: France’s trade with its own colonies
reports highest shares of (i) average per capita imports of raw agricultural material, and of (ii) av-
erage per capita exports of manufactured goods, emphasizing the importance of such trade to those
colonies economies. Also, we observe an increasing trend in the Franco-colonial trade after French
colonization, but we do not observe any increase in the trade between France other colonial groups
in the aftermath of colonization from Britain or other metropolis. In fact, the prevailing view in
the economic history literature is that the French applied coercive labor policies to exploit their
colonies, bias production towards primary products, depress wages, and create monopolies to ex-
tract all rent from trade (Tadei, 2013). Louis Faidherbe, a French general, colonial administrator
and governor of Senegal wrote that the function of the French officials was "to maintain tranquility
so that the natives could work and produce, and so that the French could get the highest advantages
from commerce at as low cost as possible" The governors were entrusted with the safety and tran-
quility of the circles and instructed to make sure that the inhabitants of their territory demonstrated
the fidelity and obedience that they owed France (Cohen, 1971).
Marseilles (1984), who concentrated on roughly the same period but looking only at the trade
relations between France and its empire, similarly claims that France applied extractive policies
and used the colonial market to dispense its manufactured products. In order to further explore
trade patterns between France and her trading partners, we calculate some trade indicators that will
help us understand some trade features and whether those features are in accordance with the above
claims about the nature of French colonial trade. For the statistics presented in this section, we use
again the total trade with France to compute the economic indicators.
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Balassa Revealed Comparative Advantage
The revealed comparative advantage index, developed by Balassa (1965), is an index that captures
the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country in a certain product or class of products
or services as evidenced by trade flows. Initially, the revealed comparative advantage index is
computed as the ratio of the share of exports of country i in sector s to the share of the world’s
exports in sector s. Since we do not have data on world trade, we can only compute the ratio of the
share of exports of each colonial group in sector s to France to the share of the world’s exports
in sector s to France. Hence, we can only measure the revealed comparative advantage of each
colonial group as a measure of their economy’s specialization in a specific sector with respect to
trade with France, and not to the world. We denote this index RCAF , and we compute it as follows:
RCAF =
(exisFR/EXiFR)
(exsFR/EXFR)
(1.1)
where exisFR denotes exports to France in sector s, where s ∈ {agricultural raw material, raw ma-
terial for industry, manufactured goods}, from a group of countries i, i ∈ {French colonies, British
colonies, Other colonies, Former colonies, Non Europe, Europe}. EXiFR denotes total exports from
group i to France. The numerator constitutes the share of exports in sector s from group i to France,
and is divided by exsFR/EXFR which represents the share of exports from all countries in sector s to
France. Figure 1.9 shows, for each of the three sectors, the RCAF with respect to trade with France
for French, British, Other, and Former colonies and Europe.
With respect to trade with France, the French colonies had a comparative advantage in raw agri-
cultural material, with an RCAF steadily above 2 for the whole period. It is worth noting that the
RCAF of French colonies in agricultural sector is overestimated compared to the RCA computed
with respect to world trade since, according to other sources, French colonies exports of agricul-
tural goods to France exceeded 80% of their world exports in that sector (Marseilles, 1984 and
Markovtich, 1966). We can infer from the above that the share of exports of French colonies to
France in agricultural raw material (the numerator in our RCA) is close to that share with respect to
world trade (the numerator in the world RCA), which is not the case for our denominator.13
13This does not hold for the RCAF for other and British colonies, since the share of exports in a certain sector with respect to France
is not similar to that share with respect to world trade. Those colonies might trade more with their own metropolis in a particular sector.
However we do not have data to confirm or reject this assertion.
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The RCAF of French colonies of raw material for industry is slightly below 1 whereas the one
for manufactures is almost zero. The RCAF values could simply reflect that French colonies had
a comparative advantage in primary agriculture due to low labor cost and availability of land, but
could also mean that the French colonizer was exploiting those colonies. Unfortunately, the infor-
mation generated from RCAF values does not exclusively confirm nor refute that France exploited
their colonies’ agricultural and natural resources by importing all their raw material.
However, historically, scholars favor the theory of exploitation rather than that of comparative
advantage: Lenin (1971) states that colonizers exploit under-developed countries, because profits
are usually high, capital is scarce, the price of land is relatively low, wages are low, and rawmaterials
are cheap. Alam (1994) also states that colonizers usually impose a high level of imperial control in
order to offset the costs generated from low labor productivity especially in land-scarce countries.
Moreover, land scarcity implies that there is little room for growth based on primary production
unless technology is changed. Since these countries are also prevented from developing their long
run comparative advantage in manufactures, they cannot achieve growth by only specializing in
primary production. Furthermore, even while specializing in primary agricultural production (which
explains a high RCA in that sector with respect to trade with France), colonies face terms of trade
that aim at only increasing the rent for the metropolis. Chailley -a prominent colonial governor-,
thinks that the French were stifling the growth of their colonies by pursuing only a course leading
to immediate economic ends, advantageous to the mother country, and by failing to wait until the
colonies would prosper (Betts, 1961). He further states that it was only the colonists themselves
who could guarantee that an economically sound colony can import and export as they saw fit.
The RCAF of British colonies is high for the sector of rawmaterials for industry. British colonies
might have had a comparative advantage in exporting raw material necessary for industry to France
such as iron, tin, copper, wool, and rubber, which they were able to export due to the "open door"
policy imposed by Great Britain.14 This RCAF is only partially representative of what might have
been the main specialization of those colonies, since British colonies traded relatively less with
France compared to French colonies. If we computed the RCA of that sector relative to world trade
14An open door trade policy refers to a tariff regime where there is no distinction made between the products of the mother country
and non-empire trading partners.
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instead of that to France (for which we do not have data), we may find a different result.
Figure 1.9(c) shows that, up until mid 1890’s, "Other" colonies specialized in exporting raw
agricultural material to France, whereas after 1896, they shifted their exports to France towards raw
materials for industry, as the RCAF in the figure show. We know that it was not the colonization
event that shaped this shift, since colonization of Namibia by the Germans, Western Sahara by the
Spanish, and Democratic republic of Congo by the Belgians, occurred around mid 1880’s, that is,
ten years earlier. We also know that trade between France, on one side, and Namibia and Western
Sahara, on the other, was scarce. Hence, the shift towards exporting raw material for industry
to France should have been from the Belgian colony. The Belgian Congo was known to be rich
in natural resources, such as gold and other precious metals, and fully exploited by the Belgian
colonizers. If we assume that excavation did not immediately occur at the event of colonization, but
a few years later, this would explain the shift in the RCAF in mid 1890’s in that particular sector.
The former colonies, mainly represented in our sample by the Southern American countries, had
a steady comparative advantage in exporting primary products to France instead of manufactures.
This is because the land in this continent is favorable for agriculture and is rich in natural resources.
As for the European countries, the high RCAF (around 2) for the manufactured products is evident,
because it was the era of industrial revolution and all European countries were already specializing
in manufactures.
Contribution to Trade Balance
Another indicator that helps describe the Franco-colonial trade patterns at the end of the nine-
teenth century is the contribution to trade balance (CTB). This indicator can be an alternative for
"revealed" comparative advantage as it focuses on a country’s specialization profile by comparing
its trade balance in a sector s with that of the country (Dedinger, 2012). As defined by the OECD
(2009), "contribution to trade balance reveals an economy’s structural strengths and weaknesses
in terms of technological intensity. It indicates whether an industry performs relatively better (or
worse) than the total, and can be interpreted as an indicator of revealed comparative advantage that
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is based on countries’ trade specialization." The CTB is calculated as follows:
CTBsi =
[
(EXsi− IMsi)− (EXi− IMi)EXsi+IMsiEXi+IMi
EXi+ IMi
]
×100
If there were no comparative advantage or disadvantage for any sector s, a country’s total trade
balance (surplus or deficit) should be distributed across industries according to their share in total
trade and CTB should be close to zero. A positive value for a sector or industry indicates a structural
surplus, and a negative one a structural deficit, hence the country specializes in this sector relative
to the other sectors. The indicator is additive and by construction, the sum over all sectors is zero.
To allow comparisons across countries or groups of countries, the indicator is generally expressed
as a percentage of total trade.
Figures 1.10 and 1.11, respectively, plot the path of France’s CTB relative to each trading group
and the path of each group of countries’ CTB relative to France. France trade in manufactured goods
exhibit a structural surplus of 25% with its colonies and of around 10% with the remaining trading
partners. This result indicates that France specializes in manufactured goods. France exhibits a
deficit of 25% towards its colonies in trade of raw materials for industry. Meaning that compared to
other sectors, France had a structural deficit in raw materials necessary for industry in the trade with
its own colonies. The CTB of French trade of agricultural goods shows a slight structural deficit with
the French colonies and Europe, and a slightly positive one with British and other colonies. This
indicator along with the previous ones also gives a flavor of the reality of exploitation of primary
products during the French colonization.
On the other hand, French colonies contribution to trade of agricultural goods towards France
exhibit a slight surplus of 5%. We can not infer from this specific result that French colonies had
a comparative advantage in exporting primary agricultural products even though we know from
our previous results that they were the main providers of agricultural products to France. Actually,
when colonies "specialize" in primary production, this substitutes a wide range of skills previously
present or potential to develop in the manufacturing sector without creating new skills.
The remaining colonial groups exhibit neither an advantage nor a disadvantage in agricultural
products (structural surplus almost null). We notice a structural surplus of 5 to 15% in primary
products for industry in those remaining colonial groups and in Europe which is lesser than in the
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French colonies CTB. Also, all groups have a structural deficit in the trade of manufactured goods
to France with the highest deficit attributed to French colonies. This shows that the trade relation
between France and the other groups is smoother and more balanced than with its own colonies.
Trade Balance
We calculated the trade balance of France with each group of countries for the total trade as well
as for the trade by sector. Trade balance is just the difference between exports and imports as shown
in the equation below.
TBis = EXis− IMis
The results in Figure 1.12 show that the trade balance of France with Europe is in surplus. Trade
balance with former colonies exhibit a deficit that can be explained by the high share of French
imports from those colonies of rawmaterial and in particular rawmaterial for industry. Interestingly,
the trade balance with French colonies is almost null because French imports of primary products
from those colonies were offset by the French exports of manufactured goods to the same colonial
group. Actually, looking at the French trade balance by sector with its own colonies, we see France
exhibit a long-run deficit in both agricultural raw material and raw material necessary for industry
and a long-run trade surplus in manufactured goods. The fact that France has a deficit trade balance
in raw material with these countries in the long run may suggest that France is capable of extracting
its raw materials without "paying" them with comparable exports. Comparing the French trade
balance for each sector with its own colonies to that with the British colonies, we notice that for the
three sectors, the balance is close to zero. Hence, as statistics show, France was not likely able to
exploit British colonies agricultural goods since the trade balance here is almost null.
Share of manufactures in total exports or imports
Finally, we compute the percentage share of manufactures in total exports and imports. For
the percentage share of manufactured goods in exports for France, we compute the ratio between
French exports of manufactured goods to the group of countries i, exmiFR , and French total exports
to that group of countries, EXiFR . The second equation represents the same ratio for imports. .
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⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
XimFR =
eximFR
EXiFR
×100
MimFR =
IMimFR
IMiFR
×100
For the different groups of countries, we use the following equations:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
XFRmi =
exFRmi
EXFRi
×100
MFRmi =
IMFRmi
IMFRi
×100
where exFRmi represents the exports of manufactured goods from the group of countries i to France,
while EXFRi is the total exports of group i to France. Analogously, IMFRmi and IMFRi represent
those values for imports of group of countries i.
Figure 1.13 shows the percentage share of French exports and that of colonial exports of manu-
factured goods. We note that 60% of total French exports to its colonies are composed of manufac-
tured products whereas only 10% of French colonies exports to France are of manufactured goods.
If we calculate the share of French colonies’ exports of primary products to France, we find that 90%
of French colonies exports to France are composed of primary production. It is worth noting that,
while the percentage share of French imports of manufactured goods in the total French imports
from the colonies is below 10%, French imports of manufactured goods from Europe accounted for
almost 20% of total French imports from Europe.
All those indicators are compatible with our initial suggestion on the nature of French trade:
France used the colonial land to exploit colonies’ resources and the colonial markets to dispense
French manufactured products. Terms of trade with French colonies were in general unfavorable to
the latter and favorable to the former. The colonial power gave room to interference in trade policies
in favor of the metropolis. As for the trade with Europe and former colonies, those were free from
any foreign powers and hence able to apply policies in favor of their national and commercial
interest (Maddison, 1989).
1.4.4 The Role of Trade Policy
The trade statistics that we have described in the previous sections present some interesting patterns.
In particular, the large bilateral trade between France and its colonies of raw agricultural goods and
of manufactured goods, where France imports agricultural goods from its colonies and exports man-
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ufactured goods to them. We suggest that this pattern stems from policies imposed by France on
its colonies and from trade policies imposed by other colonial powers on their respective colonies.
Many economists in the international trade literature praise the benefits of preferential trade agree-
ments and of common currency areas in boosting international bilateral trade (Estevadeordal et al.,
2002; Glick and Rose, 2002; Rose, 2000-2004; Lopez-Cordova and Meissner, 2003). In particular,
such trade policies were even more effective during the colonial reign, since they may have been
shaped by colonial ties. European powers viewed colonies as a way of setting up protective leg-
islations, preferential trading relationships, and of ensuring solvable markets, in the interest of the
mother country (Estevadeordal et al., 2002; Alesina, 2002).
The literature provided some evidence that imperialism imposed during colonization tended to
bias colonial production towards primary products and domestic one towards manufactures. This
practice, defined by Myrdal (1957) as complementarity, is when metropolis and colony comple-
ment each other, with one supplementing raw material and the other manufactured goods. Col-
onizers would favor such practice by imposing preferential trade agreements for their advantage.
They would hence monopolize trade opportunities to exclude any rival from accessing the colonial
markets.
In particular, French trade policies played a major role in shaping colonial trade between France
and its own colonies in the age of high imperialism. Unlike the British who adopted liberal policies,
France adopted protectionist policies, for they benefited from it, forcing the colony’s population to
"buy their imports for more and to sell their exports for less than world prices" (Kleiman, 1976, p.
1). One of the events that actually shaped that protectionist decision was this particular incident prior
to the Franco Prussian war, where Germany, a great trading partner to France, set a tariff in 1879
intending to stop the French exports from accessing the German market. One reaction was that,
in 1881, the French government passed a new tariff law (later revised in 1884–5) a protectionist
legislation, which applied to Germany, and increased tariffs mainly on food products (Dedinger,
2012). Those policies urged France to start searching for alternative outlets for their exports, which
were found most profitable in colonies. A nice quote by the British premier’s as a response to
the French ambassador in 1897 regarding French trade policy: "If you were not such persistent
protectionists you would not find us so keen to annex territories." (Alesina, 2002, p.20).
We have historically identified three forms of preferential trade agreements that prevailed trade
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during colonial period and on: tariff assimilation, preferential tariff policies, and open door policies.
As defined by Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) "Tariff assimilation is a policy regime where the
tariff rates on goods are the same in the metropolis and the colony. Under this arrangement, the
metropolis and colony form a custom union. Preferential tariff system describes a trade policy
where colonies and the mother country have differential tariffs but non-empire goods are generally
taxed at a higher rate. An open door trade policy refers to a tariff regime where there is no distinction
made between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners." (Mitchener and
Weidenmier, 2008, p.1819).
Table 1.3, extracted from Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008), shows the colonial tariff systems
between each colonial power and its corresponding colonies. France and most of its colonies
adopted either tariff assimilation or a customs union.15 This regime allowed the colonies to en-
joy free trade with France for most products, while non-colonies had to pay tariffs. This policy
aimed mainly at promoting trade within the empire in order to, first, acquire primary products at
low prices, and, second, to ensure profitable markets for its products in times of economic crisis, or
of saturation of the European markets (Marseilles, 1984; Alesina, 2002).
Even when the world entered into the free trade competitive era during the industrial revolution,
France did not find it profitable to let go of its colonial market, for it had developed a careful system
of trade agreements to secure imports of agricultural products - the major production of French
colonies - guaranteeing that the French market is the preferred one for the French colonial exports
(Lavallée and Lochard, 2012)16 and ensuring that its exports are dispensed back in the colonies
(Bairoch, 1989).17 On the other hand, the British system applied quite loose trade policies, giving
the opportunity to its colonies to trade outside the empire. While most of British colonies adopted
an open door policy, some of them like Jamaica, British Guiana, and Bahamas adopted differential
import duties in order to promote their own manufactures. Bairoch (1989) noted that Britain had a
free trade colonial policy and colonial trade was open to all foreign countries.
15Algeria, Indochina and Tunis, three of France’s most important colonies, formed customs union with the metropolis.
16"For instance, bananas, cocoa, coffee and citrus fruit enjoyed tariffs and quotas preferences in France; cereals and oil seeds a
guaranteed market price above world level; cotton and other were protected by licensing and by a purchasing cartel." (Lochard and
Lavallée, 2012, p.5).
17Morocco was also forced to accept a maximum import duty of 10%. (Bairoch, 1989, p.139)
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Table 1.4 from Marseilles (1984) reports the share of French colonial imports from France in
their total imports. The table is grouped by colonies adopting same trade agreements. It indicates
that colonies who adopted an assimilated trade agreement with France traded the most with it while
those who adopted an open door traded the least. Figure 1.15 reports the repartition of French
colonies imports from France by tariff system. Those shares are also retrieved from Marseilles
(1984) and are only available for the years 1912-1913. Although they do not comprise all years in
our sample, they still show that colonies with preferential trade agreements with France had a biased
trade towards the metropolis. According to the figures in the table, colonies forming a custom union
with France imported more than 90% of their total imports from France, making the latter their
main provider of products. Those under preferential tariff system imported 30% of their imports
from France while colonies under the "open Door" policy only imported 10% of their imports from
France.
1.4.5 Comparison with Jacques Marseilles Data
According to the trade patterns and the stylized facts highlighted in the previous sections, we
concluded that France mainly imported agricultural goods from its colonies and exports manufac-
tured goods to them. In order to take an alternative overview on those patterns and confirm our
conclusion, we checked Jacques Marseilles (hereafter JM, 1984) statistics about French colonial
trade. His dataset is constituted of French imports and exports between France and its own colonies
and covers the period from 1880 till 1930.. We collected it from the original manuscript of Mar-
seilles’ thesis (1984).18 The data was originally collected from similar primary resources as ours,
namely, "The tableau général du commerce de la France". We will first present some of JM conclu-
sions and then we will present his data, in order to highlight the converging points from our statistics
and his.According to the overall conclusion drawn by JM about the profitability of colonization to
France, colonial French market was a safe outlet for France in times of crisis. That same market also
provided France with natural and agricultural raw material. He stated that the French imports from
their colonies were always satisfied by those colonies during periods of expansions and recessions,
while French exports were highly oriented to the French colonies during recessions but towards the
18Thanks to the university library services that managed to get the original manuscript.
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rest of the world during expansions. He also quoted in his conclusion parts of a French official
speech: "As a whole, our colonies are no longer a burden to the metropolis but a source of profit
[...] We should put in evidence the commercial and industrial activity to justify a posteriori the work
already accomplished" (Marseilles, 1984, p. 54) (translation by the author).19 According to him,
the colonial policy aimed strictly at securing the exclusivity of raw materials towards the mother
country and providing outlets for the French products. His findings are in line with the exploitative
nature of colonization through the use of international trade.
Another conclusion drawn by JM was that, while the rest of the world was opening their markets
to free trade, allowing for technology and factor transfer and for poorer countries to industrialize,
France was isolated within its empire, imposing prices and quantities through trade agreements that
favor its terms of trade especially during crisis periods. Such periods were concurrent with more
land acquisitions. Actually, the French thought of any external opening to the rest of the world
as only a mere compromise to shortages of internal opportunities that necessitate acquiring new
markets, instead of a permanent driver of growth. Although such a protectionist policy was thought
to be a source of benefit to the mother country, it had been a brake for the modernization of France
by protecting old fashioned industries, such as iron steel and textile, through protectionist policies.
His data, is more detailed than ours in terms of sector segregation: Information is available
for the main products constituting each of the three sectors in our data. As stated earlier, France
exported high quality manufactured goods to Europe while she exported low quality manufactures
to its colonies. As we will see in the next paragraphs, many converging points can be brought
forward between Marseilles’s and our trade patterns.
Figure 1.16 and its corresponding Table A.2 in the appendix from Marseilles’ statistics present
the percentage share of French total exports and of French exports of some selected products to
French colonies in the total French exports and in the French exports of those selected products. His
statistics show that the share of total French exports to the colonies, prior to WWI, did not exceed
10%. However, for some products the share of French exports to French colonies is high while
this share is low for other products. In total, this makes the share of French exports to colonies
19"Dans leur ensemble, nos colonies ne sont plus une charge pour la metropole mais bien une source de profit [...] il faut mettre en
evidence cette activite commerciale et industrielle pour justifier a posteriori l’oeuvre deja accomplie." Originally from: H. Bouteville,
preface de l’ouvrage d’H. Paulin, l’outillage economique des colonies francaises, paris 1913
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not very high. For instance, Figure 1.16, shows that French colonies absorbed around 35% of the
cotton industry’s exports, roughly the same share of equipment, machines and mechanics, and 30%
of refined sugar. However, the share of exports of "expensive manufactures" such as silk and leather
fabrics to colonies in the total French exports was almost null. Actually JM stresses the fact that
there were some manufactured products that were not exported to the colonies but rather exported
to the the European countries, such as real leather fabrics, chemicals, jewelry, watches, objects for
collection, musical instruments, perfumes, among others; whereas other manufactured goods were
mostly exported to those colonies, like weapons, ammunition, powder, flour, metal tools, wine, food
for colonial consumption, brandy, fabric trimmings, wool and cotton fabric. Figure 1.17 reports
the geographical distribution of French exports by main countries: Algeria occupied the first rank
advancing respectively Tunisia, West Africa, Indochina and Madagascar by almost eighteen times
in the first decade. A multiple that dropped to six times in the second decade of the sample and
slightly five times in the last period of the sample.
Figure 1.18 and its corresponding Table A.3 in the appendix report the French colonial share in
the French total imports. French imports from their colonies were in large modest not exceeding
the 10%. Remarkably, imports of agricultural raw materials from colonies had increased from 8%
in 1880 to 40% in 1890’s -the period of the French African conquests-. The imports of wine and
spirits from the empire were between 70-80% by the year 1900. Imports of oil seeds and peanuts
from colonies, grew from 10% in 1880’s to 30% around 1900’s. The imports of rice from colonies,
occupied the highest rank averaging a share of 80% of total French imports of rice; this increase is
noticed around the year 1890. The colonial share of French imports of textile and cotton did not
exceed 5%, as for mining raw materials, France imported from its colonies a share of around 10%.
This low share is due to the lack of such resources in the colonial land. Figure 1.19 also reports the
geographical repartition of countries of origin of French imports. Almost the same trading partners
that absorbed the biggest share of French exports, were the providers of French imports, with a
highest share attributed to of Algeria.
Marseilles (1984) general conclusion can be summarized as follows: Between 1880 and 1906,
French imports from the rest of the world were low. This is due to the slowdown of industrial
production in the world. This stagnation of imports was accompanied by an increase of imports
from the French empire "from 244.6 millions in 1880 to 524.1 millions in 1906" (Marseilles, 1984,
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p.65). By 1900’s the colonial "réservoir" was amongst the main providers of raw materials to France
namely in agricultural raw materials. For the domestic food industry and chemical industry, the
colonial reservoir, prior to 1914, was an essential source of procurement to the metropolis.
We used JM’s trade data in order to compare its general interpretation to ours validating the
suggestions drawn from the description of our statistics in terms of the types of products traded be-
tween France and its colonies, and of the exploitative aspect of such trade. In fact, he tried to answer
the universal question of whether colonialism contributed or not in the economic development of
the Western industrialized societies and in particular France. His analysis, which was based on his-
torical events and on descriptive statistics can be summarized under the following two statements:
1) given that practically all the industrial powers have sought to develop a colonial empire, it must
be that such empire was beneficial for their economy and especially for their industries. 2) Since
the colonies had suffered economically from colonization, the colonizer (Europe) would necessarily
had been extracting profits.
1.5 Concluding Remarks
The main motive of this chapter was to describe the construction of a new data set on French
trade statistics between 1880 until the eve of the WWI, and investigate the trade patterns as well
as some stylized facts we can identify from this data . To build the data set, we relied on various
primary historical sources containing information on the value of French trade split in three sectors
-Agricultural raw material, food, raw material for industry and manufactured goods- with each of
its trading partners during the period of 1880-1912. The first part of the chapter has been devoted to
the definition and the construction of the dataset and the historical background. We then proceeded
to the description of French trade patterns and compared them across French , British , other and
former colonies, as well as European and sovereign non-European countries.
First, we found that, at the event of French colonization, trade between France and its own
colonies increased, while colonization from Britain and other metropolis did not impact trade be-
tween France and those colonies. The French colonies provided France with raw agricultural goods
and imported its manufactured goods. During times of crisis, the empire was used as buffer to
dispense the metropolis products. Colonial markets were considered a privileged island in the inter-
national markets. The exchange between France and its colonies was very important to the economy
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of those colonies.
Our stylized facts also show that the French colonies had a "revealed comparative advantage
with respect to France" in agricultural goods. Also, France exhibited a long-run deficit in both
agricultural raw material and raw material necessary for industry and a long-run trade surplus in
manufactured goods. The deficit trade balance in raw material with its colonies suggest that France
is capable of extracting the colonies’ rawmaterials without "paying" themwith comparable exports..
We also found that the French colonies that traded the most with France had signed preferential
trade agreements with the metropolis, which suggested that those trade patterns may stem from
trade policies between France on its colonies such as custom unions and assimilated tariff systems.
Finally, after comparing our data to that of Jacques Marseilles, we concluded similarly to him,
that colonial French market was a safe outlet for France in order to sell its products, and a provider
of natural and agricultural resources.
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Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of French Trade in thousand French Franc
Sector Colonial group Mean SD Min Max Coefficient of
variation
N
French
Exports
Food
French 46490.65 8131.26 30251.74 60864.03 17% 27
British 273.96 168.37 93.41 688.11 61% 37
Other 712.63 416.14 185.32 1505.14 58% 17
Former 1735.36 1503.67 455.86 5039.27 87% 17
Non Europe 133.25 28.61 85.51 186.79 21% 4
Europe 3229.51 476.95 2509.65 4369.76 15% 16
Raw material
for industry
French 3836.47 910.00 2456.67 5706.04 24% 27
British 83.13 36.11 48.99 242.04 43% 37
Other 123.89 140.77 9.41 535.52 114% 17
Former 266.67 98.57 147.65 555.34 37% 17
Non Europe 187.89 34.20 144.82 278.11 18% 4
Europe 6956.29 1543.02 4850.53 10282.80 22% 16
Manufactured
Goods
French 55501.91 12761.49 37442.91 90238.56 23% 27
British 796.13 187.99 521.85 1392.64 24% 37
Other 12141.26 12071.18 277.97 47513.16 99% 17
Former 3985.78 1586.39 1882.89 7573.04 40% 17
Non Europe 922.62 193.11 659.19 1282.71 21% 4
Europe 7661.09 1507.34 5492.77 10457.37 20% 16
French
Imports
Raw
agricultural
Goods
French 334417.93 93903.53 79325.54 439899.61 28% 27
British 872.88 655.80 260.19 2622.54 75% 37
Other 1348.97 2225.49 181.91 12562.41 165% 17
Former 3732.18 1206.92 2149.00 6873.42 32% 17
Non Europe 878.20 471.80 391.32 1799.34 54% 4
Europe 3659.37 1214.09 2017.53 5574.25 33% 16
Raw material
for industry
French 40448.68 15698.26 8439.85 61731.22 39% 27
British 872.88 655.80 260.19 2622.54 75% 37
Other 1415.66 889.39 447.02 5240.50 63% 17
Former 9269.00 2577.37 6303.70 14283.54 28% 17
Non Europe 1867.15 318.89 1335.38 2808.04 17% 4
Europe 7680.44 807.33 6227.54 9981.70 11% 16
Manufactured
Goods
French 2959.76 1467.88 1103.72 8626.90 50% 27
British 11.73 11.66 2.70 57.28 99% 37
Other 203.29 569.30 5.71 3247.78 280% 17
Former 203.74 225.58 12.52 915.50 111% 17
Non Europe 205.35 101.86 62.58 399.55 50% 4
Europe 3533.78 722.42 2679.84 5252.41 20% 16
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Table 1.3: Colonial Tariff Systems
Countries Assimilated Preferential Open Door
France Algeria, French Indo-China,
Madagascar, Reunion,
Martinique, Guadeloupe, New
Caledonia, French Guiana
Gabon
Great Britain Dominions: Canada Australia
New Zealand Cook Islands
Union of South Africa
Rhodesia Colonies: Trinidad
British Guiana Jamaica and
Caymans Turks and Caicos
Barbados Leeward Islands:
Dominica Montserrat St.
Christopher -Nevis Virgin
Islands Antigua Windward
Islands Grenada St. Lucia St.
Vincent British Honduras
Bahamas Fiji
British India
Newfoundland Papua
Norfolk Island Colonies in
Asia: Aden Ceylon Straits
Settlements Federated
Malay States Protected
Malay States Hong Kong
Weihaiwei
Germany German East Africa
German Southwest Africa
Kamerun Togo German
Samoa New Guinea
Spain Fernandi Po Spanish Guinea Canary Islands Spanish
Morocco
Belgium Belgium Congo
Note: Assimilated tariff system is where the tariff rates on goods are the same in the metropolis and the colony. Preferential tariff system
is where colonies and the mother country have differential tariffs but non-empire goods are generally taxed at a higher rate. An open
door tariff regime does not distinguish between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners.
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Table 1.4: Percentage share of French colonial imports from France between 1912 and 1913
Custom Unions (Assimilated) Percentage
Algeria 98.9
Indochina 90.7
Madagascar 98.9
Guadeloupe 94.5
Martinique 94.9
Reunion 98.8
New Caledonia 78.7
Gabon 30.6
Preferential Tariff System
Tunisia 32.9
Senegal 16.3
Sudan 11.5
Guinea 9.8
Open door
Cote-d’ivoire 9.3
Dahomey 1.2
Morocco 13.7
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Table A.1: The country dis-aggregation data
Regions as defined in the Tableau du Commerce general de la France Countries
Segregated
Colonizer Year of
Colonization
Year of inde-
pendence
Europe
Possessions anglaises
de la mediterranee
Gibraltar GBR 1700 2012
Cyprus GBR 1878 1960
Malta GBR 1802 1964
Afrique
Egypte Egypt GBR 1882 1922
Etats Barbaresques
Regence De Tripoli Libya ITA 1910 1947
Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Cote occidentale (Du
maroc au cap de bonne
esperance)
Western Sahara ESP 1884 1965
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Guinea Bissau PRT 1800 1973
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Liberia USA 1847
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Equatorial Guinea ESP 1844 1968
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Congo FRA 1903 1960
Dr Of Congo BEL 1885 1960
Namibia DEU 1884 1949
Angola PRT 1500 1975
Sao Tome And
Principe
PRT 1500 1975
Botswana GBR 1885 1966
Afrique Possessions Anglaises
Partie Occidentale (Y
compris le cap de
bonne esperance
Sierra Leone GBR 1808 1961
Gambia GBR 1888 1965
Ghana GBR 1874 1957
South Africa GBR 1806 1910
Nigeria GBR 1800 1914
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Partie Orientale (Y
Compris L’ile
Maurice)
Malawi GBR 1891 1964
Tanzania GBR 1918 1961
Kenya GBR 1888 1963
Uganda GBR 1894 1962
Somalia GBR 1884 1960
Sudan GBR 1899 1960
Mauritius GBR 1835 1968
Zimbabwe GBR 1888 1965
Zambia GBR 1899 1964
Afrique
Autres Pays (Y
Compris L’ile De
Madagascar)
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Niger FRA 1922 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Ethiopia
Mozambique PRT 1500 1975
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Asie et Oceanie Indes Comptoirs
Anglais
India GBR 1857 1947
Myanmar GBR 1857 1948
Pakistan GBR 1857 1947
Bangladesh GBR 1857 1971
Hollandais (Java Et
Sumatra)
Indonesia PRT 1600 1945
Asie et Oceanie
Philippines Philippines ESP 1521 1898
Chine China
Royaume De Siam Thailand
Japon Japan
Australie Australia GBR 1750 1901
Autres Iles De
L’oceanie
Fiji GBR 1700 1970
Solomon Islands GBR 1893 1978
New Zealand GBR 1840 1907
Amerique Septentrionale
Etats Unis
Ocean Atlantique United States GBR 1600 1776
Ocean Pacifique
Mexique Mexico ESP 1650 1810
Amerique Centrale
Guatemala-CostaRica-
Honduras
Guatemala ESP 1519 1821
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Costa Rica ESP 1522 1821
Honduras ESP 1520 1821
Nouvelle Grenade Colombia ESP 1525 1808
Amerique Meridionale
Cote est
Venezuella Venezuela ESP 1490 1821
Brezil Brazil PRT 1500 1822
Uruguay
(MonteVideo)
Uruguay ESP 1500 1821
Republique Argentine Argentina ESP 1500 1816
cote ouest
Equateur Ecuador ESP 1500 1822
Perou Peru ESP 1500 1821
Bolivie Bolivia ESP 1500 1825
Chili Chile ESP 1500 1810
Amerique Antilles et possessions Europeennes
colonies anglaises Canada Canada GBR 1763 1867
Autres Y Compris Les
Antilles
Barbados GBR 1650 1966
Bahamas GBR 1650 1973
Jamaica GBR 1650 1962
Guyana GBR 1700 1966
British Virgin
Islands
GBR 1672 1967
Dominica GBR 1805 1978
Grenada GBR 1763 1974
Saint Lucia GBR 1750 1979
Trinidad And
Tobago
GBR 1750 1962
Antigua Et
Barbuda
GBR 1632 1981
Haiti Et Republique
Dominicaine
Haiti FRA 1697 1804
Dominican
Republic
ESP 1500 1865
Colonies espagnoles
Cuba-Porto Ricco
Cuba ESP 1492 1898
Puerto Rico ESP 1493 1898
Saint Thomas Virgin Islands (Us) DNK 1600 1917
Colonies Hollandaises
Aruba PRT 1600 1986
Suriname PRT 1683 1975
Colonies Francaises
Algerie Algeria FRA 1830 1962
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Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Congo Congo FRA 1903 1960
Senegal Senegal FRA 1850 1960
Etablissement
Francais De La Cote
Occidental D’afrique
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Colonies Francaises
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Colonies Francaises
Madagascar Et
Dependences
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Mayotte Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Noisy-Be Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Ile De La Reunion Reunion FRA 1642 2012
Cote Des Somalis Djibouti FRA 1896 1977
Etablissement
Francaise De L’inde
Laos FRA 1880 1949
Cambodia FRA 1863 1953
Indo-chine Francaise Vietnam FRA 1859 1945
Etablissements
Francais de l’ oceanie
Nouvelle Caledonie New Caledonia FRA 1853 2012
Autres Etablissements
French Polynesia FRA 1842 2012
New Hebrides
(Vanuatu)
FRA 1880 1980
Guyane Francaise French Guiana FRA 1814 2012
Martinique Martinique FRA 1685 2012
Guadeloupe Guadeloupe FRA 1635 2012
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Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon Et Grande
Peche
Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon
FRA 1814 2012
C
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Table A.2: Percentage share of French Exports to French colonies
Total Exports Clothes and leather Fabric and silk Equipment Machinery and
Mechanicals
Refined
sugar
1880 6.30 6.80 0.20 10.90 10.00 8.90
1881 6.60 6.40 0.20 10.40 11.90 10.70
1882 6.90 6.60 0.10 5.80 12.50 10.70
1883 7.00 7.00 0.10 11.20 10.40 10.90
1884 6.90 6.80 0.70 11.10 10.90 14.90
1885 7.40 7.20 0.30 15.20 9.60 15.50
1886 7.50 7.40 0.30 16.80 14.10 13.00
1887 0.60 6.00 0.50 14.70 12.30 9.40
1888 7.40 8.20 0.60 15.50 10.50 13.20
1889 6.80 7.50 0.80 10.90 7.40 11.10
1890 7.80 9.10 1.30 11.00 8.10 12.70
1891 8.40 9.70 0.90 14.80 11.70 15.70
1892 8.50 6.30 0.60 17.00 13.90 15.30
1893 0.60 8.50 0.60 16.70 12.40 14.80
1894 10.40 11.20 0.90 19.00 15.80 14.90
1895 9.60 10.40 1.00 21.60 17.70 18.60
1896 10.10 10.90 0.80 18.80 15.80 18.00
1897 9.90 11.80 0.80 19.30 16.30 15.00
1898 11.10 12.80 0.90 23.10 22.10 18.90
1899 11.40 14.10 0.50 24.80 18.60 21.10
1900 11.60 15.19 0.50 25.50 20.60 18.00
1901 12.70 16.00 0.90 33.60 21.70 18.00
1902 12.00 14.50 0.60 34.40 24.91 21.80
1903 11.90 14.40 0.60 34.00 28.10 29.10
1904 12.50 15.10 0.70 31.40 27.30 29.00
1905 12.00 14.60 0.90 27.10 23.50 29.10
1906 11.40 12.50 0.60 26.40 21.80 30.40
1907 12.20 35.00 0.80 26.70 25.90 32.60
1908 13.50 16.60 0.60 27.50 29.70 38.30
1909 12.40 14.80 0.50 26.40 20.15 38.90
1910 11.80 13.70 0.60 29.40 25.10 43.50
1911 13.10 14.60 0.50 33.40 29.50 47.60
1912 13.50 14.80 0.80 32.40 29.70 43.80
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Table A.3: Percentage share of French Imports from French colonies
Total
Imports
Agricultural Raw
Material
Wine and
Alcohol
Oil seeds and
Peanuts oil
Rice Textile Raw
Material
Mining Raw
Material
1880 4.80 7.80 0.20 17.10 15.80 2.50 6.30
1881 4.80 8.40 0.10 17.40 5.80 1.30 4.40
1882 5.20 9.20 0.10 26.70 4.50 1.50 4.40
1883 5.30 8.40 0.80 22.50 4.10 1.40 1.90
1884 5.20 9.90 2.10 15.50 26.60 1.00 1.20
1885 6.70 13.00 3.70 18.70 4.50 1.30 2.20
1886 6.10 11.20 4.20 20.80 - 1.30 1.10
1887 6.50 14.70 6.00 18.40 3.50 2.40 0.60
1888 7.20 13.60 9.70 17.80 6.30 3.20 0.90
1889 7.90 17.30 14.40 21.40 3.50 2.40 4.20
1890 8.10 18.70 16.80 17.80 11.10 2.00 1.80
1891 7.50 15.50 13.80 10.40 48.40 2.00 4.40
1892 8.50 18.40 28.10 15.20 29.90 1.70 5.00
1893 8.20 19.10 26.50 11.80 70.00 2.40 6.20
1894 10.20 26.20 39.90 13.40 80.40 2.30 8.40
1895 11.00 30.60 43.60 7.40 74.80 1.60 6.80
1896 9.40 25.10 35.10 8.18 88.50 1.40 7.40
1897 10.00 27.90 48.80 7.40 73.90 1.80 7.30
1898 9.20 19.90 3811.00 1102.00 80.60 1.80 8.30
1899 10.40 38.50 53.90 9.20 80.70 1.80 9.80
1900 7.70 28.60 33.00 16.70 78.00 2.10 3.50
1901 9.10 32.70 51.70 18.00 79.40 1.70 10.00
1902 11.00 39.90 71.10 18.00 81.30 1.10 7.80
1903 10.40 33.60 66.60 18.30 74.10 1.40 6.70
1904 10.80 39.80 56.70 17.40 82.30 1.50 7.00
1905 9.40 35.90 80.60 12.00 82.60 2.40 7.80
1906 9.30 33.00 75.00 16.70 84.00 2.90 0.10
1907 9.80 37.10 83.10 18.80 62.50 2.60 9.00
1908 10.90 41.60 86.80 18.90 85.90 1.50 12.00
1909 10.70 37.60 86.80 22.50 91.70 2.00 9.30
1910 12.80 42.00 82.70 20.00 88.50 2.00 9.80
1911 11.10 30.80 75.00 17.50 84.10 1.70 13.00
1912 10.70 34.90 78.60 20.70 65.80 2.30 10.90
Note: We note that the share of total agricultural raw material in total French imports ranges between 25% and 30%, the share of total
textile raw material in total French imports ranges between 20% and 25%, while the share of total mining raw material in total French
imports ranges between 2% and 7%.
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French Colonial Trade Patterns and
European Settlements
Abstract
We construct a new database relying on various primary historical sources containing information
on the value of French sectoral trade between 1880 and 1913 in order to assess the contemporaneous
effects of colonial European settlements on French trade patterns. Our empirical results show that
French colonies with more European settlements traded more with France, whereas the opposite is
true for other colonies. We also investigate different factors through which European settlements
might have affected the French trade pattern with colonies, namely, the establishment of formal
institutions, the use of European languages and the duration of colonization. We find that better
formal institutions brought by European settlements had a negative impact on trade with French
colonies, while they promoted French trade with British colonies. These results are consistent with
the extractive nature of French trade relations with its colonies. As for the use of common language
and the duration of colonization, the stronger those ties the higher the overall French trade with
French colonies but the lower French trade with other colonies.
2.1 Introduction
Colonial trade has been identified as one of the main tools of colonial extraction, while the extrac-
tion itself is widely held to have been the driver of colonization. Although political rivalry might
have been another driver of colonial expansions, economic motives remain its ultimate goal. This
economic aspect of colonialism had a longstanding influence on current economic disparities among
the former colonies (Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2012; Alam, 1994; Bertocchi and Canova, 2002;
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Kwon, 2011; Lange et al., 2006; Nunn, 2008). European powers established their colonial control
by settling in the colonies and exploiting their resources through trade. This assertion is not new to
the literature and can be traced back to Lenin and further back to Hobson and Marxist thinkers, who
regarded trade as the primary cause of imperialist expansion (Kleiman, 1976). The French coloniza-
tion offers a quite representative example: French colonizers settled in the form of military troops,
imposed territorial powers, and set up trade policies and preferential trade agreements in order to
transfer resources from the colony to themselves and secure favorable markets for their products
(Crowder, 1968).1
Colonizers exploited their colonies in a "legitimate form" through trade. For that reason, we look
at the trade relations with the French empire and the different groups of colonies during the age of
high imperialism to shed some light on this feature of the colonial strategy. More specifically, in
this paper we investigate whether the amount of European settlement (hereafter ES) in 1900 affected
France’s trade patterns with the colonies, and how those trade patterns differ if the trading partner
were the French colonies or other colonies.
We argue that investigating the impact of ES on trade, rather than using just a colonization
dummy, may offer new insights. First, colonization as an abstract event cannot be quantified; how-
ever, its degree can be measured through the number of citizens that actually settled in a colony.
Settling in their colonies was a way to concretize colonization. Second, the presence (or absence)
of European settlers actually affected the type of institutions set by the colonial administration and
the insertion of European trading companies. In some French colonies in Africa, for instance,
where production was in the hands of domestic farmers, European settlers facilitated large compa-
nies to lobby the colonial government and establish a controlled system of marketing based on an
oligopoly of firms, and in turn the colonial administration generally supported the activity of trading
companies by implementing coercive institutions (Hopkins, 1973). Differently, in British colonies
production was often controlled by the European settlers who already had a political influence be-
fore the colonial government. Hence, the cost of imposing extractive institutions was higher (Tadei,
2013). Whether production was organized through small domestic farmers or plantation companies,
1Trade with territories politically dependent on the country is more profitable than trade with the rest of the world. In cases where
trade monopolies were imposed by empires, they need not, in theory at least, to bias the colony’s choice of trade partners. "But the
growing internal democratization of the colonial powers [...] required a trade structure biased towards the metropolitan country as a
necessary condition for the economic exploitation of colonial territories through trade [...]" (Kleiman, 1976, p.459).
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the constraints on the executive.
With respect to the effect of language and duration of colonization, those two indicators can
contribute to strengthening social ties developed through the settlers presence and through the re-
duction of transaction costs. Indeed, in a recent study on the causal relationship between migration
and trade, Canavire Bacarreza and Ehrlich (2006) show that the presence of foreign immigrants in
Bolivia and of Bolivian emigrants abroad have positive and significant effects on Bolivian bilateral
trade. A similar argument can be applied to the colonial era. European settlers brought more than
just formal institutions to the New World, they also brought human, physical and social capital.
Settlers also promoted their language and culture and got acquainted with the culture, habits, and
traits of the colonies, thereby reducing transaction costs and facilitating trade between their country
of origin of and the colony in which they settled. In sum, those variables may be interpreted as
capturing informal institutions, networking and cultural ties between the metropolis and the colony.
This channel is captured by arrows 1, 2 and 4 in Figure 2.2.
The other channel we exploit, through which ES may impact trade, refers to the relation be-
tween ES and the establishment of formal institutions. In their paper on the colonial origins of
development, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) (hereafter, AJR) argue that European set-
tlers established European-style institutions with property rights, checks and accountability for the
governor, and higher levels of democracy. Those institutions persisted and impacted positively the
economic performance of those countries who inherited the "good" institutions. Recent studies, on
their turn, show that a higher quality of institutions exerts significant positive effects on bilateral
trade flows due to the lower transaction cost and higher level of trust they produce (Briant et al.,
2009; De Sousa and Lochard, 2010; De Groot et al. 2004; Linders, 2004).
Combining these two arguments, we claim that the establishment of "good" institutions intro-
duced by the colonizer would promote favorable trade between the colonizer and the colonies. More
specifically, if, for instance, British settlers introduced good institutions, this would result in more
favorable trade between France and British colonies. This channel is depicted by arrows 3, 5 and 7
of Figure 2.2. On the other hand, if French settlements introduced policies that perpetuated inequal-
ity and exploitation, it should increase the level of extractive trade, as indicated by arrows 6 and 8
in the Figure 2.2.
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insignificant or negative effects on French exports and imports, indicating that European settlement
captures the observed increase in trade associated with being a colony.5 This result goes one step
beyondMitchener andWeidenmier (2008), who claim that being part of an empire (being colonized)
increases bilateral trade.
We then examine the impact of ES through formal institutions, captured by the variables democ-
racy and constraints on executive, and through common language and duration of colonization. We
estimate the predicted value of ES explained by each of these variables to try and disentangle the
part of ES corresponding to common language and to duration of colonization and the part corre-
sponding to the formal institutions.
We find that the worse the formal institutions in French colonies, the higher the French imports
of raw material and the French exports of manufactured goods to those colonies. These results
confirm our hypothesis that France was better at exploiting its colonies in the presence of extractive
institutions. On the other hand, higher institutional quality in the British colonies is associated
with higher trade between those colonies and France confirming also that better formal institutions
promote favorable trade in the absence of power imbalance between the two trading partners.
As for the effect of common language and the duration of colonization, we find that stronger
ties between France and its colonies captured by those two variables increased French exports and
imports with French colonies, with the highest magnitude attributed to French imports of raw agri-
cultural goods. Among French colonies, the positive impact of ES through language and duration is
complementary to the negative impact through of formal institutions in the sense that extractive poli-
cies can be more easily implemented whenever the colonizer have acquired greater power through
longer period of colonization and sharing some common language. This, in turn, would boost ex-
tractive trade. We also find that the longer the British colonized and their respective colonies and the
more they share a common language with the indigenous population, the lesser the trade between
those colonies and France. These results still hold after controlling for endogeneity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the literature examining
the link between colonialism and trade. Section 3 presents the empirical model, the data, and the
baseline results. Section 4 explores the channels through which settlement might have affected
5The insignificant effect emphasizes that settlement is the main engine of trade-creation. The negative and significant effect is
puzzling though.
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trade. The last section concludes.
2.2 Colonization, Settlement and Trade
The economics and history literature suggest a variety of reasons to explain why colonization
might have affected the patterns of trade during the imperialism period. As the main goal of colo-
nialism, trade was initiated by principles of mercantilism and of imperialism. Betts (1961) and
Kwon (2011) relate the expansion of imperial control to mercantile economic policies, which led
to demand for formal political control. Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) further argue that, prior
to the Industrial Revolution, colonial acquisitions were continuously sought by imperial powers to
complement their growing economies, which ultimately affected colonial trade. The authors find
that belonging to an empire doubled trade relative to those countries that were previously not part
of an empire.6 These findings are consistent with previous literature suggesting that colonial dom-
ination has increased colonies’ trade with their metropolitan countries (Bairoch, 1999; Kleiman,
1976).
In its extreme form, colonization reflects some form of "forced trade", which implies some
monopolization of colonial trade, "forcing the colony’s population to buy their imports for more and
to sell their exports for less than going world prices" (Kleiman, 1976, p. 1). To a lesser extreme,
colonies are not entirely subjugated to the colonizer and have some level of internal sovereignty;
hence, exploitation in its literal sense becomes difficult and "a trade structure biased towards the
metropolitan country is needed for the economic exploitation of colonial territories through trade"
(Kleiman, 1976, p. 1). Colonization facilitates trade by using power to impose preferential trade
policies, currency and custom unions (Crowder, 1968; Estevadeordal et al., 2002; Ferguson and
Schularick, 2006; Lal, 2004; Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008). Using French colonization as an
example, the French benefited from low-cost imports, especially agricultural goods, and from some
trade agreements that gave large advantages to French exports (Amin, 1972; Lavallée and Lochard,
2012).
6Agricultural exports boomed in the Gold coast, including Senegal, Ivory Coast and other French colonies in West Africa; in return,
these colonies began to import Europeans manufactured goods. In Indochina (a French colony), the land under cultivation dramatically
increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008)
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According to Head et al. (2010), former colonies’ trade with the metropolis, three decades after
acquiring its independence, would shrink by more than 60% due to the termination of some forms
of formal or informal trade agreements. Hostile separations put an end to any form of influence or
domination, leading to immediate reductions in trade. Similar results were put forth by Lochard and
Lavallée (2012), who show that an independence event reduces the overall post-independence trade
mainly within the French colonies. These results suggest that colonial trade was upheld against the
interests of the inhabitants of the colonies and, consequently, the attainment of sovereignty would
be followed by a decrease in bilateral trade.
Nevertheless independence lead to a decrease but not to a total elimination of trade, suggesting
that at least part of the trade was beneficial to the colony. Thus, colonization and the resulting
trade agreements only partially relate to extractive trade. A colony’s tendency to trade with its
empire might be driven by preferential treatment or other conditions favoring such trade, even in
the absence of colonial domination. One aspect distinguishing various types of dependencies is
whether colonies were free to decide what, and with whom to trade outside their colonial empire.
This distinction can be made using our data: for example, if British colonies with higher level of
democracy and more constraints on the governor traded with the French empire, this indicates that,
regardless whether they were forced or not to trade with their own empire, they were also allowed
to engage in favorable trade with external partners such as France.
The main premise of this research is that European settlements in colonies in the 1900’s might
have had a direct and an indirect impact on the trade relations. On the one hand, settlements deep-
ened the establishment of the colonizers’ connections through sharing a common language and a
longer history of colonization, enabling them to maintain more extractive policies and exploit re-
sources more easily with the country’s own colonies. Egger et al. (2012) argue that migrants acquire
economic, cultural and institutional knowledge about both the home and the host markets enabling
them to mediate economic exchanges between those markets.
On the other hand, settlements led to the creation of European style institutions that lowered the
level of enforced trade and increase that of favorable trade with all colonies. AJR (2001) argue that,
whenever Europeans found viable areas, they tended to settle, build infrastructure, and promote
European-style institutions that have persisted until today; wherever they faced tropical soils and
diseases, they confronted the high costs of cultivation, building and trade, which demotivated the
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settlers, leaving them with only extractive institutions.
In order to empirically investigate how European settlements affected the French trade patterns
with the various colonial groups and to assess their importance on trade as compared to other factors
that might also affect trade, we use an augmented gravity model, as explained in the next section.
2.3 Empirical Model and Data
2.3.1 Baseline model
The gravity model is the workhorse model for examining bilateral trade flows and it is used exten-
sively in the literature due its good fit to the data. In its basic form, the model suggests that the
larger the trade partner, the greater the trade is, whereas the greater the distance between them, the
lesser the trade. For our empirical analysis, we use an augmented version of the gravity model to
include the share of European settlers in 1900 in the host country as additional explanatory variable,
together with size, distance and a number of economic and geographical variables (i.e., currency
and custom unions, tariffs, wars, landlocked and colonial dummies).
More specifically, our baseline regression is based on the following gravity equation:
Ln(Trade)its = β0+ γ0ESi+∑
j∈J
γ jDi jtESi+∑
j∈J
β jDi jt +αXit + ε, (2.1)
where indices i, t and s represent, respectively, the country France is trading with, the year, and
the sector. Trade is divided into four sectors: food, agricultural raw materials, raw materials for
industry and manufactured goods. j ∈ J refers to the colonial group within the set of colonizers
J= (Great Britain, other empires, f ormer colonies). France is not included under J because French
colonies are the reference group in all the coming regressions.
Di j are colonial dummies that equal one when country i is within the colonial group j and zero
otherwise. The colonial status dummies are relevant as they indicate whether the colonial status
per se affected trade. ESi represents European settlements in 1900 in country i. The interaction
term between European settlements and colonial dummies allows us to identify whether the impact
of French settlements differs from other European settlements in their own colonies, under the
presumption that European settlements in other colonies was carried out mostly by citizens from
their respective metropolis.
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Xit is a vector of control variables composed of population density in 1900 (in log), the distance
between France and its trading partner (also in log), and dummies for being landlocked and a dummy
capturing whether France was in a state of war, and another dummy indicating whether the trading
partner was at war. Those variables are relevant because they affect the volume of trade (Martin et
al., 2008). We acknowledge that we are only accounting for trade resistance between France and its
trading partners, without considering multilateral trade resistance (MTR), the barriers to trade that
each country faces with all its trading partners. such limitation should not have a major drawback
on our estimates because first, we only have bilateral trade with France, and second, the countries
in our sample were not independent at the time. Hence barriers to trade were more likely driven
by political statuses rather than geographical ones. Following earlier studies, we also incorporated
historical–institutional dummies: nine distinct dummies capture whether the country was part of a
formal or informal trade preference agreement, currency union or custom union with its European
colonizer. These variables are relevant to control for, since such trade agreements are likely to in-
crease trade with its agreement partner, possibly also affecting trade with other partners. Finally, we
control for climate indicators (temperature and humidity). Those variables are particularly relevant
because they affect agricultural productivity and the main trade between France and its colonies is
based on agricultural products.
We estimate equation (2.1) using pooled ordinary least squares, with year fixed effects to control
for random annual shocks. We do not control for country fixed effects because most of our control
variables are invariant over time. We tried, however, to incorporate a large number of control vari-
ables in order to capture cross country differences and to mitigate the lack of country fixed effect.
Notice that, by controlling for each variable individually, we can explain the economic effect of
those variables on trade rather than accounting for unobserved heterogeneity through country fixed-
effects.7 Finally, there was no or little missing values in our data, so we do not encounter the zero
problem in our gravity equation.
7In a different set of regressions, not reported here, we added country fixed effects to our existing variables. They show insignificant
coefficients for most of the countries.
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2.3.2 Data
We have constructed a large database of annual French sectoral trade from French statistical primary
sources. In particular, we relied on numerous volumes of the "Tableau Général du commerce de la
France" and the "Tableau décennal du commerce de la France". The data include more than 20,000
observations of French bilateral imports and exports in French Francs from 1880 to 1913 for a total
of 98 colonies, including 27 French, 37 British, 17 colonies from other empires and 17 former
colonies.8 Notice that, although we have data from 1880, we chose to base our analysis on data
starting on 1890. The reason for this choice is to keep the time frame closer to that of our main
explanatory variable, European settlement, which is available only for the year 1900.9 All data is
deflated using the INSEE published index of prices calculated from the gross prices of 45 products
(base 100 Francs 1914).
The data are dis-aggregated into the following sectors: food; agricultural raw materials; raw
materials for industry; and manufactured products. We note that France largest share of exports to
its colonies consisted of food sector, accounting for more than 80% of French colonial exports. The
raw materials for industry consist of mining products such as gold, cobalt, phosphate, iron, wood,
and wool. The manufactured goods consist of things produced by either France or the colonies such
as: machinery, tools, fabric, weapons.
Notice that our database significantly improves upon historical trade data used in previous stud-
ies, for it includes data on exports and imports separately, as well as dis-aggregated trade data into
sectors, as described in the previous paragraph. We have yearly data covering all French trad-
ing partners. This detailed and comprehensive data allows comparing French trade with its own
colonies, to French trade with other colonies (including German, Belgian, Spanish and Portuguese)
as well as former colonies.
8French colonies: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Fasso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, French Guiana, French
Polynesia, Gabon, Guadeloupe, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Martinique, Mauritania, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Niger,
Reunion, St Pierre and Miquelon, Senegal, Vietnam, Morocco, and Tunisia. British colonies: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Ba-
hamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, Ja-
maica, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saint Lucia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Egypt, and India. Other colonies: Angola,
Aruba, Cameroon, Cuba, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Togo, Virgin Islands (US), and Western Sahara. Former colonies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
9Extrapolating European settlement in 1900 twenty years backwards (i.e. back to 1880) is a stronger assumption and harder to
justify. Nevertheless, we used the full sample for robustness check and our main results were unchanged.
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The trade data were originally collected at the aggregate level by colonial groups and geograph-
ical regions and were subject to continuous changes throughout the years of the sample. Taking into
account, on a yearly basis, the political and historical events (i.e. colonization, independence, cre-
ation of a nation, new groups entering the sample), we were able to assign the appropriate countries
to each colonial group, using population collected from Mitchell (2007) and Madison (2005) as a
weight to assign trade values for each country.10 The dis-aggregation from the group to the country
level is presented in Table A.1 in the appendix if chapter one.11
Figure 2.3 shows the world map containing all the countries included in our sample and how
they were divided among the colonial powers. Table 2.1 presents the total value of trade with each
group of countries, as well its exporting and importing shares per sector. For instance, it shows that
the value of trade between France and its colonies accounts for 92% of the total value of French
trade with all the colonies (first line of Table 2.1). Moreover, 69% of the value of trade between
France and French colonies is attributed to the imports of raw agricultural goods (fifth column).
Notice that French exports of raw materials for industry (third column of the table) and their imports
of manufactured goods (fourth column) were very small compared to trade in other sectors: they
correspond to not more than 1% of total trade. We then choose not to include them in our regression,
since they are not economically significant.
10We have also conducted an alternative weight measure using arable land area as a robustness check. Those results are similar to
the ones found in our initial specification and are reported and commented for in the robustness checks section
11The groups are well defined in terms of geographical location and identity of the colonizer so we were able to accurately conduct
the dis-aggregation process with minor losses of information. The first chapter of the thesis details the data construction.
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(Mayer and Zignago, 2011) and from Nunn (2008).
Following previous studies (Mitchener andWeidenmier, 2008; Rose, 2000), who found a signif-
icant impact of trade agreement on trade, we included dummies for preferential trade agreements,
custom and currency unions to indicate whether the country was in any form of agreement with
France, Britain or a third colonial power. These variables are from Mitchener and Weidenmier
(2008).12 The data on whether each country was at war in a particular year were constructed based
on the data from the Correlates of War website. The climate variables, average temperature and
average humidity, are from AJR (2001), completed with those from Parker (1997).13 We took the
average temperature in Centigrades and the average humidity in percentages.
The colonial status dummies were constructed based also on the Geo CEPII data constructed by
Mayer and Zignago (2011). For the dates of colonization, we collected information from various
sources. We defined the year of colonization as the year the colonizer established the colony, not
the year it acquired the land. In addition, the year of independence is the year of decolonization.
As the sample spans a long period, political states often changed, as did countries’ colonial status
within the sample, and the colonial status dummies capture those changes.
2.4 The impact of settlements on trade
2.4.1 POLS results
Table 2.2 reports the pooled ordinary least-squares (POLS) regressions of equation (2.1). The esti-
mated coefficient for ES in 1900 is significant for most sectors and interaction terms, as well as for
the reference group, which are the French colonies. Column (1) presents the results for the impact
of the explanatory variables on the total trade with France. As indicated by the coefficient of ES,
we find that a higher share of settlers in French colonies is associated with more trade with France.
The interaction term between ES and the colonial dummies is negative and significant for British
and other colonies, indicating that the impact of ES in those colonies on trade with France is smaller
than that for French colonies. Actually, the absolute impact of ES in British colonies is not signifi-
12We thank Marc Weidenmier and Kris Mitchener for generously sharing their data.
13Note that the original source of AJR is Parker (1997) from which we also double-checked AJR data.
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cantly different from zero, whereas for other colonies it is negative. This result is compatible with
the presumption that settlers in other colonies were mainly their respective colonizers; once they
settled, they constrained the colonial trade with France, particularly in colonies other than British.
Empirical evidence from Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) indicates that membership in an
empire increased bilateral trade. Our results go one step further by showing that the level of ES
captures the impact of being a colony on trade. Interestingly, once we control for this ES in the
colonies, colonial dummies are negatively correlated with trade with France. For the colonies from
other empires, this negative coefficient is compatible with the idea that their trade might have been
more intense with their own colonizers, and they would trade less with other countries such as
France. However, the French colonial dummy also has a negative coefficient: conditional on settling
in a French colony, being a French colony is not positively correlated with trade with France, as we
would expect. This is a puzzling result.
Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.2 show the impact of ES on French exports of food and of man-
ufactured goods, respectively. The coefficient of the reference group indicates that a higher share
of French settlers in their colonies increased French exports of food and of manufactured products.
This result corroborates our previous argumentation that colonization provided a way for the French
to establish control through settlements and strengthen their trade ties in order to use the colonial
market as the main consumer of its products. Marseilles (1984) observed that France, isolated within
its empire and imposing the prices of products in the colonial markets through custom unions and
trade preferences, exported its manufactured products to ensure the existence of solvable markets
for the empire during times of crisis.
The coefficients of ES interacted with the British and with the other colonies dummies are
negative, indicating that, for those colonies, ES has a smaller impact on French exports of food and
of manufactured products compared to settlements in French colonies. In fact, the overall impact of
ES in British and in other colonies on trade with France is not significantly different from zero.
As for the imports of raw agricultural goods, they are negatively correlated with ES in French
colonies (our reference group), as shown in column (4) of the table. Such result might be related
to reverse causality between settlements and trade, which are not corrected for in the POLS regres-
sions. More specifically, one potential explanation is that the French might have been exploiting the
natural resources even before formal colonization took place, so that they did not need to, nor were
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they encouraged to settle in order to extract. Why would that be the case? Actually, the colonial vo-
cation was generally not popular in France. The health conditions were deplorable; tropical diseases
took a heavy toll in the colonial corps between 1887 and 1912 (16% died in the colonies) (Victor
Marguerite, De La Justice, Annals Colonials XIII June 1, 1912). Consequently, administrators could
not bring their families with them, and few men were willing to accept a lifetime career away from
their families.14 This being stated, as long as they were able to engage in trade, settlements overseas
were limited to some traders and officers (Cohen, 1971). This effect should render the POLS coef-
ficient smaller, and controlling for it we would be able to capture the positive impact of settlements
on French imports of raw agricultural goods from is own colonies. This is actually the case, as we
will see in the next subsection when comparing the POLS coefficient to the IV coefficients.
Also in column (4) of Table 2.2, we see that ES has a higher impact on French imports of raw
agricultural products from British colonies, compared to French colonies. The net impact of British
settlement is not significantly different from zero. This relation can be attributed to two possible
explanations. On the one hand, reverse causality might have increased the POLS estimator. The idea
is that it is not the British settlements that drove British colonies to trade with France. It may have
been the case that France was already importing agricultural raw products from British colonies even
before colonization, and Great Britain non-randomly sought those territories expecting economic
profits.15 On the other hand, after Britain established colonization, it set up certain trade policies
with its colonies to encourage trade with other empires.16 This second explanation can be confirmed
by the positive estimator of trade agreements with British colonies, indicating that British colonies
that signed trade agreements with Britain increased their exports of raw materials to France.
The standard gravity variables are controlled for, and reported in the table. As shown, most vari-
ables enter with the correct expected sign and are, for most sectors, statistically significant. In terms
of geographical influences on trade, being landlocked or far away from the trading partner reduces
14Cohen explains in his book that the rare French settlement is due to the fact that overseas French possessions were modest and
scarcely populated. They consisted mainly of plantation owners, slaves and small trade forts on the coastline of West Africa and India
which were occupied by a small number of French traders and officers. Relation with the indigenous population were limited to trade
and the establishment of some form of diplomatic relations with the local states (Cohen, 1971).
15For further discussion of reverse causality between colonization and trade, see De Sousa and Lochard (2012).
16Britain established open door policies: An open door trade policy refers to a tariff regime where there is no distinction made
between the products of the mother country and non-empire trading partners.
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trade flows. Most specifications also show that richer countries (as measured here by population
density) trade more. Furthermore, the interstate and French war variables significantly reduce trade.
Coefficients of year fixed effects were insignificant for most years.17
Although we tried to control for most factors affecting trade, POLS results may be biased due
to reverse causality issues. In particular colonization and the choice of settling in the colonies may
be endogenous to trade. The fact that trade might have preceded colonial expansions or even lead
to it, is a plausible possibility. In order to correct for this endogeneity problem we will employ
a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation method which will be described in detail in the next
subsection.
2.4.2 Instrumental variables
One drawback of POLS estimation on the impact of European settlements on trade with France is
that it does not take into account the possibility of reverse causality: pre-colonial trade is likely to
have impacted settlement and colonization decisions. We use instrumental variables to try and con-
trol for possible reverse causality in the POLS results. We first describe the instrumental variables
used, and then present the results from the two-stage least square regressions.
2.4.2.1 Identification of Instrumental Variables
Previous literature has used three instruments for European settlements in the colonies. The first
one is pre-colonial population density (in the 1500s) from Acemoglu et al. (2002). Engerman and
Sokoloff (1997) argue that Europeans were more likely to settle in previously poor and less popu-
lated regions because indigenous population density raised costs for Europeans to obtain and secure
land for new settlers. Acemoglu et al. (2002) also argue that Europeans settlements in 1900 are
negatively correlated with pre-colonial population in 1500 because the density of pre-colonial in-
digenous population affects the returns from setting up extractive institutions. Moreover, Fenske
(2013) argues that population density is positively correlated with the formation of precolonial
states. Strong pre-colonial states might have discouraged new settlers to settle because of the costs
17Note that the correlation between population , which we used to disagregate the trade values across countries, and ES is -0.09,
while the correlation between population and population density in 1900, our control variable in equation (2.1), is 0.2. Both correlations
are low and should not bias the the estimation of our coefficient. Correlation matrix is in the appendix below.
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incurred from setting extractive trade institutions. Following the same line of arguments, Huillery’s
(2011) recent empirical results show that pre-colonial high population density would increase the
risk of indigenous hostility and hence discourage new settlements. Based on this discussion, popula-
tion density in 1500 might have had a significant impact on decisions related to European settlement
in 1900. Moreover, we have no reason to believe that this instrument is likely to be correlated to
trade in 1900.
The validity of our instrument is only threatened if other factors correlated with population
density in 1500 affect trade in 1900, such as population density in 1900, climate conditions, disease
environment, natural resources, education levels, technology, among others. In this regard, we
investigate whether ES (instrumented by population density in 1500) have an impact on trade in
1900 while controlling for some of those variables that are likely to be correlated with population
density in 1500 (population density in 1900 and climate conditions). We still find a negative and
significant correlation between our instrument (population density in 1500) and ES in the first stage
least square regression, and a positive impact of ES on trade in the second stage least squares
regression.
Notice that the potential impact of population density in 1500 on trade through the remainder of
the factors not controlled for, if such impact exists, should be a positive one, for they are likely to
have a positive impact on economic activity, hence on trade expansion later on. Since we found a
negative correlation between population density in 1500 and ES, and a positive correlation between
ES and trade, we have that the impact of population density in 1500 on trade through ES is a negative
one. Therefore, the impact we are capturing cannot be driven by these other factors.18
The second instrument for ES is latitude, measured as the distance from the equator. This vari-
able has been used in previous works as instrument for European settlement in colonies, given its
relation to land and climate conditions (AJR, 2001, 2002, 2005). Favorable conditions undoubt-
edly encouraged settlers to settle whereas unfavorable climate would have discouraged settlement
However, latitude is also correlated to climate and geographical conditions that affect agricultural
performance, hence countries’ comparative advantages and trade capacity. Latitude would then have
a direct impact on trade, independently of the impact exerted through its correlation with European
18We also checked the correlation between our instrument and population density in 1900 on side and population on the other. The
values are respectively -0.003 and 0.01, hence such low correlation does not overturn the validity of our instrument.
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settlement. Therefore, this variable does not qualify as a valid instrument for our purposes.
The third instrument is settler mortality from AJR (2001, 2002), who argue that historical mor-
tality rates were influential in shaping the pattern of ES in former colonies. The main problem
of using settler mortality data as an instrument of ES, aside from doubts about its various sources
(Albouy, 2005) and endogeneity issues (Jones, 2013), is the fact that it can be correlated to low
agricultural productivity due to the high burden of diseases. Thus, this instrument would not be
valid since it would also have a direct impact on trade.
Altogether, population density in 1500 seems to be the most appropriate instrument because,
following the discussion we presented above, the only channel through which population density in
1500 can affect trade in 1900 has to be through European settlements.
Our identification can be expressed as follows:
ESi = α0+α1IVi+∑
j∈J
β jDi jt +αXit +ϑ (2.2)
where IVi is the instrumental variable and X is the vector of our explanatory variables as described
previously in equation 2.1.
The results, reported in Table 2.3, show that the coefficient of our preferred instrument, the
population density, has the highest magnitude with an R-square of 58%. The coefficients of latitude
and settler mortality taken alone, have high magnitudes and strong explanatory power with R-square
of, respectively, 50% and 70%. However, when taken with population density, their magnitude
decreases substantially confirming the superiority of population density in 1500 as an instrument.
Note, nevertheless that these other two instruments will be used for robustness purposes.
2.4.2.2 2SLS Results
Column 3 of Table 2.3 reports the first stage results of our instrumental variable regression using
population density in 1500 as an instrument for ES, whereas Table 2.4 reports the second stage
results. Columns 1 to 3 report the instrumental variable results for total trade, exports of food
and exports of manufactured products, respectively. Those results are very similar to the baseline
regressions for most of the sectors and most of the variables. Namely, higher settlements in French
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colonies (the reference group) increase both total trade and French exports of food and manufactured
goods to those colonies, whereas the impact is smaller, and not significantly different from zero,
for settlements in British colonies. For other colonies, settlements had a negative impact on total
trade with France and on French exports to those colonies. Endogeneity appears to introduce a
downward bias for the reference group (representing French colonies) since the coefficients of ES,
when instrumented, are higher.
It is interesting to note that the coefficients for imports of raw agricultural material are opposite
to the ones in the POLS as shown in column 4 of Table 2.4. The 2SLS results indicate that a one
percentage point increase in French settlements increased the French imports of agricultural goods
from French colonies by nearly 8%, whereas a one percentage point increase in the share of British
settlements increased French imports of agricultural goods by nearly 2% (the difference between
the reference group (8%) and the British coefficient (-6%). The overall impact of ES in British
colonies is significantly positive, though of smaller magnitude than that of French colonies. Once
we control for reverse causality, our results indicate that more French settlements increase imports
of raw agricultural material from their French colonies, thereby facilitating extraction. This result
is in line with what Marseilles (1984, p. 75) wrote: "The colonial empire was reserve tank of
agricultural commodities" (translation by the author).
Column 5 shows a positive but statistically non-significant effect of British settlements on
French imports of industrial raw materials from the British colonies. British colonies employed
an "open door" policy (refer to footnote 16 for a definition of an open door policy) in which they
did not have a preferential tariff with their metropolis, but rather they would pay the same tariff
to any trading partner including France. This could explain why British settlements do not have a
significant impact on trade with France. Overall, these results indicate that British settlements affect
less French trade with the British colonies compared to that with French colonies. We hope to shed
further light on this result once we capture the part of ES affected by common language, duration
of colonization and formal institutions in section 4.
To provide some additional insights to the effects of ES on sectoral French trade, it is in-
teresting to look at the export boom in French West Africa—namely, in Senegal and the Ivory
Coast—between 1897 and 1913. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast increased by a factor of six
in twenty years (Frieden, 2006), as colonial imports of European manufacturers grew. In Indochina
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(which was under French colonial regime), the area of cultivated land dramatically increased, allow-
ing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008).
French settlements strengthened their ties between the empire and its colonial markets, achieving
the ultimate goal of French colonization, as stated by Jules Ferry in his 1911 essay "Colonial policy
is the daughter of industrial policy".19 France used the colonial markets as both a buffer in times of
crisis and a profitable alternative in times of expansion to dispense its products (Marseilles, 1984).
2.4.3 Robustness Checks
To check whether our results are sensitive to the specification of the econometric model, we con-
ducted a series of robustness checks. The first column in Table 2.5 is the same as column 1 in
Table 2.2 used here as a reference for comparison. The first test we conduct is by including the full
sample of trade from 1880 to 1913 instead of 1890-1913.20 The inclusion of 10 additional years
(i.e., 1880–1890) does not change our results. As shown in column (2) of Table 2.5, French settle-
ments still had a statistically significant effect on overall trade. The results are similar to the base
sample POLS in column 1 for the remainder of the control variables (not reported here). Column
3 presents results of the same regression, but trade data is dis-aggregated from the original region
to the country level using arable land area instead of population. The data were assembled using a
variety of sources, including Mitchell (2007), Madisson (2006) and Nunn and Wantchekon (2011).
The estimated coefficients of our main explanatory variables and the control variables are similar to
the ones in the base regression in column (1), but with a smaller magnitude.
Testing over-identification restrictions
In order to check for the validity of our initial instrument and the non-validity of the inclusion
of the remaining two, we conduct a series of regressions with the alternative instruments, latitude
and settler mortality. Columns (4) to (6) in Table 2.5 use respectively, latitude as an instrument
to ES, settler mortality as an instrument to ES, population density in 1500 (our initial instrument)
as an instrument to ES, while column (7) uses all instruments together to instrument ES. When
19La politique coloniale était fille de la politique industrielle
20Refer to section 3.2 above as for why we start our analysis on data starting on 1890
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we include settler mortality and latitude as instrumental variables and when we include the three
instruments together, results do change as compared to when we only use our initial instrumental
variable. Actually, our results only seem to be robust to the various instrumental alternatives in
the French colonies: French settlements did increase overall French trade in the French colonies
for columns (4) to (7). European settlements in British and other empires either increase or reduce
trade with France depending on the instrument used. This might be related to the none relevance or
the non validity of the inclusion of settler mortality and latitude as additional instruments.
As an additional check for the validity of our instrument only, we conduct a Sargan test, a general
test for over-identification restriction to check whether all our IV’s are exogenous (hence valid). The
test is conducted as follows: We regress the residual of the regression in column (7) that includes
all the three instruments together on our explanatory variables and we retrieve the R-square R21.
Under the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid, our statistic follows a chi-square distribution
nR21 ∼ χ2q where q is the number of over-identifying restrictions, i.e. the number of instrumental
variables minus the number of endogenous explanatory variables (q=3-1=2). Actually, as predicted,
the test statistic exceeds the critical value and we reject our hypothesis that the estimates are equal
under the different instruments, hence that all instruments are valid.21
We repeat the same test for each alternative instrument alone. We regress the residual of the
regression that includes latitude and population density in 1500 and retrieve its R-square, and regress
the residual of the regression with settler mortality and our instrument and retrieve R-square.22 (e.g.
in column 4, the coefficient using latitude alone is compared to the estimate using latitude and
population density in 1500 as instruments). The test statistic exceeds also the critical value and
we reject our hypothesis that the estimates are equal under the different instruments. The other
variables in the gravity model generally have the predicted signs and are statistically significant at
conventional levels.23
21Testing of over-identifying assumptions is less important in longitudinal applications because realizations of time varying explana-
tory variables in different time periods are potential instruments, i.e., over-identifying restrictions are automatically built into models
estimated using longitudinal data.
22Not reported here.
23To ensure robustness, we also conducted the same analysis for each sector separately, (not reported here). Most variables and
interaction terms showed similar results as previously reported (not reported here).
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Comparing with cross section analysis
One concern may be related to the fact that many of our control variables do not vary over time,
while the dependent variable varies over time. Estimated standard errors may therefore be larger
than their true values. To check whether our results are robust to such limitation, we conduct a cross
section analysis by averaging the trade volumes over the considered period. The cross-section OLS
and IV regressions, respectively in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, yield similar results to the POLS and to the
IV regressions, in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. The magnitude of both coefficients and standard errors are
now larger, preserving the statistical significance of our results. There are some differences for the
regression on imports though. Some coefficients that were not significant in the Panel estimation,
become significant in the cross-section estimation, whereas for other coefficients, the opposite is
true. We argue that the values of our trade flows vary over the period of our sample. Reducing such
flow to an average of one period might remove some information.
2.5 The Settlement Effect: transmission mechanisms
Our empirical results indicate that European settlements in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries positively and significantly affected trade between France and its colonies, while it did
not affect French trade with British and other colonies. These results suggest that settlements may
affect trade through different underlying channels. In this section we explore two possible channels.
One channel is through sharing a common language with the settlers and through the duration of
colonization. Those variables can relate to different sorts of connections formed between the colony
and the metropolis that facilitate trade, such as informal institutional and cultural traits that reinforce
ties between them. For simplicity, we will name this channel ’networking’. The other channel is
related to the establishment of formal institutions. With better institutions, for instance, colonies
would be less captive of the metropolis, and hence freer to choose with whom and what to trade. In
the next two subsections, we discuss these two channels in turn.
2.5.1 Language and duration of colonization
The longer the colonization and the more people share a common language with the settlers, the
more acquainted colonizers, settlers, and trading companies become with the cultural and institu-
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tional traits of the colony, the more experience they acquire, and hence, the lower the operational and
transacational costs of trade; hence, facilitating commercialization and strengthening the network-
ing ties between the trading partners. Recent studies have highlighted the importance of networks
in monitoring trade in unorganized exchange markets as they facilitate matching sellers and buyers
and fostering deals where laws of contract are weak (Rauch, 1999). Some evidence in the trade
literature suggests that weak contracting institutions can be substituted by long-term relationships
as well as kin- and ethnic-based networks to ensure efficient engagements (Nunn and Trefler, 2013).
Moreover, Sandberg and Seale (2012) argue that former trade networks have a significant impact on
current trade volumes attributed to regionalism (via the enactment of regional trade agreements) and
history (via the modern effects of former imperial relationships). This is also true, and maybe even
more important, in the colonies, where societies were less developed and legal apparatus was absent.
Moreover, in a time when communication was more difficult, social networking had a greater role
in creating some sort of informal contract enforcement that, even under extractive policies, would
enhance trade between two countries.
European settlements contribute to the development some form of informal institutions, which
should strengthen networking ties between the settlers and the indigenous population. When they
settled, Europeans not only established formal institutions, but they also developed informal ones
in the form of cultural traits, common language, human, physical and social capital (Easterly and
Levine, 2012; Glaeser et al., 2004). Settlers promoted the use of their language in the colonies,
thereby making communication with merchants easier. "Even in cases where the dominant lan-
guage of the population differed from that of the imperial power, a lingua franca often developed
around commercial centers" (Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008, p. 1821). Alam (1994) also ar-
gues that colonizers had previously encouraged emigration into their dependencies to give a form
of permanence to their occupation of these territories and strengthen their ties.
Networking established by immigration reduces costs associated with international transactions,
and the networks are stronger the longer immigrants live in the host country. Colonial settlers can be
seen as immigrants. Following this logic, we argue that, the longer the colonization, the more likely
the immigrants created an inclusive form of social ties with the indigenous population, thereby help-
ing to alleviate uncertainty, asymmetric information and opportunism associated with international
trade. Walmsley et al. (2005) and Parsons (2005) show a positive relationship between immigration
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and bilateral trade flows. Egger et al. (2011) also argue that migrants acquire economic, cultural
and institutional knowledge about both the home and the host markets; they are able to mediate
economic exchanges between those markets, thereby increasing trade above what it would be in the
absence of such migration. While extraction was mainly exercised by concessionary companies in
the French colonies and particularly in French Equatorial Africa, the presence of settlers would op-
timize such extraction by reducing information asymmetries that were even more severe during the
age of high imperialism. Merchants had a financial incentive to learn the culture, habits and mostly
the language of colonial masters in order to sell more goods and to protect themselves and mostly
to become more familiar with the European settlers in order spare themselves the cost of coercive
institutions.
A simple example makes the point about the role of networks in exchanges. During the period
of colonial reign, colonizers were attracted by the cheap and abundant factor endowments in the
colonies. In order to extract the full rent from this "wealth", colonizers had to impose some form of
subjugation only possible through establishing strong ties within the colony on the field.
In order to capture the the basket of informal institutions, cultural traits, and transactional costs
effects , we used two proxies that we believe are likely to best represent such impact as argued thus
far. The first variable is the duration of colonization, measured as the length of time from the year
of colonization until the year in our sample. We argue that the longer the Europeans stayed, the
more familiar they became with local customs, language, beliefs and culture, the development of
distribution and marketing channels, or the formation of social networks of the colony. This should
decrease transaction costs associated with trade and hence increase international trade.
The second variable is common European language, an index ranging from 0 to 1 which is a
proxy of the share European languages spoken in the country, namely French, English, Spanish,
Dutch, Italian and Portuguese. The variable was constructed based on the CEPII data set. The
CEPII data reports the main four languages spoken by at least 9% and at most 20% of the population
and the main four languages spoken by more than 20% of the population. The data also contains
information on whether two countries share a common ethnological language, including the creole
language and a lingua franca. Based on these data and the historical background, we constructed
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our index for language according the following formula:
EL=
nEL
NTL
+
mEL
MTL
×0.2
where EL is the European language index, nEL is the number of European languages spoken by
more than 20% of the population, NTL is the total number of languages spoken by more than 20%
of the population, mEL is the number of European languages spoken by 9 to 20% of the population,
and MTL is the total number of languages spoken by 9 to 20% of the population. The second ratio
is multiplied by 0.2 to take into account that this ratio concerns at most 20% of the population. The
value of 1 is attributed to those countries whose second official language is a European one. This
additional information is gathered from various historical backgrounds.24
2.5.2 Formal Institutions
The second channel linking European settlement and trade is the establishment of formal institu-
tions. Nunn and Trefler (2013) find that institutions seem to exert a significantly and economically
important impact on the comparative advantage of advanced manufacturing goods, even after con-
trolling for factor endowments and for human capital variables (Acemoglu et al., 2014). This effect
occurs through factor accumulation, technological innovation and commercial enterprise. In other
studies on the impact of institutions on historical and current trade flows, Mitchener andWeidenmier
(2008) and Estevadeordal et al. (2002) show that the main channels through which colonization has
boosted trade were the explicit implementation of historical–institutional trade policies. DeGroot
et al. (2004) find that institutional homogeneity increases overall current trade flows by 13% and
that good governance increases it by 40% through imposing formal rules and securing and enforc-
ing property rights in international transactions as well as Proudman and Redding (2000) found a
positive correlation between the quality of institutions and the growth of international trade in 2000.
What shapes institutional legacy during the colonial reign? Different types of colonization poli-
cies create different sets of institutions—an interpretation consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2001,
24Notice that, theoretically, the index could take a value larger than one if, for example, there is only one language spoken by at
least 20% of the population and only one language spoken by 9 to 20%, and these two languages are European. In this case, the number
would be 1.2. First, such case does not occur in our data, second it would be evident to take the minimum value between the EL index
and 1.
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2014) and Crosby (1986), who argue that the colonization strategy was subjective to the viability of
settlements. When European settlers faced favorable climate and soil conditions (resulting in low
mortality rates and advantageous disease environment), they felt encouraged to stay and introduced
good (productivity-enhancing) institutions which promote private property and checks against gov-
ernment power. This led to the creation of what Alfred Crosby called "Neo-Europe". Meanwhile,
when a settlement was not viable due to unfavorable bio-geographic conditions (resulting in high
mortality rates), they established extractive institutions favoring autocracy and weak accountabil-
ity of the governors. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) assert that, when Europeans faced national
resources with profitable international markets but did not find the lands, climate, and disease en-
vironment suitable for large-scale settlement, they had no or little incentive to invest in institutions
or infrastructure in the colonies and instead created authoritarian political institutions to extract and
exploit natural resources.
Let us consider a few examples. The Belgian colonizers in the Democratic Republic of Congo
did not introduce any rule of law against government expropriation; extractivists only transferred
many of the colony’s resources to their homeland. Between 1905 and 1914, 50% of French Da-
homey GDP was extracted by the French (Manning, 1982), and taxation rates in Tunisia were four
times as high as those in metropolitan France (Young, 1994). Moreover, in French Africa, most
of the agricultural production was based on small farmers with little political power and ability to
oppose extractive institutions imposed by the colonizers (Tadei, 2013). Another example is the case
of the Spanish and the Portuguese colonists during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who
set up complex mercantile systems of monopolies and trade regulations in order to obtain gold and
other valuables. Finally, a last example is the British introduction of sound economic and political
institutions who transferred common-law systems to their colonies, property rights, and developed
financial markets (Cain and Hopkins, 1993; La Porta et al., 1998, 1999; Landes, 1998; North et al.,
1998).
In order to capture formal institutions, we used two main variables widely used in the eco-
nomic history literature. Our first variable is constraint on executive for the year 1900, which is a
seven-point scale ranging from 1 to 7, with a higher score indicating more constraints. A score of
1 indicates unlimited authority for the governor, 3 indicates slight to moderate limitations by other
institutional corps, 5 indicates substantial limitations, and 7 indicates executive parity or subordina-
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tion. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 indicate intermediate values. A higher score refers to a better quality of
institutions. Data are from Acemoglu et al. (2001), and the missing values were completed from
the polity III data set.
During French colonization and in at least some of the French colonies, the constraint on ad-
ministrators was very low, leading governors to be brutal towards the indigenous population. Cohen
(1971, p. 62) stated that French colonial administration was, in actual practice, a decentralized sys-
tem giving nearly full authority to the men in the colonies: "The administrators tended to ignore
their superiors and ruled their circles according to their whims, they would levy severe fines on the
natives without serious causes and without the governors’ permission."
Our second variable is democracy in 1900, measured as an index ranging from 0 to 10 (also from
Acemoglu et al., 2001, completed from Polity III data for missing values). A higher score indicates
more democracy points from three dimensions: competitiveness of political participation (from 1 to
3 points); competitiveness of executive recruitment (from 1 to 2 points, with a bonus of 1 point if
there is an election); and constraints on chief executive (from 1 to 4 points). The measurement was
equal to 1 if the country was not independent on the date in question.
In their recent work, Nunn and Trefler (2013) showed that a tradition of local democracy is
also associated with attitudes that favor democracy, better quality institutions, and a higher level of
economic development. Their findings not only indicate persistence in democratic institutions over
time, but are also consistent with national institutions affected by local institutions.
2.5.3 Empirical setup
In order to assess the effects of language and duration of colonization and of formal institutions
through which European settlement might have impacted French trade, we start by estimating the
part of European settlement associated with each of these two channels. Following Mitchener and
Weidenmier (2008), we regress European settlements on common language and duration of colo-
nization for the first channel capturing the informal institutions, cultural traits and networking effect,
and constraint on executive and democracy in 1900 capturing formal institutions. We estimate the
following equations:
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⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ESi = αI + ι1ExConstri+ ι2Demi+μI
ESi = αN +η1Langi+η2Duri+μN
(2.3)
where ES represents European Settlements in 1900, ExConstri refers to constraint on executive in
1900 and Demi to democracy in 1900. Langi and Duri refer respectively to common European
language and duration of colonization of the colonizer. μI and μN are the error terms.
Table 2.8 reports the ordinary least square regressions of equation (2.3). Column (1) of Table
2.8a shows the regression of European settlement on the formal institutions indicators (constraint on
executive and democracy), whereas column (2) shows the same regression on European language
and the duration of colonization. As for columns (3) and (4), they show the same regressions as
in (1) and (2) however using the first stage values of ES from the 2SLS regression in Table 2.3
instrumented by population density in 1500.25 The correlation coefficients are shown in Table
2.8b. Results of column (1) and column (3) indicate that both institutional indicators are strongly
and positively correlated with European settlement with a quite high R-squared of 33% and 30%.
Column (2) and (4) present results for common European language and years spent in the empire
by the European colonizer (not only by the French colonizer). Both indicators are also positively
and significantly correlated with ES for both specifications, that is, using the original initial values
of ES and the IV values.
Note that, at this stage, we do not worry about reverse causality inherent in equation (2.3). Our
goal is to capture the correlation between European Settlements and the variables representing the
different channels, no matter in which direction causality goes. Therefore those variables do not
need to be instrumented.
After regressing the set of equations (2.3) for both specifications of ES as represented in columns
(1) to (4) in Table 2.8a, we use the estimated values of the parameters ι̂1, ι̂2, η̂1 and η̂2 presented the
same table to compute the fitted values of the part of European settlements associated to common
language and duration of colonization ÊSNi and the one associated to formal institutions ÊSIi, as
represented in the equations:
25Using the values from the first stage regression to regress them separately in a different equation, as we do here, do generate
accurate estimates; however the standard errors might not be exact. With such a large sample size, such imprecision should not affect
the results.
Chapter 2 91
Three essays on French colonial trade
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ÊSIi = ι̂1ExConstri+ ι̂2Demi, and
ÊSNi = η̂1Langi+ η̂2Duri.
(2.4)
Note that we generate two sets of fitted values for European settlements, ÊSIi and ÊSNi: the first
set using the parameters from columns (1) and (2) from Table 2.8a, estimated from the original
values of European Settlements; and the second set using the parameters from columns (3) and (4),
estimated from the instrumented values of ES from the 2SLS regression.
We now consider the extent to which these newly generated variables impacted trade between
France and its colonies as compared to the other colonial groups. We re-estimate equation (2.1),
now replacing the European settlement variable by the two fitted values from equation (2.4), which
correspond to the institutional and to the networking channels of European settlement. The new
gravity equation looks like:
LTradeist = λ0+∑
j∈J
λ1 jDi jt ÊSIi+λ2ÊSIi+∑
j∈J
λ3 jDi jt ÊSNi+λ4ÊSNi+λXit + ε (2.5)
where Xit is a vector of explanatory variables detailed previously in equation (2.1).
Since we are using predicted values for settlements associated to the two channels we con-
sider, as described in equation (2.4), we applied a re-sampling technique of 5000 samples based on
bootstrapping technique in order to obtain stable standard errors (not reported here). Like in the
previous regressions, all standard gravity variables behave well in terms of sign and significance.
France traded less with countries that are more distant, trade decreased with war, and humid and cold
climate reduced trade. Preferential trade agreements with France boosted trade with its colonies;
however, countries that had trade agreements with their respective empires tended to trade less with
France. Colonial status exerted a negative impact on trade once we controlled for settlement and
other trade policy factors.
Table 2.9 reports the POLS results of equation (2.5), using the POLS fitted values from equation
(4). In Table 2.10, we present analogous results, but using the instrumented values for European
settlement. The results of both the pooled OLS and the IV regressions are similar for the overall
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trade as well as for trade in the different sectors. For this reason we will focus on the discussion of
the instrumental variables results in Table 2.10 only.26 First, the coefficients capturing the impact of
settlements through formal institutions in Table 2.10 indicate that the quality of formal institutions
brought about by French settlements in their colonies is negatively correlated with the levels of those
colonies’ trade with France. This is true for overall trade, in column (1), as well as for exports and
imports in each of the sectors in columns (2) through (5). On the one hand, an institutional system
lacking democracy and giving full authority to the governor would allow France to secure favorable
markets for its products within its colonies, exporting food and manufactured goods to its colonies.
On the other hand, more authoritarian institutions (less constraints and less democracy) in French
colonies allowed the exploitation of raw agricultural goods and raw material for industry.
Actually, those results confirm why the French had low incentive to establish good quality insti-
tutions. Their settlements helped traders and military troops to impose control in order to facilitate
extractive policies. So, in sum, among French colonies, those with better institutions traded less
with France. Louis Faidherbe27 wrote: "In Algeria and Senegal the aim is the same, to dominate the
country at as low cost as possible and through this get the highest advantages commerce." The func-
tion of the French officials was to maintain tranquility so that the natives could work and produce
and so that they could recognize the advantages of our domination. The governors were entrusted
with the safety and tranquility of the circles and instructed to make sure that the inhabitants of their
territory demonstrated the fidelity and obedience that they owed France (Cohen, 1971). Our re-
sults also explain why post-independence trade between France and now its former colonies sharply
shrank after independence (Head et al., 2010). This decrease can be attributed to the notion of
"forced trade" developed through the system of authoritarian institutions that did not promote the
welfare of the colony.
Among British colonies, when European settlements lead to the establishment of good quality
institutions, trade with France is higher relative to the reference group. As indicated in the results
presented in Table 2.10, the institutional impact of British settlements on both French exports to
British colonies and French imports from British colonies of agricultural and industrial raw material
26Some of the instrumental variable results are higher in magnitude than the POLS results. Please, refer to section 3 for a discussion
on this difference.
27French general and colonial administrator who created the Senegalese Tirailleurs when he was governor of Senegal.
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is significantly higher than the institutional impact of French settlements. There are two possible,
and maybe complementary, explanations. First, British colonies with higher democracy and better
governance were less captive of trade with Great Britain and, therefore, freer to trade more with
France. Second, the British favored free trade policies, and colonies with a democratic system
and accountability can take more advantage of it since higher institutional quality can reduce trade
costs (Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; Hughes, 1987; Levchenko, 2007; Rauch, 1999). Overall,
when the British induced representative formal institutions in their colonies, they delivered what the
settlers wanted, and what they wanted was freedom and the ability to get rich by engaging in trade
(Denoon, 1983).28 The British were credited with allowing the native to have a hand in government
and to have a "hand-off" policy (Betts, 1961). Chailley-Bert greatly admired the flexibility of the
British colonial system, whose colonies were not rigidly categorized, were more timorous than
the French ones, and were not insisting that their legal codes are applicable anywhere." (Chailley-
Bert, 1894). Also in some of the British colonies (East-African), production was controlled by
European settlers who had political influence before the colonial government. This suggests that
the cost of enforcing extractive was higher in those British colonies which explains the difference
in colonial extraction among regions. Moroever, it has been argued that Britain was convinced with
the ineffectiveness of colonial exploitation (Brett, 1973). The French on the other hand made great
use of their political power in order to establish extractive institutions and acquire non-competitive
gains from trade.
With respect to the effect of settlements related to common language and number of years spent
in the colony, Table 2.10 also suggests that trade with French colonies benefited most from French
settlements through informal institutions, culture and networks, which we denote "network". The
results in column 1 indicate that even among extractive policies, networking would boost overall
trade. In particular, networking would increase extraction of agricultural raw material (column 4)
and French exports of manufactured goods (column 3). Greater control induced by networking
allowed the French to extract their colonies’ raw materials and sell their manufactured products and
food to those colonies. Marseilles (1984, p. 121) noted: "Colonial empire was a privileged market
28The particular case of Australia and New Zealand is an intriguing example: settlers were mainly ex-convicts who fought for the
establishment of European-like institutions in order to protect their rights against the arbitrary power of landowners, who themselves,
were the ex-jailers. They demanded jury trials, freedom from arbitrary arrest, and electoral representation (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
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for French capital exports, a compensating element and a stable outlet, an necessary outlet for raw
material."29
The network impact of European settlement, as expected, was positively and significantly cor-
related with French trade with its own colonies while it was negatively correlated with French trade
with other colonies. This is a reasonable result, since a greater number of years spent by British
and other Europeans in their colonies tended to promote Great Britain, Portugal, Spain and Ger-
many’s trade with those colonies, but was less likely to promote France’s trade with them. Actually
we would infer from the negative sign of the network effect of British settlements on trade with
France, that the common European language spoken by the British colonies was not French - the
more British settled in their colonies, the more likely those colonies would learn English and less
likely French- (Ginsburgh et al., 2014). This would make exchange more likely with the British
empire, which substitutes for trade with France.30
Overall, our initial result that the presence of settlers increased trade in French colonies but had
no significant impact on trade in non-French colonies is due to the fact that, in the French colonies,
the networking effect of settlement is stronger than the institutional effect of settlement leading to
a total positive net effect of settlements on trade within French colonies. However, the opposite is
true for the non-French colonies: actually, in those colonies the two effects have opposite signs on
trade, and the magnitude of one channel outweighs the magnitude of the other leading to net effect
of settlements not significantly different from zero.
It is possible that European settlements affected trade though different channels than the ones
tested by our model, however testing them empirically would be a daunting task. We limit our-
selves to capturing the impacts of formal institutions and of ties generated from sharing a common
language and the duration of colonization. As our results indicate, such impacts are significant and
high in magnitude. Moreover, the error terms μI and μN from equation ((2.3)) are low in magnitude,
indicating that the channels we have identified should account for a substantial share of the impact
European settlement on French trade and help shed additional light on the settlement effect reported
in this article.
29Translated from the original: “L’empire colonial, champs privilégié de l’exportation des capitaux français [...] un
élément compensateur et un débouché stable, [...] un débouché essentiel de matières premières.”
30However, we cannot disentangle trade deviation effect from direct networking effect
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2.5.4 Robustness of the empirical model
Initially, the goal of identification from equations (2.3) and (2.4) is to separate the effects generated
from formal institutions from those generated from both sharing a common language and the du-
ration of colonization, which should capture ties arising from information institution, culture and
networking. However, it is unlikely that these four variables are orthogonal. For instance, the adop-
tion of certain formal institution may be related to the duration of colonization. Hence, the estimated
parameters may contain some bias. We will attempt to correct for this by using Principle Component
Analysis (PCA hereafter) for the four variables in question. The PCA approach is performed before
a regression and it aims at reducing the number of variables by condensing some of the correlated
variables together into one single representation (or an artificial variable) called a ”principal compo-
nent”. Each factor or component is a linear combination of the initial variables, and it accounts for
a part of the total variation in the original dataset. Moreover, the generated factors are un-correlated
by construction.
Table 2.11 shows the percentage variance of the corresponding factors that were generated from
the initial four variables, namely, constraint on executive in 1900, democracy in 1900, common
European language, duration of colonization. Those percentages reflect how much of the initial
variability of the original data each factor represents. In our analysis, the first two factors represent
85.4% of the initial variability of the original four variables. Table 2.12 presents the factor loadings
(or estimates) of the linear combination between the generated factors and the initial variables. We
find that the first principal component D1 is heavily “loaded” on the two variables relate to formal
institutions, constraint on executive and democracy in 1900, while the second principal component
D2 is “loaded” on the last two variables, common language and duration of colonization. Table 2.13
shows the factor score or the component score coefficient. Those coefficients are interpreted as the
contribution of each variable to its factor. In Table 2.13 we notice that constraint on executive and
democracy contribute to almost 93% (44% + 49%) of the first factor and that common language and
duration of colonization contribute to also 93% of the second factor. Indeed, constraint on executive
and democracy appear to describe a common variability related to formal institutions while common
language and duration of colonization relate to some networking ties while ensuring orthogonality
between the two.
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This exercise allows us to predict observations for two factors D1 and D2, where D1 represents
the formal institutions and D2 represents the common language and duration of colonization, while
ensuring orthogonality between these two factors. We then estimate the part of European settlement
associated with each of these two factors. More specifically, we regress European settlements on D1
(capturing constraint on executive and democracy in 1900) and on D2 (capturing common language
and duration of colonization), as in the equation:
ESi = αI + ι1D1i+ ι2D2i+ εi (2.6)
Next, we use the estimated values of the parameters ι̂1 and ι̂2 from equation (2.6) to compute
the fitted values of the part of European settlements associated to D1 (formal institutions) and the
one associated to network ties (common language and duration of colonization), as represented in
the equations:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
ÊSIi = ι̂1D1i, and
ÊSNi = η̂1D2i.
(2.7)
Finally, we estimate equation (2.8):
LTradeist = λ0+∑
j∈J
λ1 jDi jt ÊSIi+λ2ÊSIi+∑
j∈J
λ3 jDi jt ÊSNi+λ4ÊSNi+∑
j∈J
λ5 jDi jtεi+λ6ε i+λXit+ζ , (2.8)
which is a transformation of equation (2.5), where we included the error term ε as an additional
control variable to account for the impact of ES on trade not associated with neither the institutional
factor, nor with the factor related to common language and duration of colonization.
Table 2.14 reports the ordinary least squares regression for Equation (2.8). As the results of that
table show, the aggregation of the variables constraint on executive, democracy, common language
and duration of colonization into two factors D1, related to formal institutions, and D2, related
to common language and duration of colonization, do not overturn our initial results. Similar to
the results found in Tables 2.9 and 2.10, Table 2.14 show that the quality of formal institutions
brought about by French settlements in their colonies is negatively correlated with the levels of
those colonies’ trade with France, and this is true for overall trade, as well as for exports and
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imports in each of the sectors in columns (2) through (5). Among British colonies, those with
better institutions brought by European settlements traded more with France relative to the reference
group. Also, Table 2.14 shows that the impact of common language and duration of colonization
associated to European settlement was positively and significantly correlated with French trade with
its own colonies and negatively correlated with French trade and other colonies. An additional and
interesting result is that the impact of the residual impact of settlements in French colonies ε (and
British and other colonies which is not reported here) is very low in magnitude for the overall trade
and have no impact on some sectors. This means that the channels D1 and D2 we have identified
account for most of the impact of European settlement on French trade and help shed additional
light on the settlement effect reported in this chapter.
2.6 Conclusion
How did the French, British, and other European settlements impact the French colonial trade
patterns? Did the French use their political control and networks to transfer resources from the
colony to themselves as well as secure favorable markets for their products? Did the British or other
settlers introduce institutions in their colonies that favor mutually beneficial trade, enabling them to
trade with France outside the circle of the empire? We provide some perspective on these questions
by constructing a new database of more than 20,000 observations, relying on various primary his-
torical sources containing information on the value of French sectoral imports and exports with each
of its trading partners from 1880 to 1913. We find strong evidence that French exports and imports
were higher to colonies with more French settlements. The positive impact of settlements was even
higher for French exports of manufactured goods and imports of raw materials, suggesting that the
French sought territories to both extract resources and procure markets for their products. British
and other settlements, on average, led to a reduction of French overall trade with their respective
colonies or had no significant impact. The settlement effect appears to be robust to a variety of
econometric specifications, including instrumental variable regressions and alternative instruments
and year fixed-effects.
We suggest two interrelated channels through which European settlements might have affected
French trade patterns: formal institutions and informal ones accounting for cultural and network-
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ing ties. Our empirical findings suggest that the low constraints on the French governors and the
low democracy rates in the French colonies drove the colonizers to perpetuate extractive policies,
increasing the levels of extraction through trade. We also find that British colonies with better in-
stitutions had stronger trade relations with France. Moreover, the different effects of "networks" on
different colonies help explain why the effects of European settlers on trade differ. French language
and customs were especially prevalent within the French colonies, thereby reducing the transaction
costs of trade and creating an extractive environment that favors trade boosts. These special social
network effects were not applicable when British or other Europeans settled, which explain our
finding that the networking effect lessened French trade outside French colonies.
It would have been interesting to the study the mutual benefits or costs of such trade for the
colonies. Unfortunately, proxies for measuring the cost of such trade are scarce. One alternative
and interesting avenue for future research though would be to empirically analyze how the initial
endowments of colonies affected their institutional quality and economic performance. This is seen
in the literature in terms of the natural resources curse, which documents a negative relationship
between specialization in natural resource production and institutional development (Ross, 1999).
An earlier contributor to the literature, Barro (1999), showed that oil extraction hinders democracy.
This historical evidence suggests that the institutional development depends on whether the elite or
the merchants benefited from this trade (Acemoglu et al., 2005).
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Table 2.1: French trade with colonies
Exports Imports Total
Colonies
Manufactured
Goods Food
Raw material
for industry
Manufactured
Goods
Raw
agricultural
goods
Raw material
for industry
French 11% 10% 1% 1% 69% 8% 14,993,317.56 92%
British 23% 8% 2% 0% 25% 42% 109,222.81 1%
Other 76% 4% 1% 1% 8% 9% 494,316.28 3%
Former 21% 9% 1% 1% 19% 48% 594,974.33 4%
Total 14% 9% 1% 1% 65% 10% 16,191,830.97 100%
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Table 2.2: POLS: The Effect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Goods Raw agricultural goods Raw material for industry
European Settlement 1900 0.09* 0.03*** 0.04*** -0.04** 0.01
(0.192) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
European Settlement in British Colonies 0.01 -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.06*** 0.01
(0.210) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.010)
European Settlement in other Colonies -0.17 -0.05*** -0.06*** 0.03 -0.01
(0.207) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.009)
European Settlement in Prev Colonies 0.05 -0.00 -0.02*** 0.04** 0.03***
(0.205) (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.010)
French colonies -8.48 -0.46** -1.64*** -4.49*** -0.45*
(5.724) (0.214) (0.241) (0.369) (0.251)
British colonies -12.66** -1.75*** -2.62*** -3.54*** -1.27***
(5.775) (0.215) (0.251) (0.346) (0.240)
Other Colonies -23.77*** -3.38*** -4.42*** -5.13*** -2.49***
(8.703) (0.297) (0.339) (0.481) (0.285)
Log population density 1900 1.40*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.32***
(0.333) (0.011) (0.014) (0.017) (0.012)
Log distance sqm -1.01 -0.28*** -0.38*** -0.34** 0.31***
(2.319) (0.090) (0.096) (0.152) (0.101)
Landlocked -10.48*** -1.71*** -1.84*** -1.63*** -2.08***
(2.533) (0.116) (0.139) (0.185) (0.117)
External War -0.59 -0.38 -0.94** -0.06 -0.00
(4.404) (0.515) (0.376) (1.132) (0.223)
French War -1.17 -0.26 -0.02 -0.46 -0.09
(1.057) (0.249) (0.262) (0.368) (0.239)
Temperature -0.10 -0.01 -0.02** 0.05*** 0.03***
(0.281) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.012)
Average Humidity -0.05 -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00
(0.061) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Trade preference w/ Fr colonies 6.82** 0.91*** 1.26*** 1.64*** 0.57***
(3.392) (0.139) (0.125) (0.250) (0.205)
Trade preference w/ Br colonies -0.12 -0.52*** -0.99*** 1.30*** 0.06
(3.926) (0.150) (0.174) (0.214) (0.145)
Trade preference w/ other colonies 19.96*** 1.88*** 2.88*** 2.33*** 1.84***
(6.948) (0.239) (0.252) (0.492) (0.240)
Custom union w/ Br colonies -3.12 -0.17 -0.95*** 0.65*** -0.73***
(3.861) (0.143) (0.172) (0.208) (0.133)
Custom union w/ other colonies -1.32 -0.04 -0.08 -1.29*** -0.32
(8.538) (0.286) (0.320) (0.460) (0.233)
Currency union w/ Fr colonies 11.02*** 1.63*** 1.63*** 4.05*** 0.56***
(4.035) (0.167) (0.158) (0.281) (0.213)
Currency union w/ Br colonies -1.43 -0.21 0.44** -2.05*** 0.09
(3.999) (0.154) (0.184) (0.202) (0.149)
Currency union w/ other colonies 5.35 0.66*** 0.38 1.23*** 0.44**
(6.489) (0.215) (0.233) (0.349) (0.189)
Constant 81.14*** 14.70*** 17.28*** 16.49*** 8.16***
(22.433) (0.868) (0.941) (1.511) (1.014)
Observations 1,981 2,130 2,124 2,086 2,124
R-squared 0.627 0.595 0.598 0.450 0.571
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The estimates of our standard gravity variables are significant and report the correct sign. The larger the economy, the higher is the trade in all sectors and the further
away is the country from France, the lower will its trade with France. Being landlocked and in times of war would reduce trade. Being part of a trade agreement, custom
union or currency union with France would increase trade, but being part of trade agreement with British or other empire would reduce it. Favorable climate would also
increase trade. Differences in the number of observations across columns comes from missing data across sectors. The difference is however minimal compared to the
actuale dataset. Note that we regressed the above 5 regressions using the same number of observations and results are very similar.
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Table 2.3: Instrumental Variables
Dependent Variable: European Settlement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Latitude 0.46*** 0.68***
(0.044) (0.040)
Settler Mortality (in
log)
-3.48*** -0.73*
(0.441) (0.406)
Popden1500 (in log) -6.70*** -6.87***
(0.322) (0.281)
Constant -16.43* -28.61*** 94.16*** -12.44
(8.862) (9.175) (8.275) (8.596)
Observations 2,134 1,474 2,046 1,474
R-squared 0.501 0.702 0.585 0.827
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Settlement on Trade: Instrumental Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Goods Raw agricultural goods Raw material for industry
European Settlement 1900 0.12* 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** -0.01
(0.066) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.012)
European Settlement in British Colonies -0.17*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.06*** 0.03**
(0.064) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011)
European Settlement in other Colonies -0.73*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.17*** -0.01
(0.082) (0.014) (0.016) (0.022) (0.013)
European Settlement in Prev Colonies -0.10 -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.07*** 0.04***
(0.067) (0.011) (0.013) (0.018) (0.012)
French colonies -16.56*** -1.75*** -3.19*** -6.55*** -1.32***
(1.649) (0.248) (0.300) (0.402) (0.305)
British colonies -20.22*** -2.77*** -4.29*** -4.76*** -1.96***
(1.780) (0.271) (0.331) (0.423) (0.312)
Other Colonies -15.48*** -1.76*** -3.15*** -2.33*** -1.46***
(1.845) (0.262) (0.332) (0.454) (0.307)
Log population density 1900 1.57*** 0.21*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.35***
(0.064) (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.011)
Log distance sqmKm2 -2.02*** -0.73*** -0.79*** -0.68*** 0.26***
(0.518) (0.088) (0.100) (0.126) (0.100)
Landlocked -9.64*** -1.32*** -1.58*** -0.97*** -2.05***
(0.720) (0.126) (0.158) (0.184) (0.130)
External War 2.30 -0.31 -0.72*** -0.10 0.42**
(2.469) (0.376) (0.258) (1.163) (0.208)
French War -0.78 -0.22 0.02 -0.44 -0.10
(1.498) (0.242) (0.254) (0.360) (0.238)
Temperature -0.05 0.04*** -0.01 0.14*** 0.08***
(0.092) (0.014) (0.019) (0.022) (0.017)
Average Humidity -0.11*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.01**
(0.015) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Trade preference w/ Fr colonies 8.95*** 1.34*** 1.52*** 2.63*** 1.03***
(0.886) (0.148) (0.141) (0.240) (0.221)
Trade preference w/ Br colonies 5.20*** -0.17 -0.28 1.77*** 0.63***
(0.998) (0.157) (0.189) (0.253) (0.171)
Trade preference w/ other colonies 19.18*** 1.56*** 2.79*** 0.84** 1.45***
(1.515) (0.190) (0.257) (0.374) (0.290)
Custom union w/ Br colonies 0.69 0.19 -0.30 1.30*** -0.48***
(1.019) (0.156) (0.197) (0.220) (0.157)
Custom union w/ other colonies -7.92*** -1.24*** -1.17*** -3.45*** -1.48***
(1.395) (0.212) (0.260) (0.390) (0.197)
Currency union w/ Fr colonies 9.51*** 1.63*** 1.69*** 3.37*** 0.40*
(0.881) (0.161) (0.151) (0.269) (0.210)
Currency union w/ Br colonies -3.68*** -0.47*** 0.02 -2.06*** -0.14
(0.933) (0.150) (0.184) (0.199) (0.156)
Currency union w/ other colonies -4.19*** -0.76*** -1.27*** -0.72** -0.53***
(1.175) (0.189) (0.215) (0.302) (0.151)
Constant 96.84*** 18.35*** 21.95*** 18.62*** 7.94***
(6.195) (1.003) (1.249) (1.400) (1.122)
Observations 1,899 2,063 2,056 2,014 2,058
R-squared 0.655 0.620 0.616 0.503 0.558
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<.1
Note: The instrument used for the above regressions is population density in 1500. ES refer to European Settlement in 1900. The first variable is the reference variable not
interacted with any colonial dummy but actually representing ES in the French colonies.. Differences in the number of observations across columns comes from missing
data across sectors, and between this table and the POLS comes from the introduction of instruments which contain missing information. The difference is however minimal
compared to the actuale dataset. Note that we regressed the above 5 regressions using the same number of observations and results are very similar.
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Table 2.5: Robustness Checks of Effect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
POLS POLS full
sample
POLS Land
area
IV latitude IV Settler
mortality
IV Population
density 1500
IV all
instruments
ES 0.09* 0.07* 0.006* 0.90*** 1.17*** 0.12* 0.42***
(0.048) (0.045) (0.003) (0.068) (0.131) (0.066) (0.052)
ES in British 0.01 0.05 -0.006 0.16** 0.03 -0.17*** -0.21***
Colonies (0.053) (0.049) (0.27) (0.069) (0.076) (0.064) (0.054)
ES in Other -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.13 0.30* -0.73*** 0.56***
colonies (0.052) (0.048) (0.006) (0.097) (0.164) (0.082) (0.183)
ES in Former 0.05 0.06 0.03*** 0.12** 0.08 -0.10 -0.10*
Colonies (0.052) (0.047) (0.004) (0.060) (0.081) (0.067) (0.056)
Constant 72.66*** 82.21*** 12.83*** 58.62*** 108.31*** 80.28*** 94.58***
(5.065) (4.790) (0.391) (4.480) (6.919) (5.709) (6.952)
All Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1,981 2,815 2544 1,986 1,362 1,899 1,362
R-squared 0.627 0.60 0.425 0.667 0.71 0.655 0.694
P-value Chi
squared test
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: ES refer to European Settlement in 1900. The first variable is the reference variable not interacted with any colonial dummy but actually representing the
French colonies. The first column is the base regression for POLS. Column 2 and 3 report results with different data specifications. The Column 2 includes the
full sample from year 1880-1913. Column 3 reports results for different weights values of trade. Trade data was diasgregated from the region level to the country
level using arable land area as a weight instead of our base one which is the population. Column 5 6 and 7 use different instrumental variables. The results for
the standard gravity variable are also significant and exert the correct sign for the various specifications. The bigger the size, the higher is the trade ofr all sectors
and the further is the country from France, the less likely they will trade with France. Being landlocked and in times of war would reduce trade. Being part of a
trade agreement, custom union or currency union with france would increase trade, but being part of trade agreement with british or other empire would reduce it.
Favorable climate would also increase trade. Colonial dummies seem to exert a negative impact on trade. Those results indicate that that colonial status per se does
not necessarily present a positive impact on French trade if settlement and trade policies are not accounted for.
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Table 2.6: Cross-section OLS: The Effect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Goods Raw agricultural goods Raw material for industry
European Settlement 1900 0.62** 0.13*** 0.13*** 0.07 0.08**
(0.267) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055) (0.037)
European Settlement in Br Colonies -0.59** -0.13*** -0.13** -0.06 -0.07*
(0.283) (0.048) (0.053) (0.059) (0.040)
European Settlement in other Colonies -0.85*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.11* -0.10**
(0.286) (0.049) (0.054) (0.059) (0.040)
European Settlement in Prev Colonies -0.27 -0.08 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
(0.277) (0.047) (0.052) (0.057) (0.039)
Log population density 1900 0.97*** 0.10** 0.14*** 0.09* 0.26***
(0.266) (0.045) (0.050) (0.055) (0.037)
Log distance sqm 1.56 0.14 0.12 0.65 0.79**
(2.502) (0.426) (0.471) (0.519) (0.351)
Landlock -7.68** -1.08* -1.06 -1.88** -1.35***
(3.484) (0.593) (0.655) (0.723) (0.489)
Temperature -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.274) (0.047) (0.052) (0.057) (0.039)
Average Humidity -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.00
(0.058) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.008)
Trade preference w/ Fr colonies 13.61*** 2.26*** 2.47*** 2.38*** 1.40***
(3.664) (0.623) (0.689) (0.761) (0.514)
Trade preference w/ Br colonies -4.75 -1.10* -1.26* -0.62 -0.53
(3.610) (0.614) (0.679) (0.750) (0.507)
Trade preference w/ other colonies 11.17* 0.59 1.77 1.56 0.93
(5.930) (1.009) (1.115) (1.231) (0.832)
Constant 50.40** 10.03** 11.45*** 5.76 3.49
(22.955) (3.904) (4.318) (4.766) (3.222)
Observations 98 98 98 98 98
R-squared 0.522 0.485 0.497 0.376 0.608
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<.1
Note: The first variable is the reference variable not interacted with any colonial dummy but actually representing ES in the French
colonies. The results show that they are significant and report the correct sign. The larger the economy, the higher is the trade in all
sectors and the further away is the country from France, the lower will its trade with France. Being landlocked and in times of war would
reduce trade.
Table 2.7: Cross-section IV: The Effect of Settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Goods Raw agricultural goods Raw material for industry
European Settlement 1900 0.58** 0.15*** 0.12** 0.08 0.06
(0.249) (0.042) (0.049) (0.052) (0.036)
European Settlement in Br Colonies -0.55** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.06 -0.05
(0.26) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
European Settlement in other Colonies -1.15*** -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.17*** -0.11**
(0.30) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04)
European Settlement in Prev Colonies -0.15 -0.07* -0.05 0 0.01
(0.24) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Log population density 1900 1.14*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.13** 0.28***
(0.25) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Constant 60.78*** 12.34*** 13.90*** 7.68 3.49
(22.97) (3.88) (4.48) (4.78) (3.35)
Observations 95 95 95 95 95
R-squared 0.58 0.565 0.534 0.45 0.612
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<.1
Note: The first variable is the reference variable not interacted with any colonial dummy but actually representing ES in the French
colonies. The results show that they are significant and report the correct sign. The larger the economy, the higher is the trade in all
sectors and the further away is the country from France, the lower will its trade with France. Being landlocked and in times of war would
reduce trade.
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Table 2.8: The channels of European Settlement
(a) The channels of Settlement
European Settlement
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS OLS IV IV
Constraint on Executive 0.92** 1.70***
(0.456) (0.366)
Democracy 4.42*** 2.63***
(0.311) (0.249)
Common Language 14.48*** 18.34***
(1.54) (1.174)
Duration of colonization 0.04*** 0.03***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 2,068 2,134 2,002 2,068
R-squared 0.333 0.176 0.299 0.265
(b) Correlation Matrix
Constraint on Democracy Common Duration of
Executive Language Colonization
Constraint on Executive 1
Democracy 0.8673 1
Common language 0.5045 0.3860 1
Duration of colonization 0.3551 0.2026 0.5029 1
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The same regression was repeated at the cross section level. Estimates are similar in terms of magnitude and sig-
nificance. The standard errors are smaller however. But none of this overturn our results. Hence, we chose to report this
regression for consistency in the sample size
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Table 2.9: POLS: The effects of channels of settlement on trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured
goods
Raw agricultural
goods
Raw material
for industry
Institutional effect -0.54*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.071) (0.012) (0.01) (0.028) (0.009)
Institutions effect in
British colonies 0.71*** 0.08*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.14***
(0.077) (0.013) (0.012) (0.028) (0.01)
Institutions effect in
Previous colonies 0.44*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.11***
(0.084) (0.014) (0.013) (0.029) (0.013)
Institutions effect in
Other colonies 4.62*** 0.76*** 1.09*** 1.04*** 0.12
(0.764) (0.121) (0.17) (0.136) (0.121)
Network effect 1.25*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.32*** 0.16***
(0.081) (0.013) (0.014) (0.022) (0.016)
Network effect in
British colonies -1.03*** -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.14*** -0.11***
(0.091) (0.015) (0.016) (0.025) (0.017)
Network effect in
Previous colonies -0.87*** -0.12*** -0.06* -0.26*** 0.01
(0.164) (0.026) (0.033) (0.049) (0.033)
Network effect in
Other colonies -0.74*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.17*** -0.11***
(0.114) (0.019) (0.021) (0.031) (0.02)
Control Variables YES YES YES YES YES
Constant 86.64*** 16.76*** 17.69*** 17.46*** 6.91***
(5.078) (0.844) (1.054) (1.522) (1.102)
Year Fixed Effects YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1916 2064 2058 2020 2058
R-Squared 0.71 0.675 0.683 0.562 0.61
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note: The institutions effects and network effects represent the fitted values of the European settlements explained by either
as shown in equation 5. The first variable of each represent the reference variable not interacted with any colonial dummy
but actually representing the French colonies. The residual is the unexplained part of the settlements. The standard gravity
variables not reported in this table show that they are significant and exert the correct sign.
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Table 2.10: IV: The Effects of channels of settlement on Trade
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured
goods
Raw agricultural
goods
Raw material
for industry
Institutions effect -0.84*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.23*** -0.10***
(0.139) (0.024) (0.024) (0.044) (0.033)
Institutions effect in
British colonies
1.16*** 0.16*** 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.16***
(0.147) (0.025) (0.026) (0.045) (0.033)
Institutions effect in
Previous colonies
0.77*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.18*** 0.12***
(0.148) (0.026) (0.026) (0.046) (0.035)
Institutions effect in
Other colonies
-1.39*** -0.20*** -0.32*** -0.30*** 0.07
(0.385) (0.056) (0.082) (0.075) (0.068)
Network effect 1.12*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.26*** 0.15***
(0.08) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.018)
Network effect in
British colonies
-0.19 -0.13*** -0.23*** 0.20*** 0.04
(0.166) (0.028) (0.032) (0.042) (0.028)
Network effect in
Previous colonies
-1.33*** -0.33*** -0.30*** -0.08* -0.18***
(0.157) (0.024) (0.029) (0.048) (0.035)
Network effect in
Other colonies
-0.1 -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.02 -0.04*
(0.138) (0.023) (0.023) (0.036) (0.024)
Residuals in French
Colonies
All Controls
Constant 104.79*** 21.89*** 23.54*** 17.46*** 11.41***
(5.335) (0.868) (1.056) (1.439) (1.076)
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 1916 2064 2058 2020 2058
R-squared 0.709 0.663 0.671 0.565 0.606
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p< 0.01, ** p< 0.05, * p< 0.1
Note: The institutions effects and network effects represent the fitted values of the European settlements explained by either
as shown in equation 5. The first variable of each represent the reference variable not interacted with any colonial dummy
but actually representing the French colonies. The residual is the unexplained part of the settlements. The standard gravity
variables not reported in this table show that they are significant and exert the correct sign.
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Table 2.11: Percentage of variance
D1 D2 F3 F4
Variability (%) 47.401 38.002 11.681 2.915
Cumulative % 47.401 85.403 97.085 100.000
Table 2.12: Factor loadings
D1 D2
constraint on executive 0.913 0.307
Democracy 0.965 0.106
Common language 0.357 0.767
Duration of colonization 0.065 0.909
Table 2.13: Component score coefficients
D1 D2 Dot product
constraint on executive 0.493 -0.030 -0.014
44% 6%
Democracy 0.586 -0.206 -0.12
49% 1%
Common language -0.002 0.505 -0.001
7% 39%
Duration of colonization -0.232 0.707 -0.16
0.2% 54%
-0.30
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Table 2.14: The Effects of channels of settlement on trade: PCA approach
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Exports Imports
Total Trade Food Manufactured Goods Raw agricultural goods Raw material for industry
Institutional effect of Settlement -0.47*** -0.04** -0.03** -0.18*** -0.10***
(0.081) (0.016) (0.013) (0.029) (0.014)
Institutional effect in Br colonies 0.75*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.19*** 0.15***
(0.086) (0.017) (0.015) (0.029) (0.014)
Institutional effect in Prev colonies 0.53*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.18*** 0.14***
(0.091) (0.017) (0.016) (0.031) (0.016)
Institutional effect in Other colonies 0.67*** 0.09** 0.15*** 0.25*** 0.04
(0.225) (0.035) (0.045) (0.05) (0.035)
Network effect of Settlement 1.68*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.33*** 0.23***
(0.121) (0.019) (0.02) (0.034) (0.022)
Network effect in Br col -1.25*** -0.27*** -0.35*** -0.07* -0.15***
(0.122) (0.02) (0.021) (0.038) (0.023)
Network effect in Prev colonies -1.16*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.26*** -0.01
(0.233) (0.038) (0.047) (0.066) -0.045
Network effect in Other colonies 0.19 -0.04** -0.03 0.13*** -0.04*
(0.133) (0.021) (0.023) (0.038) (0.024)
Residuals of settlements -0.05 0 0.02*** -0.10*** 0
(0.042) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.008)
Residual in Br colonies 0.06 -0.01 -0.05*** 0.13*** -0.01
(0.053) (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.01)
Residual in Prev colonies 0.40*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.14*** 0.06***
(0.047) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.009)
Residual in Other colonies -0.08 -0.03*** -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.01
(0.047) (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009)
French colonies -3.39 1.28*** 1.11** -4.34*** 1.35***
(2.299) (0.381) (0.492) (0.637) (0.47)
British colonies -12.70*** -1.55*** -1.92*** -2.90*** -0.13
(2.161) (0.352) (0.471) (0.583) (0.449)
Other Colonies -24.03*** -3.05*** -2.70*** -5.56*** -1.76***
(2.515) (0.421) (0.536) (0.649) (0.475)
Log population density 1900 2.12*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.37*** 0.41***
(0.112) (0.017) (0.021) (0.021) (0.017)
Log distance sqm -3.06*** -0.63*** -0.50*** -1.39*** 0.20*
(0.537) (0.09) (0.095) (0.144) (0.114)
Landlocked -9.27*** -1.46*** -1.40*** -1.79*** -1.83***
(0.614) (0.101) (0.123) (0.178) (0.113)
External War 1.92 -0.23 -0.77* 0.26 0.25
(3.099) (0.435) (0.432) (1.155) (0.256)
Temperature 0.18*** 0.03*** 0.02** 0.10*** 0.05***
(0.057) (0.009) (0.01) (0.015) (0.011)
Average Humidity 0 0.00* 0 -0.01*** 0
(0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Trade preference w/ Fr colonies 3.46*** 0.28** 0.69*** 0.68*** 0.12
(0.803) (0.123) (0.12) (0.218) (0.202)
Trade preference w/ Br colonies 2.37** -0.07 -0.25 1.29*** 0.45***
(0.926) (0.14) (0.165) (0.188) (0.148)
Trade preference w/ other colonies 2.19 -0.51*** 0.40* -2.24*** 0.2
(1.37) (0.181) (0.241) (0.42) (0.237)
Custom union w/ Br colonies -3.46*** -0.09 -0.62*** 0.01 -0.76***
(0.83) (0.139) (0.156) (0.224) (0.122)
Custom union w/ other colonies -5.61*** -0.49** -0.41* -2.21*** -0.90***
(1.071) (0.192) (0.227) (0.272) (0.171)
Currency union w/ Fr colonies 9.36*** 1.32*** 1.42*** 3.60*** 0.13
(0.898) (0.151) (0.142) (0.278) (0.211)
Currency union w/ Br colonies -2.31** -0.36** 0.03 -1.62*** 0.07
-0.907 -0.143 -0.166 -0.212 -0.142
Currency union w/ other colonies 11.00*** 1.42*** 1.07*** 2.72*** 0.94***
(1.168) (0.164) (0.191) (0.287) (0.18)
Constant 82.05*** 14.79*** 13.96*** 22.60*** 6.41***
(5.882) (0.929) (1.023) (1.53) (1.177)
Observations 1,981 2,130 2,124 2,086 2,124
R-squared 0.74 0.71 0.706 0.597 0.64
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table B.1: The European Settlement as constructed from Huillery
District Precolonial
Empire
Current
Country
Name
European
Settlement
District Precolonial
Empire
Current
Country
Name
European
Settlement
Porto-Novo Adjatche benin 39.8 Nara Kaarta mali 22.5
Borgou Borgu benin 39.8 Nioro Kaarta mali 22.5
Abomey Dahomey benin 39.8 Sikasso Kenedugu mali 22.5
Allada Dahomey benin 39.8 Bandiagara Macina mali 22.5
Ouidah Dahomey benin 39.8 Gourma Macina mali 22.5
Tenkodogo Tenkodogo burkina
faso
10.1 Mopti Macina mali 22.5
Ouagadougou Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Macina Segu mali 22.5
Ouahigouya Yatenga burkina
faso
10.1 Segou Segu mali 22.5
Koudougou Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Adrar Emirate of
Adrar
mauritania 9.4
Bobodioulasso Gwiriko burkina
faso
10.1 Brakna Emirate of
Brakna
mauritania 9.4
Kaya Wagadugu burkina
faso
10.1 Trarza Emirate of
Trarza
mauritania 9.4
Dori Liptako burkina
faso
10.1 Tagant Emirate of
Tagant
mauritania 9.4
Fada Liptako burkina
faso
10.1 Goure Kanem-
Bornu
niger 7.4
Kindia Fuuta Jaalo guinea 70 NGuigmi Kanem-
Bornu
niger 7.4
Koumbia Fuuta Jaalo guinea 70 Dosso Sokoto niger 7.4
Labe Fuuta Jaalo guinea 70 Konny Sokoto niger 7.4
Mamou Fuuta Jaalo guinea 70 Tessaoua Sokoto niger 7.4
Pita Fuuta Jaalo guinea 70 Zinder Sokoto niger 7.4
Matam Fuuta Toro guinea 70 Hautegambie Bundu senegal 179
Podor Fuuta Toro guinea 70 Baol Bawol senegal 179
Kankan Samori guinea 70 Thies Bawol senegal 179
Kissidougou Samori guinea 70 Louga Jolof senegal 179
Kouroussa Samori guinea 70 Tivaouane Kajoor senegal 179
Bondoukou Abron ivory coast 11.7 Sinesaloum Siin Salum senegal 179
Assinie Sanwi ivory coast 11.7 Dagana Waalo senegal 179
111
T
hree
essays
on
French
colonialtrade
Table B.2: The country dis-aggregation data
Regions as defined in the Tableau du Commerce general de la France Countries
Segregated
Colonizer Year of
Colonization
Year of inde-
pendence
Europe
Possessions anglaises
de la mediterranee
Gibraltar GBR 1700 2012
Cyprus GBR 1878 1960
Malta GBR 1802 1964
Afrique
Egypte Egypt GBR 1882 1922
Etats Barbaresques
Regence De Tripoli Libya ITA 1910 1947
Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Cote occidentale (Du
maroc au cap de bonne
esperance)
Western Sahara ESP 1884 1965
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Guinea Bissau PRT 1800 1973
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Liberia USA 1847
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Equatorial Guinea ESP 1844 1968
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Congo FRA 1903 1960
Dr Of Congo BEL 1885 1960
Namibia DEU 1884 1949
Angola PRT 1500 1975
Sao Tome And
Principe
PRT 1500 1975
Botswana GBR 1885 1966
Afrique Possessions Anglaises
Partie Occidentale (Y
Compris Le Gap De
Bonne Esperance
Sierra Leone GBR 1808 1961
Gambia GBR 1888 1965
Ghana GBR 1874 1957
South Africa GBR 1806 1910
Nigeria GBR 1800 1914
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Partie Orientale (Y
Compris L’ile
Maurice)
Malawi GBR 1891 1964
Tanzania GBR 1918 1961
Kenya GBR 1888 1963
Uganda GBR 1894 1962
Somalia GBR 1884 1960
Sudan GBR 1899 1960
Mauritius GBR 1835 1968
Zimbabwe GBR 1888 1965
Zambia GBR 1899 1964
Afrique
Autres Pays (Y
Compris L’ile De
Madagascar)
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Niger FRA 1922 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Ethiopia
Mozambique PRT 1500 1975
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Asie et Oceanie Indes Comptoirs
Anglais
India GBR 1857 1947
Myanmar GBR 1857 1948
Pakistan GBR 1857 1947
Bangladesh GBR 1857 1971
Hollandais (Java Et
Sumatra)
Indonesia PRT 1600 1945
Asie et Oceanie
Philippines Philippines ESP 1521 1898
Chine China
Royaume De Siam Thailand
Japon Japan
Australie Australia GBR 1750 1901
Autres Iles De
L’oceanie
Fiji GBR 1700 1970
Solomon Islands GBR 1893 1978
New Zealand GBR 1840 1907
Amerique Septentrionale
Etats Unis
Ocean Atlantique United States GBR 1600 1776
Ocean Pacifique
Mexique Mexico ESP 1650 1810
Amerique Centrale
Guatemala-CostaRica-
Honduras
Guatemala ESP 1519 1821
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Costa Rica ESP 1522 1821
Honduras ESP 1520 1821
Nouvelle Grenade Colombia ESP 1525 1808
Amerique Meridionale
Cote est
Venezuella Venezuela ESP 1490 1821
Brezil Brazil PRT 1500 1822
Uruguay
(MonteVideo)
Uruguay ESP 1500 1821
Republique Argentine Argentina ESP 1500 1816
cote ouest
Equateur Ecuador ESP 1500 1822
Perou Peru ESP 1500 1821
Bolivie Bolivia ESP 1500 1825
Chili Chile ESP 1500 1810
Amerique Antilles et possessions Europeennes
colonies anglaises Canada Canada GBR 1763 1867
Autres Y Compris Les
Antilles
Barbados GBR 1650 1966
Bahamas GBR 1650 1973
Jamaica GBR 1650 1962
Guyana GBR 1700 1966
British Virgin
Islands
GBR 1672 1967
Dominica GBR 1805 1978
Grenada GBR 1763 1974
Saint Lucia GBR 1750 1979
Trinidad And
Tobago
GBR 1750 1962
Antigua Et
Barbuda
GBR 1632 1981
Haiti Et Republique
Dominicaine
Haiti FRA 1697 1804
Dominican
Republic
ESP 1500 1865
Colonies espagnoles
Cuba-Porto Ricco
Cuba ESP 1492 1898
Puerto Rico ESP 1493 1898
Saint Thomas Virgin Islands (Us) DNK 1600 1917
Colonies Hollandaises
Aruba PRT 1600 1986
Suriname PRT 1683 1975
Colonies Francaises
Algerie Algeria FRA 1830 1962
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Tunisie Tunisia FRA 1881 1956
Maroc Morocco FRA 1912 1956
Congo Congo FRA 1903 1960
Senegal Senegal FRA 1850 1960
Etablissement
Francais De La Cote
Occidental D’afrique
Guinea FRA 1890 1960
Colonies Francaises
Central African
Republic
FRA 1889 1960
Gabon FRA 1885 1960
Ivory Coast FRA 1889 1960
Benin FRA 1892 1960
Mali FRA 1892 1960
Mauritania FRA 1895 1960
Burkina Fasso FRA 1897 1960
Chad FRA 1900 1960
Togo FRA 1918 1960
Cameroon FRA 1918 1960
Colonies Francaises
Madagascar Et
Dependences
Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Mayotte Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Noisy-Be Madagascar FRA 1883 1960
Ile De La Reunion Reunion FRA 1642 2012
Cote Des Somalis Djibouti FRA 1896 1977
Etablissement
Francaise De L’inde
Laos FRA 1880 1949
Cambodia FRA 1863 1953
Indo-chine Francaise Vietnam FRA 1859 1945
Etablissements
Francais de l’ oceanie
Nouvelle Caledonie New Caledonia FRA 1853 2012
Autres Etablissements
French Polynesia FRA 1842 2012
New Hebrides
(Vanuatu)
FRA 1880 1980
Guyane Francaise French Guiana FRA 1814 2012
Martinique Martinique FRA 1685 2012
Guadeloupe Guadeloupe FRA 1635 2012
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Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon Et Grande
Peche
Saint Pierre Et
Miquelon
FRA 1814 2012
C
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Table B.3: The Correlation matrix between population variables
Lpopulation
density
1500
European
settlement
1900
Lpopulation
density
1900
Population
Lpopulation
density
1500
1
European
settlement
1900
0.096 1
Lpopulation
density
1900
-0.003 0.027 1
Population 0.019 -0.097 0.255 1
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Chapter 3
The French colonial patterns of imports,
Institutions, current Economic
performance
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the relation between the type of goods colonies exported to France
and those economies’ later development. A common explanation for the export-growth nexus is the
quality of institutions established in those colonies during the colonial period. The issue we explore
is whether colonial trade patterns have directly affected development in the former colonies today,
or have operated indirectly through institutions. In order to investigate the impact of colonial trade
on current growth through the mediation of institutions, we use the Partial Least Squares Structural
Equation Modeling. This method allows us to simultaneously predict the relative importance of
French imports and of institutions on growth, while taking into account multicollinearity between
the variables, their measurements errors and small sample size issues. The results are suggestive
of an important joint role for both trade and institutions in determining economic development
in the long run. In particular French colonies who exported raw material developed extractive
institutions, which negatively affected development today, while those who exported manufactured
goods experience better economic performance today. Among British and other colonies, however,
higher exports of both raw materials and of manufactured goods to France are associated with better
institutions. These differences had a long-run impact on economic development.
118
Three essays on French colonial trade
3.1 Introduction
A number of studies have highlighted a positive relation between export growth and economic
growth (Leamer, 1984; Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Frankel and Romer, 1999; Acemoglu et al.,
2005). However, a puzzling phenomenon is that some export dependent countries are often also un-
derdeveloped, especially former colonies (Rungi, 2010). Some countries and regions that specialize
in exporting their abundant natural resources and agricultural commodities become trapped in their
resource comparative advantages, so that such trade does not translate into higher growth rates for
the country. This phenomenon is related to the "resource curse" (Arroyo Abad and van Zanden,
2014). For example, we have, on the one hand, resource-rich Nigeria and Russia with low levels
of economic growth (Aragona et al., 2015), and, on the other hand, resource-poor Republic of Ko-
rea, Japan and Switzerland who experienced high growth in the 19th and 20th centuries. Abundant
natural resources is not necessarily a curse, however: Norway’s income per capita, for instance,
increased drastically a decade after the discovery of oil (Larsen, 2006).
We explore the idea that the impact of exports and the exploitation of natural resources on
growth may be mediated by the quality of domestic institutions. According to Auty (2001), Mikesell
(1997) and Gelb (1988), a negative relation between growth and international specialization may be
the result of the quality of institutions. In particular, a weak governance could imply a wasting of
benefits derived from trade; such benefits could be in the form of knowledge creation, innovation or
also in the formation of human and physical capital (Sachs and Warner, 1995), whereas countries
that export goods whose production is associated with better governance and higher productivity
levels grow more rapidly (Hausmann et al., 2007). Moreover, Van der Ploeg (2011) attributes the
positive growth experiences of resource rich countries to the high level of industrial diversification,
of growth of manufacturing, of expenditures on education and of the development of institutions
and market friendly policies. The disappointing levels of economic growth in similar countries, on
their turn, is related to appreciation of the real exchange rate, deindustrialization, and to the inability
of a country to transform its resources into other productive assets. Such adverse effects are more
severe in countries with bad institutions, higher corruption levels, lack of democracy.1
The role of institutions has been identified in previous research to be a fundamental cause for
1For a detailed discussion on the role of institutions on the relation between resources abundance and growth, see Van Der Ploeg
(2011).
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the differences in income per capita across regions. Countries facing better institutions, higher
accountability, less corruption, more rule of law will perform more efficiently and hence achieve
greater incomes (Acemoglu et al., 2001; Alam, 1994; Bretocchi and Canova 2002; Kwon, 2011;
Lange et al., 2006; Nunn, 2008; North and Thomas, 1973). Following this literature, we focus on
the importance of considering the quality of institutions as a mediator the impact of colonial exports
on current level of development in former colonies. In particular, using data on colonial exports
to France, we investigate the role of the colony’s institutional quality on the relation between its
exports to France and current growth, taking into account the potential interaction between trade
pattern and institutions.
The idea is the following: On the one hand, in colonies with good institutions, trade with France
should be mutually beneficial, whereas for a colony with bad institutions, trade with France could
take the form of extractive trade for the benefit of the greater power. On the other hand, the source
of differences in those institutions may be the potential benefit for the colonizer from exploiting
the resources of the colony. Resource abundant colonies with potential exports of primary products
tended to attract extractive colonial institutions, built for the purpose of transferring resources from
the colony to the colonizer. Finally, we argue that those institutions persisted until present and
affected current economic growth.
More precisely, our empirical investigation rests on three premises: First, according to Sachs
and Warner (1995) and to Mehlum et al. (2006), resource abundance is usually measured as the
relative size of primary exports. Empirical evidence provided by Leamer (1984) and Trefler (1995)
confirms that the relative abundance of oil leads to net exports of crude oil and that of coal and
mineral leads to net exports of raw materials. In our empirical analysis, we will study the colonial
exports of primary goods to France, which we argue to be an indicator of the abundance of natural
resources in the colony. Second, there were various types of colonial institutions. At one extreme,
there were the extractive states, which "main purpose was to transfer as much resources from the
colony to the colonizer" (Acemoglu et al., 2001, p. 2). There were also colonies with institutions
that replicated the European style ones, with constraints and checks over government power. In
particular, the mix of products that the colonizer imports from the colony is informative about the
type of institutions set by the colonizer. Whenever the colony is rich in raw material, such as sugar
or gold, with potential extraction opportunities, institutions tend to be coercive in order to facilitate
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such extraction (Acemoglu et al., 2001). On the contrary, if the country specializes in the production
of manufactures, trade empowers merchants that supported pro-business institutions and constraints
on the executive.2 Finally, the colonial institutions set during the colonial reign persisted and had a
long-term impact on today’s economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001).
In sum, our empirical model tests three main hypotheses: i) There is a correlation between
the mix of French imports from colonies and the type of institutions introduced by the colonizer
as depicted under H1 in Figure 3.1. ii) Those colonial institutions are positively correlated with
current ones meaning that they persisted over time as H2 in the same figure shows. iii) Finally,
current institutions affect economic performance today as indicated by H3 in Figure 3.1.
The relation between French imports from colonies and colonial institutions depends in part on
whether those institutions were necessary to increase the rent extracted from the colonizer through
colonial trade. A negative relation establishes that colonies exporting relatively more to France
developed worse institutions. This result would suggest that the colonizer favors more extractive
institutions to increase the rent from trade. A positive relation, on its turn, would imply that trade
is beneficial to both parties and that good institutions are necessary to increase such trade. For
instance, if domestic merchants and not only the colonizer were gaining from trade with France,
they would push for better institutions.3
To address this issue, we constructed an original data set from various primary sources on French
imports of both raw material4 and of manufactured goods from 1880 to 1912, as described in chap-
ter one of this thesis. Our empirical analysis is based on Partial Least Square Structural Equation
Modeling (PLS-SEM),5 initially proposed by Wold (1966), which is a particular form of Struc-
tural Equation Modeling (SEM). This method, which combines both factor analysis and traditional
multivariate regression models, has a number of attractive statistical features not present in the
2
A seminal example is the one of the industrial revolution in Great Britain that lead to the increase of English production and exports
of manufactures. Those exports benefited English merchants who encouraged the establishment of pro-business institutions (Nunn and
Trefler, 2013).
3A noteworthy example is the trade between Western Europe and the countries across the Atlantic. The gains from such trade
was beneficial to European merchants who pushed for better institutions, which in turn affected the economic performance of Europe
(Acemolgu et al., 2005).
4French imports of raw materials consisted of sugar, fruits and other agricultural products, as well as of tobacco, phosphate, iron,
ore, copper, zinc, tin, coal, oil, wood, rubber, silk, cotton.
5This method is also known as Partial Least Squares Path Modeling (PLS-PM).
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traditional econometric models. In particular, it makes the best predictions about the unobserved
dependent variables, based first, on the observed values of the independent variables and on the lin-
ear combination that we apriori have defined among those variables. The unobserved variables are
constructed under features of factor analysis techniques specific to PLS-SEM (Wold, 1966; Chin,
1998). Once the constructed values are predicted, the model allows the conduction of several regres-
sions simultaneously under one model. Note that SEM has been used in social sciences since the
1970s (Bollen, 1990; Joreskog, 1973), and more recently it has become a quasi-standard method in
marketing and management research when it comes to analyzing the cause–effect relations between
latent constructs (Hair et al., 2011).
One of the difficulties we face in our empirical investigation is that we use some concepts which
cannot be captured by a single observable variable, such as the abundance in natural resources, the
quality of institutions, the level of human capital, etc. PLS-SEM solves this problem by empiri-
cally validating the indicators used to measure our concepts, making sure not to mix the measure of
each concept with another measure. Structural Equation Modeling allows predicting the unobserved
conceptual variables using the observable data while verifying the validity of those constructed vari-
ables (Wold, 1966, 1985; Bollen and Jackman 1985, 1989). More specifically, PLS-SEM measures
the reliability of the construct by measuring the correlation between comparable parts within the
same construct (internal consistency approach, Chin, 2010). Actually mis-measuring any of those
conceptual variables may generate misleading results in the structural relation between two con-
structs (Wold, 1966, 1985).6 Here is an example of how the different prediction of a concept may
affect consequent results. Arezki and Van Der Ploeg (2007) confirmed the resource curse hypothesis
for countries with poor institutions, showing that they have low level of investment. However, their
OLS result does not survive the use of Instrumental Variables techniques and when institutions are
measured using the de jure method (that is, colonial settler mortality, legal origin and the fraction
of the population speaking English language to account for institutions). Hence, the measure of
institutions seems to matter in the resource curse-growth debate.
Another problem our empirical study faces is that of multicollinearity. Actually countries with
6The impact of political democracy on income inequality in Bollen and Jackman (1985) and in Muller (1988) differs depending
on the indicators used to measure either variables. Such conflicting impacts could arise from either invalid indicators used to measure
political democracy, or from the failure to accurately validate their reliability (Bollen, 1990; Wold, 1966).
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better institutions and countries that trade more grow faster. Also, countries with better institutions
tend to trade more (Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Regressions of measures of trade and of institutional
quality on GDP are uninformative about the relative importance of each of the two predictors on
growth because of the very high collinearity between them and of eventual measurement errors in
measuring each of those conceptual variables. PLS-SEM is designed to deal with this problem,
especially when the sample size is small and collinearity is high between the variables.7 Its added
value relies in conducting simultaneous regressions of the impact of colonial exports of raw mate-
rial to France on the quality of institutions, and that of the quality of institutions on GDP. Also, it
generates the partial effect of French imports on GDP which is mediated by the channel of institu-
tions. Unlike any other model, PLS-SEM allows us to reveal the mediator effect of institutions of
the impact of trade on GDP (Hair et al, 2011; Henseler et al., 2009).
Furthermore, this model allows comparing the results across different groups of colonies. It
produces a multi-group analysis to check whether there are any significant differences among the
coefficients of each colonial group. The multi-group analysis ensures the comparability among
the groups by standardizing the variances across the groups in order to guarantee the validity of
outcomes and conclusions (Hair et al., 2015; Lohmöller, 1989; Wold, 1982).
We will then be able to compare the effects of French imports on institutions and on GDP and
that of institutions on GDP across different colonial groups. Our hypothesis becomes clear: if
French imports of primary products from their colonies are associated with more extractive institu-
tions, it would suggest that worse institutions in French colonies are correlated with trade extrac-
tion.8 Indeed, according to Grier (1999), Bretocchi and Canova (2002), French colonies rich in
primary products were to become less fortunate in the future because they attracted more extractive
institutions and were subject to greater exploitation. As for the other colonial groups, a positive
relation between French imports and colonial institutions could suggest that, trade with France was
generating gains to either local merchants or to the domestic colonizer encouraging them to es-
tablish better institutions in order to facilitate such trade, or that non-French colonies with better
7Note that, since we are not concerned about the individual coefficients in generating our constructs, multicollinearity is not a
problem in constructing our concepts. On the contrary, even if two variables are highly correlated, it is worth including both of them if
each one contributes significantly to the predictive power of the model.
8It could be that either French colonizers set institutions in favor of extraction or that French colonies with worse
institutions allowed for trade extraction.
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institutions were freer to trade with France.
This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, we study the impact on the eco-
nomic development of former colonies that simultaneously integrates institutional differences with
differences in the natural resource endowments. To explain this phenomenon, we need to collect
information about the natural resources, and about colonial institutions during the colonial period,
and to understand the link between the two. Second, we constructed variables such as the quality
of institutions, the level of human capital, the fertility of soil, the wealth in mineral resources that
are not observed. More importantly, using the values of colonial exports of primary products and
of manufactured goods to France, we were able to infer a measure of respectively the levels of
French colonial extraction and of colonial specialization in production. This was achievable thanks
to our original data set which includes information on the imports of France from all colonies, dis-
aggregated into three sectors: agricultural raw material, raw material necessary for industry, and
manufactured goods. Thirdly, we were able to generate the direct and indirect impacts of French
imports of raw material and of manufactured goods on the level of economic performance simulta-
neously. The method explicitly divides both impacts and attributes the indirect effect to a mediator
effect, namely, the quality of colonial and current institutions. Fourthly, the method allows us to
conduct a comparative analysis among each colonial group of the differential impact of French im-
ports on GDP through institutions. The model we use has the capacity to provide robust results even
if the sample size of each colonial group is statistically small (the size of French colonial group is
only twenty seven colonies).
There is some previous literature on the relation between the quality of institutions and the type
of goods exported. Meon and Sekkat (2008) found that the quality of institutions has a positive
impact on exports of manufactured goods, while it does not affect, or may even correlate negatively,
with exports of non manufactured goods. Barro (1999) shows that oil extraction lowers democracy
and Tsui (2011) unveils a positive relation between oil discoveries and autocracy. According to
theory, the underlying problems of resource exploitation, trade and production activities are directly
linked with the type of institutions embedded in the country and have to be considered altogether
when studying the economic development of a country, since the extractive profit-seeking behavior
could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources through time (Rungi, 2010). Nun and Trefler
(2013), argue that the comparative advantage in manufactured goods in the 19th century in England
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is highly related to institutions that promoted innovation and commercial enterprise.
Actually, the growth of trade may impact the domestic distribution of wealth and power. Those
in hold of power, and benefiting from trade, drive institutional changes to either coercive or pro-
production biases. In the case of French colonies, French colonizers expropriated their land, ex-
ploited their labor at low wages, and charged high prices for their exports (Tadei, 2013). As noted
by Ndulu and Oconnell (2007), a larger portion of Africa’s economies are based on the extraction
of natural resources than is the case of other regions in the world; one outcome is income inequal-
ity. European powers exploited the colonies’ resources through trade and induced institutions to
favor this type of extraction. Differences in agricultural policies in sub Saharan Africa are attributed
to both changes in institutions and natural endowments (Bates and Block, 2010). They do so by
influencing the politics of redistribution and revenue extraction particularly toward cash crops for
exports. This assertion is not new to the literature and can be traced back to Hobson, Lenin and on
down to Marxist thinkers, who regarded trade as the prime cause of imperialist expansion (Kleiman,
1976).
We have discussed the impacts of trade pattern and of natural resources abundance on institu-
tions. There is a prominent literature, on its turn, relating institutions to economic growth (Ace-
moglu et al., 2001, 2002, 2005, 2011, 2014, and North, 1990). Besides this indirect effect on
growth through institutions, trade patterns and natural resources abundance may be directly related
to development. With respect to the aforementioned relation, a long strand of research identifies cor-
relations between growth and exports patterns within an economy dating back to Chenery (1960)
and Leamer (1984). Sachs and Warner (1995, 2001) and Easterly and Levine (2003) were among
the first to formally explore the relation between resource abundance (as previously identified as
exports in a particular sector) and economic growth. Using a cross-section of countries, they found
that the relative size of primary exports, which they infer to be a measure of resource abundance, is
negatively correlated to gross domestic product (GDP) growth.
We find, at the pooled sample level, that more colonial exports to France, of either primary
or manufactured products, are correlated with better colonial institutions. Morevover, we find that
colonial institutions are positively correlated to current institutions, and that better current institu-
tions are correlated with better economic outcomes. French imports did not have a direct significant
impact on economic performance. However, its impact through institutions was positive and signif-
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3.2 Literature and research hypothesis
Both the economics and the history literatures suggest that there is an association between interna-
tional trade and domestic institutions. The specialization of country in international trade, plays a
key role in whether its domestic institutions are growth enhancing or growth retarding (Acemoglu et
al., 2005; Meon and Sekkat, 2008; Nunn and Trefler, 2013). In particular, our first hypothesis H1 in
Figure 3.2 checks whether the types of goods the colonies exported to France are associated with the
type of colonial institutions set in these settlements. For instance, among the west African French
colonies, French colonizers were attracted by an environment favorable for the cultivation of some
crops with potential profits generated through trade of such cultivation. They implemented coer-
cive institutions and monopsonies reducing the prices of colonial exports of raw material to African
producers by about 25%, and hence the African gains from trade by over one-half (Tadei, 2013). A
notable example of coercive labor institutions is the cotton price paid to Ubangi-Shari farmers which
was 15% of the price of cotton in New York, and the cotton quotas established by Felix Eboué in
Ubangi-Shari and Chad between 1924 and 1927 in which "every village had to produce amounts
of cotton in proportion to its population and sell it to one of four trading companies with monop-
sony power" (DeDampierre, 1960). Also, within colonies suited for sugar cane, trade movements
induced coercive institutions in favour of French low-cost imports, especially in agricultural goods
(Lavallée Lochard, 2012; Dippel at al., 2015). For instance, European trading companies bought
African crops that African laborers were forced to collect - in order to sell them at higher prices in
Europe (Tadei, 2013).
As such, given the variety of environments, commodities and abundance of resources, economic
activity, trade and institutions were structured in different ways (Busse and Groning, 2010). In
other terms, the quality of land and the appropriability conditions of natural resources determine
the relevant type of institutions that maximize the rent extraction from those resources (Bertoni and
Willebald, 2015). British possessions for instance which specialized less in primary production
and more in industrial production faced higher per capita income levels than other colonies who
focused more on primary production. Moreover, Great Britain who exported manufactured goods
to the rest of the world, enriched her middle class merchants who contributed to growth enhancing
improvements and better-performing institutions. Also, during the commercial revolution in Venice,
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trade enriched a broad range of merchants who later pushed for the constraints on the executive and
establishment of parliament in 1172. However, a small elite of those merchants later emerged
and became extremely rich in 1300’s. They rebuilt coercive states in order to suppress opposition
(Puga and Trefler, 2012). The Americas on the other hand, specialized in the production of raw
commodities (sugar, cotton, tobacco), and silver mining, which enriched the elite who used their
power to exert even more coercive institutions on workers, depriving them from any public good
(Inikori, 2003). Within Africa, for instance, the trade of slaves deteriorated domestic institutions.
Those patterns are in large part explained by the initial patterns of exports of the country in question.
Institutional responses to trade thus depend on initial comparative advantage (Nunn and Trefler,
2013).
More generally, Acemoglu et al. (2011) assert that the inelastic demand for resources have
created an incentive for resource-scarce countries to invade the resource rich country in order to
appropriate the resource. The distinguishing feature of such practice was to concentrate the power
in the hands of the elite who used it to oppress the population and induce forced labor (Acemoglu
et al, 2002, 2011). Examples of Europeans’ extraction are the transfer of gold and silver from Latin
America in the 17th and 18th centuries and of natural resources from Africa in the 19th and 20th
centuries, the Atlantic slave trade, the plantation agriculture in the Caribbean, Brazil and French
Indochina, and the rule of the Dutch East India Company in Indonesia. In a related work, Dippel et
al. (2015) find that a higher price of sugar is associated with stronger elite and hence higher levels
of coercion in British colonies with sugar plantations.
Moreover, Caselli et al. (2013) state that war between pairs of countries is more likely when
at least one country has natural resources. Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) attribute the inequality
in colonial regions to those European elites that "shielded" themselves from competition by setting
growth retarding institutions such as abusive labor rights, under-provision of education and of any
other public good. Westing (1998) argues that all colonial conquests by European powers were
driven by the necessity to find new supply channels for production and trade. By the mid-1800s,
during the industrialization boom, colonial powers were relying on their natural resources from their
overseas possessions as the increased production of manufacturing goods relied upon a consistent
endowment of raw material necessary for industry, such as coal and iron. The disposal of such
materials employed in the mass production of manufacturing goods was strategic for the industri-
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alization of European continental countries and, since they were not available at home, colonial
territories supplied useful stocks to be exploited. Europe imported commodities from colonies to
specialize in manufacturing products (Rungi, 2010).
On a somewhat different perspective, North (1990), Barro (1999) and Rodrik (1999) relate the
evolution and enforcement of property rights to trade whatever the characteristics of the traded
goods are. In particular, trade of raw agricultural material of non-French colonies with France is not
necessarily an extractive type of trade. A colony’s tendency to export to a different empire might be
driven by comparative advantages favoring such trade. It means that, for instance French imports
from British colonies may not reflect extraction from those colonies but exploiting their comparative
advantage instead. Also, even within an extractive environment, growth can still be achieved. As
Arroyo Abad, and van Zanden (2014) claim, the heavy reliance of Spanish colonial enterprise on
the mining sector attracted new settlements to the mining centers. This was considered an engine
of growth. However such growth was not sustainable due to the presence of extractive institutions.
Hence, one aspect distinguishing various types of dependencies is whether colonies trading outside
their colonial empire are associated with better colonial institutions in those colonies. Such dis-
tinction can be made through our empirical mode. For example, if exports of British colonies to
France are associated with better institutions in those colonies, this would indicate that such trade
was beneficial to those colonies or to the British colonizer, from which the incentive for the latter to
develop business driven institutions to enhance such trade.
Our second hypothesis, H2 in Figure 3.2, stands that early institutions are slow-moving in time
and hence are correlated to current ones. Finally, the third hypothesis states that the quality of those
current institutions affect the former colonies’ current economic performance. In fact, H2 and H3
are not new to the literature and focus on the role of political, economic, and social institutions,
their persistence over time, and their influence on economic outcomes. Most prominent work is the
one by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997), Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Nunn (2008), Dell (2012),
Arroyo Abad and Van Zanden (2014), Glaeser et al. (2004). Those authors emphasize the negative
impact conveyed by extractive colonial institutions on colonies’ relative economic performance.
Differences in development can be attributed to the institutional matrix that produces a set of orga-
nizations, rights and privileges; the stability of the structure of exchange relationships in political
and economic markets; and to a State that provides (or does not provide) a set of political rules
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and promotes the enforcement of rights (Bertoni and Willebald, 2015). This is denoted as the “path
dependence” where the origin of the development is traced back to the colonial period.
There is, however, not much literature about differences across colonies’ economic development
linking differences in colonial exports to differences in institutional quality. Actually, the relation
between exports and growth is not homogeneous across countries due to the fact that several chan-
nels mediate in the impact of exports on growth. Such channels could be the rentier effect, the dutch
disease, expenditure effect, among others (Oyinlola et al., 2015). A prominent channel is the one of
institutions. That is precisely what we do in this paper: we investigate the effect of exports of natural
and agricultural resources and of manufactured products on growth, mediated by institutions as part
of the debate about the "curse" (or the "blessing") of abundant natural resources. Actually, while
exporting primary products does not necessarily lead to low growth rates in the colonies, export-
ing manufactured products does not mean either that their level of economic performance will be
high. Some economies have exploited their comparative advantage in primary production without
increasing their industrial production and they still achieved high levels of economic performance.
Nevertheless, Hausmann and Rigobon (2003) point out that economies with diversified exports are
less likely to suffer negative effects of natural resource wealth.
Carmignani and Chowdhury (2007) argue that, although resource dependence is not necessarily
a curse, it may still be detrimental to growth due to poor existing institutional quality. As the argu-
ment goes, the degree of specialization in primary products could retard growth, but, as institutions
improve, resources turn from curse into a blessing. Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), while
limiting their scope to Nigeria, considered both the direct and indirect effects (through institutions)
of resource abundance on growth. The direct effect refutes the resource curse hypothesis, while,
through the indirect effect, resource abundance retards growth through institutional quality. Arezki
and Van der Ploeg (2007) confirm the resource curse hypothesis for countries that have poor insti-
tutions. Hence, the “curse” is conditional upon the existence of weak institutional arrangements in
terms of the definition of property rights, contract enforcement, the rule of law and the perpetuation
of a reduced elite in government.
Brunnschweiler (2008) empirically tested the hypothesis and found that, individually, resources
(particularly mineral resources) matter for growth, and this result is confirmed when they consider
the role of institutional quality. As Terra and Vasconcelos (2010) highlight, trade openness may
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have opposing impacts on growth rates, depending on the country’s institutional environment. Dell
(2010) also examined the long-term impact of Spanish forced labor system in silver mining in Bo-
livia. She contends that this system is negatively correlated with today’s consumption, education
and public good provision. Gylfason (2001) empirically find that resource-abundance and interna-
tional specialization in extractive sectors tends to crowd out national capital (whether financial or
human), thereby impeding economic growth.
Hence, countries that depend heavily on the exports of their natural resources tend to have
more corruption, less equality, less political liberty, less education, less domestic investment and
less financial depth than other nations that are less well endowed with natural resources. Whereas
economies that specialize in manufacturing production tend to develop more research and develop-
ment as well as processes of learning by doing which have a positive spillover of human capital (Van
der Ploeg,2011). Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) argue that, even if the abundance of natural
resources deteriorates institutions due to rent-seeking activity, it is also true that it is thanks to the
quality of institutions that the equilibrium between a pure rent-seeking (grabbing) activity and an
entrepreneurial (efficient) activity is set. If, on the one hand some citizens may take rents out from
natural resources and abandon more productive activities, on the other hand rent appropriation and
production can become complementary to each other, so that producers continue to operate effi-
ciently even if they can partially enjoy some rents deriving from natural resources. Natural resource
abundance does therefore hinder economic growth in countries with grabber friendly institutions,
but does not in countries with producer friendly institutions. Such institutions offer more scope for
resource rent extraction.
Hypotheses one, two and three emphasize the indirect impact on growth of colonial exports
to France. As an additional control, we also account for the direct impact of colonial exports to
France on GDP. in order to check whether those exports have a significant effect on growth in those
countries not captured by institutions. Actually, Sachs and Warner (1995) found evidence for a
negative relationship between economic growth and resource abundance over the period 1970–1990
without any prominent role to the quality of institutions in explaining the resource curse hypothesis.
Also, according to Acemoglu et al. (2005), growth in Western Europe from 16th till 18th century
is attributed to the Atlantic trade. Also Naritomi, Soares and Assuncao (2012), registered a high
correlation between colonial plantation of sugar in Brazil and higher inequality today.
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ticollinearity among the predictors, and empirically testing the theoretical assumptions between the
latent constructs. Actually, prior to SEM, simultaneous causal relations were difficult to incorporate
into a single economic model. A second advantage is its flexibility in the interplay between data and
theory. When the theory is strong, one can rely more on it while analyzing the data. Alternatively,
when the data is rich but the theory is under testing, the data, since its construction, measurement,
and results are empirically validated under PLS-SEM, can have a stronger say (Chin, 1998). The
Partial least squares approach to SEM (PLS-SEM) has been proposed with a slightly different al-
gorithm than the initial co-variance based SEM. Its main advantage is that it separately generates
the estimated observations for each latent construct and then, in a next step, estimates the coeffi-
cients of the structural model between those generated blocks of variables (Wold, 1975; Lohmoller,
1989; Tenenhaus, 2008). Such approach of SEM has many advantages over the initial one which
are particularly relevant to our paper.
Firstly, let us briefly define the uses of SEM and its relevance to our model. In its initial form,
the structural equation modeling is a set of data where a certain number of variables form a block
that can be summarized by a single unobserved concept, and that linear relations exist between
those concepts. Whenever researchers deal with relations between constructs such as satisfaction,
role ambiguity, or attitude, SEM is likely to be the methodology of choice (Rigdon, 1998). Simi-
larly such method perfectly fits in our model since we are dealing with concepts such as quality of
institutions, level of human capital, fertility of soil, availability of mineral resources. In particular,
we can generate a measure for the quality of institutions through a number of observed indicators
such as rule of law, control for corruption, voice and accountability. There are two ways to connect
the observable variables in a block to their latent variable: either formative or reflective way. In the
reflective model, the indicators are highly correlated among each other, and together, they reflect the
feature of the concept. In the formative model, each manifest variable represents a different dimen-
sion of the underlying concept. Therefore, unlike the reflective model, the formative model does
not assume homogeneity nor unidimensionality of the block. These indicators need not to co-vary:
changes in one indicator do not imply changes in the others and internal consistency is no more an
issue (Vinzi et al., 2010a).
Moreover, since our model requires a method that is designed to test multiple simultaneous
equations in which latent variables may influence one another reciprocally, SEM is the right fit.
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Firstly, it allows for a great flexibility on how the equations are specified, due to its graphical lan-
guage (McArdle 1980; McArdle and McDonald 1984). In particular, the method simultaneously
depicts how one dependent construct, while being caused by an independent set of other constructs,
can simultaneously predict another dependent construct as is the case of our variables colonial in-
stitutions and current institutions in Figure 3.2. In this case, SEM is a powerful method for tracing
the direct effect of French imports on colonial institutions, and its indirect effects on both current
institutions and GDP per capita while dealing with multicollinearity (Reisigner and Tuner, 1999).
The Variance-based SEM such as the PLS-SEM is another option for co-variance based SEM,
with mostly similar features (Lohmoller 1989; Wold 1982). However, when CB-SEM assumptions
cannot be met, or the research objective is prediction rather than confirmation of structural relation-
ships, then variance-based PLS-SEM is the preferred method (Hair et al., 2011). Given the greater
popularity of CB-SEM, the use of PLS-SEM often requires additional discussion to explain the ra-
tionale behind the decision (Chin, 2010).9 Its primary objective is to maximize explained variance
in the dependent constructs but additionally to evaluate the data quality on the basis of measure-
ment model characteristics. Given PLS-SEM’s ability to work efficiently with a much wider range
of sample sizes and increased model complexity, and its less restrictive assumptions about the data,
it can address a broader range of problems than CB-SEM. Moreover, because the construction of
the latent variables requires less restrictive properties under PLS-SEM, a construct with only one
indicator (i.e. our dependent variable per capita income is constructed using the observed variable
GDP per capita) (Hair et al., 2011).
Indeed, such option is particularly relevant to our model because unlike SEM, PLS-SEM does
not require multivariate normality of data or minimum sample size (n>200) (Diamantopoulos and
Siguaw, 2000) to provide consistent estimation results. Actually, our cross section pooled sample
contains only 98 observations (colonies) which are collected from primary sources not necessarily
normally distributed. Moreover, since PLS-SEM’s estimation procedure solves one block (or con-
struct) at a time, it is capable of dealing with formative as well as reflective indicators within one
9Note that the popularity as well as the frequent application across different disciplines of PLS-SEM has also grown, given the the
plethora of recent developments and discussions (e.g., Henseler et al. 2014; Hwang et al. 2010; Lu et al. 2011; Rigdon 2014; Tenenhaus
and Tenenhaus 2011; Hair et al. 2011; Lee et al. 2011; Peng and Lai 2012; Ringle et al. 2012). PLS-SEM has been increasingly applied
in marketing and other business disciplines (e.g., Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics 2009), with more than 100 published studies featuring
PLS-SEM in the top 20 marketing journals (for the marketing journal ranking, see Hult, Reimann, and Schilke 2009).
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structural equation model, a property not fulfilled in the CB-SEM (Gots et al., 2010). Such feature
is important to testing our model since one of our constructs is formative. Finally, being a mixture
of apriori knowledge, intuition, and of data analysis, the model allows the author to freely specify
his constructs or latent variables (hereafter LV), compile a number of indicators for each LV, and to
design the structural relations among them (Wold, 1985). The model then, takes care of statistically
validating those links without any ex-ante theoretical framework (Chin, 1998). Another important
advantage of PLS-SEM modeling technique is the ability to test the same model across different
groups or sub-samples (for instance, testing the structural relations within each colonial group) and
to check for significant similarities or differences in estimates among groups. Such technique is
known as as multi-group analysis (Vinzi et al., 2010b).
PLS-SEM is accomplished using a two-step process that starts with an iterative estimation of
the latent variable scores. After the weights converge and latent variable scores are estimated,
the second step is to obtain the parameters of the structural model by using ordinary least square
between the generated latent variables (Assaker et al., 2012). Refer to Vinzi et al (2010b) for a
detailed description of how the weights of latent variables are constructed.
3.3.1 Measures of latent variables
The basic approach behind PLS-PM modeling is to first construct a measure for the latent or un-
observed variables using one or several observed variables. Those measures are related to their
observed predictors in the forms of linear compounds, "by means of a sequence of alternating least
squares algorithms, each time solving a local, linear problem, with the aim to extract the predictive
information" in those observed variables capable of defining the new latent variable (Vinzi et al,
2010). Once the latent variables are constructed in a first step, under what we call the measurement
model, we estimate, in a second step, the OLS coefficients of the simultaneous equations relating
the latent variables under what we call the structural model.
Firstly, how are those latent variables constructed? Previous studies developed various sets of
criteria in determining how a latent variable should be constructed [Nunnally, 1978; Jarvis et al.,
2003] from (Assaker et al., 2012). The most common practice in specifying our constructs is based
on the classical theory of SEM. Such method assumes that the observed or the manifest variables
(hereafter MV) are highly correlated among each other, and that each manifest variable is related
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to its corresponding LV by a simple regression. We say that each MV reflects their corresponding
LV - such approach is called the reflective measure. Each block of manifest variables should be
unidimensional in the meaning of factor analysis, that is each block of MV’s should constitute
one component and not more. Cronbach’s alpha is one indicator that is intended to evaluate how
well a block of indicators measures well the corresponding construct. It does so by estimating
the reliability of the measure through internal consistency (Guinot et al., 2001), as we will further
develop in the next section. On the other hand, we have the formative measure, where each manifest
variable represents a different dimension of the underlying concept. All our constructs, except for
one, are measured through the reflective way, as summarized below.
French Imports of primary production/ or of manufactured production
In order to test hypothesis one from Figure 3.2, we constructed two measures for French imports
to be used in two separate models: The French imports of primary production and the French
imports of manufactured goods. These variables were constructed from French sectoral trade from
"Tableau Général du commerce de la France" and the "Tableau décennal du commerce de la France".
Our data extends from 1880 to 1913 and contains the following sectors: agricultural raw material;
raw material necessary for industry; and manufactured products for a total of 98 colonies, including
27 French colonies, 37 British colonies, 36 other colonies and former colonies.10 Figure 3.3 shows
the world map containing all the countries included in our sample and how they were divided across
the colonial powers. The data were then averaged for cross section analysis.
French imports of manufactured goods, which correspond to the colonial exports of manufac-
tured goods to France, is directly observed through our data set. Hence, it does not need to be
constructed from a set of other indicators.
As for French imports of primary production, we construct it using our observed data of French
imports of raw agricultural material (constituted of, among others, wheat, sugar, fruits), and of
French imports of raw material necessary for industry (constituted of, among others gold, cobalt,
10French colonies: Algeria, Benin, Burkina Fasso, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, French Guiana, French
Polynesia, Gabon, Guadeloupe, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Laos, Madagascar, Mali, Martinique, Mauritania, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Niger,
Reunion, St Pierre and Miquelon, Senegal, Vietnam, Morocco, and Tunisia. British colonies: Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Ba-
hamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Botswana, Virgin Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Fiji, Gambia, Ghana, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guyana, Ja-
maica, Kenya, Malawi, Malta, Mauritius, Myanmar, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saint Lucia, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Egypt, and India. Other colonies: Angola,
Aruba, Cameroon, Cuba, DR Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Indonesia, Mozambique, Namibia, Philippines, Puerto Rico,
Sao Tome and Principe, Suriname, Togo, Virgin Islands (US), and Western Sahara. Former colonies: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Peru, USA, Uruguay, and Venezuela
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phosphate, iron, wood, and wool). In particular, these measures partially reflects colonies’ abun-
dance in their main natural resources.11 Actually, according to Greiner and Semmler (2008) natural
resources can take the form of energy or other materials (raw materials, minerals) that are essential
for production processes and exporting those products shows that a country is abundant in them.
Tables 3.1 validates the composite reliability of the constructed block at the sample level. Ac-
tually, the two variables used to measure French imports of primary production reflect well on their
latent variable. The factor analysis reveal that they both represent one single factor, with sample
factor loadings exceeding 0.85 and with an eigenvalue or the amount of variance explained by this
factor equal to 1.5 (out of two indicators).
As emphasized earlier, hypothesis one states that the type of goods the colonies export is associ-
ated with the type of institutions the colonizer set in those colonies. Specialization in manufactures
are likely to lead to the creation of business enhancing institutions, whereas the specialization in raw
material is more prone to the creation of coercive institutions. The main advantage of our data is its
dis-aggregation into sectors, which allows us to compare, on the one hand, how colonial exports of
primary production affected colonial institutions, the "resource curse nexus", to, on the other hand,
how colonial exports of manufactured products affected those same institutions.
Colonial institutions
The variable is constructed from two main institutional indicators widely used in the economic
history literature and for which information is available in 1900: Constraint on Executive and
Democracy. Constraint on executive is a seven-point scale ranging from 1 to 7, with a higher score
indicating more constraints. A score of 1 indicates unlimited authority to the governor, 3 indicates
slight to moderate limitations by other institutional corps, 5 indicates substantial limitations, and 7
indicates executive parity or subordination. Scores of 2, 4, and 6 indicate intermediate values. A
higher score refers to a better quality of institutions. Data are gathered from Acemoglu et al. (2001),
and was completed from the polity III data set for the missing values. Democracy is measured as
an index ranging from 0 to 10, gathered also from Acemoglu et al. (2001). A higher score indicates
more democracy points from three dimensions: competitiveness of political participation (from 1 to
3 points); competitiveness of executive recruitment (from 1 to 2 points, with a bonus of 1 point if
11In the case of French colonies, such measure not only partially but fully reflects those colonies’ abundance in natural resources
since French colonies’ share of exports of raw material to France account for more than 80% of their total exports of raw material.
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there is an election); and constraints on chief executive (from 1 to 4 points). Both indicators reflect
the quality of colonial institutions. In particular, we recall that during French colonization, in at
least some of the French colonies, the constraint on administrators was very low, leading governors
to be brutal towards the indigenous population and implementing even more coercive institutions
(Cohen, 1971). Table 3.1 shows that both constraint on executive and democracy loaded onto one
single factor with loadings exceeding 0.9. The eigenvalue of the first factor equals 1.75 providing
evidence of the unidimensionality of the scale.
Institutions in 2005
A number of indices have been proposed to measure the quality of institutions. The most com-
mon baseline measures, however, rely on six indicators from Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(2011). gathered from 31 various sources and surveys reporting the perception of governance.
We picked the three mostly used indicators to construct our variable: 1) Rule of law which re-
flects the extent to which agents have confidence and abide by rules of society, such as property
rights, contract enforcement, 2) control for corruption, which reflects the extent to which public
authority is used for private interest, and, finally, 3) voice and accountability, which represents the
effectiveness of democratic system. The three indicators are measures on a scale from -2.5 (weak
institutions) to 2.5 (strong). We developed a measurement scale for the quality of institutions in
2005 that combines the three indicators all together. Results from Table 3.1 show unidimensionality
(1st eigenvalue equals to 2.9 out of 3 indicators), and factor loadings exceed 0.9 for each item. .
Human capital in 1900
As an additional variable affecting GDP, we control for human capital in 1900. As Acemoglu
et al. (2014) and Rocha et al. (2015) argue, initial education of colonizers in the colonies persisted
through time and led, in the long-run, to higher income per capita. We collected two sources of
potential exogenous variation in human capital in 1900. The first variable is the estimated percent
of the population evangelized by Christian missions by the year 1900 fromWoodberry (2004, 2012).
It is known that Christian missionaries played an important role in the development of educational
system in the former colonies. Our second indicator is primary enrollment rates in 1900 relative
to the population aged between 6 and 14. Our data come from Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson
(2014) and is complemented from Benavot and Riddle (1988) and Gallego (2010). The factor
analysis shows that both indicators load in a single factor with loadings in excess of 0.87 each. The
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eigenvalue of the first factor is equal to 1.45.
Mineral resources today
The variable we construct measures the reserves of mineral resources in a country today. It
contains four indicators: the percentage of world gold, iron, zinc and silver reserves today. The data
is retrieved from Acemoglu et al.(2001, 2002) and complemented from Parker (1997) for missing
data. We additionally controlled for reserves of mineral resources today because of its well-known
effect on a country levels of income. Alexeev and Conrad (2009) show that an abundance of oil
and mineral resources is associated with higher income per capita. Results from Table 3.1 show
unidimensionality of our block.
Temperature and Humidity
It is known from Sachs et al. (2001), that climate variables explain differences in income per
capita. We control for temperature and humidity as best reflecting climate. For each construct,
we assigned a set of indicators to reflect the variation in it. Regarding temperature, we assigned
average temperature, minimum monthly high, maximum monthly high, minimum monthly low,
and maximum monthly low, all in centigrade. As for humidity, three indicators represent average,
morning and afternoon temperature in percent. This data was also collected from Acemoglu et al.
(2001, 2002) and complemented from Parker (1997) for missing data. The indicators load into one
single factor and are uni-dimensional as the value of eigenvalues show.
Fertility of soil
The fertility of soil reflects upon measures of soil quality/climate. Also fertility of soil may
influence the performance of a country. Three indicators were used to form our construct, steppe
(semi arid climate with low latitude), desert (desertic climate) , dry steppe (semi arid climate with
dry weather). Since each indicator reflect a different feature of our construct and the correlation
among them is low, they tend to form the construct instead of reflecting on it, hence we use the
formative way in order to construct the fertility of soil. Recall that the formative model does not
assume unidimensionality of the block. A change in one indicator does not imply changes in the
others.
The remainder of the variables in the model are observed from the data set, hence they do not
need to be constructed. Our main dependent variable, GDP per capita in 2005, is collected from
Maddison (2006) and World Bank indicators. Two other variables used in our model are European
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Equation (3.1), which reflects upon hypothesis one, describes the relation between colonial
French imports of primary production and of manufactured goods FrImpi, and colonial institutions
PInsti in 1900, where i is the country. Equation (3.1) is run separately for each of the two sectors
above. ζPinst is the error term. Since we believe, as argued earlier, that settlements are also likely to
affect the type of institutions introduced by the colonizers (Acemoglu et al., 2001), we run this equa-
tion twice: once controlling for European settlements ESi in 1900, and once without this additional
control.
Equation (3.2), on its turn, describes the relation between colonial, PInsti, and current institu-
tions, CInsti (in 2005). A positive correlation confirms the persistence of institutions over time. μR
is the error term. Our structural equation model allows us to generate the indirect effect exerted
by French imports and by European settlements on current institutions through colonial institutions
PInsti, i.e. β1α1 and β2α1.
Our last equation 3.3 captures the ordinary Least squares regression on per capita income
GDPPCi, of current institutions CInsti, colonial French Imports FrImpis, and of a vector of covari-
ates Xi. ε is the error term. The main three coefficients of interest which test our three hypotheses
are β1, α1, and λ1. With those coefficients we can also obtain β1α1, reflecting the indirect effect
of colonial French imports on current institutions through the channel of colonial institutions, as
well as β1α1λ1, reflecting the indirect effect of colonial French imports on income per capita today
through both colonial and current institutions.
As additional control, we add human capital in 1900, since this variable might have influenced
the long run development. Glaesser et al. (2004) (GLLS) argue that the rate of human capital accu-
mulation developed during colonial periods disseminated slowly over generations, which impacts
comparative economic development today. Actually, 19th-century school enrollment rates appear
to have persisted to the present. Moreover, human capital that developed through missionaries ac-
tivities may also have a direct impact on long run development by influencing the current religious
composition of the population (Acemoglu, Gallego and Robinson, 2014). Jeffrey Sachs along with
many other scientists dating back to Montesquieu have argued for a direct effect of geography and
climate on economic performance. Geography is important because it is directly correlated to the
availability of key natural resources, the fertility of soil, and to advantageous conditions for agri-
culture and technology. To the extent that geographic factors do not vary over time, countries that
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were relatively rich in endowments and enjoy viable land should be relatively rich today. Climate is
important because populations in temperate areas are associated with rapid advances in technologies
compared to the development in the tropics (Sachs, 2001).
To control for those, we constructed a variety of geography-related variables, including fertility
of soil, availability of mineral resources today, temperature and humidity. We also control for war
factor, an index from 0 to 1 averaging the number of years country i was at war during our sample
period. We control for this variable since we believe that war hinders or to a lesser extent slows
down growth. Since our variables are measured at different scales, the latent variables scores were
standardized.
3.4.1 The Measurement Model
In a first step, the assessment of the measurement model is relevant in order to validate the estimates
of the coefficients in the second step. In fact, if the construct is misspecified, its variance will be
altered as well as its estimation, and the results will be either over-estimated or under-estimated,
changing the structural path as well as their interpretation (Chin, 1998). We first analyze the quality
of the reflective measurement model using both convergent and discriminant validity as well as the
reliability of the latent variables. Convergent validity means that the measures of each construct
that theoretically should be related to each other are, in fact, observed to be related to each other,
whereas discriminant validity means that measures of a construct that theoretically should not be
related to another construct are, in fact, observed to not be related to it.
Table 3.2 confirms the convergent validity of our reflective constructs (French imports of pri-
mary production, previous (colonial) institutions, current institutions, human capital, mineral re-
sources, climate and temperature), given factor loadings (co-variance between manifest and latent
variable) were around or above the 0.7 threshold for most of the indicators. As such, more than 50%
of the variance in the observed variable could be explained by its underlying construct (Hulland,
1999). Furthermore, the bootstrap test shows high significance levels for all loadings (the bootstrap-
based empirical 95% confidence interval does not include zero for all the reflective measures; see
Table 3.2). This suggests that essentially all indicators significantly reflect on their underlying con-
structs.
In addition, the average variance explained (AVE) achieved values of 68%, 87%, 96%, 82%,
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58%, 73% and 66% for the reflective constructs as shown in the last column from Table 3.2. AVE,
originally proposed by Fornell and Larcker (1981), attempts to measure the amount of variance
that a latent variable component captures from its own indicators relative to the amount due to
measurement error. Since AVE exceeded the required 0.5 threshold, the constructs captured more
than 50% of the indicators’ variance. With respect to the reliability of the construct, Table 3.2
presents two indicators of the degree to which a set of items measure a single uni-dimensional latent
construct, the Cronbach’s alpha and the Dillon-Goldstein’s rho.12 Both measures were both robust
and well above the 0.7 threshold (Nunnaly and Bernstein, 1994), indicating high-scale reliability
and further supporting the unidimensionality and reflective scheme of these factors.
The second and more detailed set of information we need to examine is how each item relates
to each construct. Not only should each indicator be strongly related to the construct it attempts
to reflect, but it should not have a stronger connection with another construct. Differently stated,
the reflective indicator should load higher on its corresponding construct than on other constructs,
otherwise, such a situation would imply that the indicator in question is unable to discriminate as to
whether it belongs to the construct it was intended to measure or to another (i.e., a discriminant va-
lidity problem). Table3.3 compares the loadings of each observed variable to its intended construct
(i.e., loadings) and compares it to all other constructs (i.e., cross loadings). As Chin (1998) notes,
going down a particular construct column, you should expect to see item loadings to be higher than
the cross loadings. Specifically, we can say that each item loads higher on their own construct than
on other constructs, and that all constructs share more variance with their measures than with other
constructs.
With respect to discriminant validity the construct should be more strongly correlated with its
own measures than with any other construct. Essentially, the argument is that if a specific construct
is more correlated with another construct than with its own measures, there is the possibility that the
two constructs share the same types of measures and are not conceptually distinct (Chin 1998b). To
test for this, we compare the square root of the (AVE) with the correlations among constructs. This
12According to Chin (1998), Dillon-Goldstein’s rho is considered to be a better indicator than Cronbach’s alpha. Indeed, the latter
assumes the so-called tau equivalence (or parallelity) of the manifest variables, i.e. each manifest variable is assumed to be equally
important in defining the latent variable. Dillon-Goldstein’s rho does not make this assumption as it is based on the results from the
model (i.e. the loadings) rather than the correlations observed between the manifest variables in the data set. Cronbach’s alpha actually
provides a lower bound estimate of reliability.
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square root should surpass the correlation coefficient of the construct with every other construct in
the model. Indeed, this is the case in our outlined model as shown in Table 3.4.
Note that discriminant validity assessment has become a generally accepted prerequisite for an-
alyzing relationships between latent variables (Henseler et al., 2015). The estimated strength of the
relationships between the latent variables, can only be meaningfully interpreted if construct valid-
ity was established (Peter and Churchill 1986). Thereby, researchers ensure that the measurement
models in their studies capture what they intend to measure (Campbell and Fiske 1959). We have
focused on the reliability and validity of the measures used to represent our constructs. Ideally, the
above provided an evaluation on how accurate and reliable the measures are and also their conver-
gent and discriminant validity (Chin, 2010).
3.4.2 The structural equation model: Analysis of results
Table 3.5 reports the regressions for the simultaneous Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3). The inde-
pendent variable in Equation (3.1) is the French imports of primary production whereas table 3.6
reports the regressions for the same equations but with regards to French imports of manufactured
goods. Both tables include the full sample of all colonies and present similar results in terms of
significance, magnitude, and sign for most of the parameters.
The coefficients of Equation (3.1), as reported in column 1 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6, are 0.335 and
0.345, respectively. Both coefficients are statistically significant and high in magnitude. Higher
colonial exports to France of either primary production or of manufactured goods are correlated
with better colonial institutions in the colonies. Indeed, colonies with good institutions are also
countries that tended to trade more with France. Results of Equation (1) support our first hypothesis
that states that French imports from colonies have an impact on the type of institutions set by the
colonizers in those colonies.
Results of Equation (2) in column 1 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 suggest that the institutional structures
set up in the colonies during the colonial era persisted, forming the basis of current institutions in
those countries. Actually, the coefficient indicates that the increase of the quality of colonial insti-
tutions by one unit explains sixty percent of the increase in the quality of current institutions. A
variety of historical evidence is in line our results. As Acemoglu and Verdier (1998) suggest, set-
ting up good institutions, such as investing in human and physical capital and setting up rules and
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property rights, is costly, so that it may not be profitable for the local elites to switch to extractive
institutions after independence. They would rather invest in enforcing property rights. In contrast,
whenever the local elites inherit extractive institutions, they may not want to bear the cost of in-
troducing good institutions, but may instead benefit from the situation and keep on exploiting their
population.
Additionally, the results of the second equation as presented in column 1 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6
show that such impact is partially attributed to colonial exports to France. In fact, colonial exports
to France positively affected the quality of colonial institutions as identified in the first equation.
This effect was partially transmitted to current day institutions. We find that a one unit increase
in colonial exports to France of either primary production or of manufactured goods lead to an
increase in the quality of current institutions by 0.2 units. Such impact is mediated by colonial
institutions.The last regression in column 1 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 reports results of Equation (3.3)
which presents the impact of the quality of current institutions and of colonial French imports (of
primary production and of manufactured goods) on per capita income, along with a variety of control
variables. Results show that colonies with better institutions perform better in terms of income per
capita (Kraay and Dollar, 2003). An increase of the quality of current institutions by one unit
is associated with an increase in income per capita by almost 0.4. Results of PLS-PM provide
evidence that almost 24% of such impact is attributed to colonial institutions in 1900’s out of which
8% are attributed to colonial exports to France in 1900’s. The coefficients of the indirect effects of
both colonial institutions and of French imports on GDP are statistically significant. These results
are suggestive of the long run joint role for both colonial French imports and colonial institutions
on GDP, leaving a smaller independent role for improvements in institutional quality today.
Our findings are in line with some results from previous literature. De Medeiros and Dos Santos
(2013) found that institutions can directly affect growth, or they can impact trade, which in turn
affects growth. Once the authors separately quantify the link from institutions to trade, and that
from trade to growth, the independent effect of institutions on growth is small. This suggests that
part of what is often understood as trade’s effect on growth can be attributed to institutional change
(Keller and Shiue, 2013). In addition, Arezki and Van Der Ploeg (2007) confirmed the resource
curse hypothesis for countries that are deficient in quality institutions, have low level of investment
and are encumbered with restrictions. Komarulzaman and Alisjahbana (2006) revealed the existence
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of resource curse at the national level in Indonesia mediated by institutions. The interaction of
resource abundance confirms the hypothesis when institution is captured by investment ratio of
GDP, resource abundance by oil and gas rent.
Moreover, Frankel and Romer (1999) highlight the importance of trade for growth in the long
run. We test for the direct independent effect of colonial exports to France in 1900’s on GDP in
order to isolate the direct effect of trade on growth, from the previously deduced indirect effect.
Results of Equation (3) in Table 3.5 do not suggest any significant impact of French imports of
primary production in 1900’s on income per capita today. However, the impact of French imports
of manufactured goods on GDP is positive and significant (Table 3.6). Those results suggest that
the French exploitation of the colonies’ raw material only affects current standards of living through
the institutional channel, whereas colonial exports of manufactured goods positively affect current
economic performance. Such result is embedded in a larger body of literature that links increases
in growth rates to exports, specialization in production, and endogenous technological progress
(Frankel and Romer, 1999).
Income per capita seems to be insensitive to our geographic variables, but it is positively affected
by the wealth of mineral resources today and the accumulation of human capital 100 years ago. The
R-squared of the last regression in column 1 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are respectively 0.7 and 0.72.
The type of colonial institutions set by the colonizers is not only affected by the type of goods
those colonizers could potentially import from the colonies, but it is also correlated to settlement
decisions, as discussed by Acemoglu et al. (2001). We then control for European settlements in
1900 in Equation (3.1). While results of when controlling for European settlements, in column 2 of
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 are similar to those without controlling for it, in column 1, there is a noteworthy
difference between trade of primary and of manufactured goods. The coefficient of French imports
of primary goods becomes insignificant once European settlements is controlled for, in Table 3.5.
This result suggests that the positive impact of French imports of primary goods was actually cap-
turing the impact of European settlements on institutions. For colonial exports of manufactured
goods, however, its impact on institutions remains positive and significant, even after controlling
for European settlements in 1900, as shown in Table 3.6. Specialization in manufactured goods still
contributed to better colonial institutions.
Finally, the indirect effect of French imports on current institutions and on GDP per capita
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becomes insignificant after accounting for the effect of European Settlements. Overall, the results
of column 2 indicate that there is a high correlation between European settlements in 1900 and
French imports in 1900. Such high multicollinerarity is disturbing the individual effect of each on
colonial institutions.
Indeed, evidence shows high correlation between settlement decisions in the colonies and poten-
tial trade (Betts, 1961; Dippel et al, 2015; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997;
and Lewis, 1983). Colonizers needed to actually settle in order to optimize the extraction of natural
resources (El Kallab and Terra, 2015). We argue that initial European settlements were themselves
not random, but based on the the bio-geographic conditions of the colony, in particular on the avail-
ability of natural resources that can be exploited. In fact, the extension of French possessions was
reflected in the heterogeneity of their natural environment, including, from the coast towards the in-
terior, tropical forests, savannahs, and arid-desert regions. For instance, the coastal forestry regions
were suitable to produce bananas, coffee, cocoa, and rubber, while the drier interior areas were suit-
able for peanuts and cotton (Hopkins, 1973). Mitchener and Weidenmier (2008) further argue that,
prior to the Industrial Revolution, colonial acquisitions were continuously sought by imperial pow-
ers to complement their growing economies, which ultimately affected colonial trade. This would
generate different outcomes in terms of institutional quality, and later on economic performance.
For the above reasons, we regress Equation (3.1) using Partial least squares regression in order
to solve the multicollinearity problem. Column 3 of Tables 3.5 and 3.6 reports the results of the
Partial least squares regressions. Once we isolate the impact of European settlements from that of
French imports, the effect of French imports of both raw material and of manufactured goods on
colonial institutions becomes positive, significant and high in magnitude. Moreover, 13% of the
impact of colonial institutions on current ones seems to be attributed to colonial exports to France
of primary production while 26% of that impact is attributed to European settlements in 1900 in
line with our findings in the previous chapter. Finally, 3% of institutional impact on GDP is due to
colonial exports of raw material to France, with no contribution of European settlements on GDP
in the long-run. The remaining regressions and variables, present similar results as in column 1 for
both Tables.13
13Bootstrap techniques of 5000 samples were conducted to ensure consistent standard errors.
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3.4.3 Identification strategy
Although we tried to control for most factors affecting GDP, there are potentially many other omit-
ted determinants of income differences across countries that are also correlated with institutions.
Moreover the relationship between institutions and economic growth is not necessarily unidirec-
tional. In particular, richer countries tend to develop better institutions (North, 1990; Acemoglu et
al., 2001, 2014; Glaeser et al., 2004; Jones, 2013). To substantiate this endogeneity problem, we
will employ a two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation method a la AJR (2001) for Equation (3.3),
where we instrument for current institutions using log settler mortality in 1900 from AJR (2001).
This instrument accounts for the institutional variation that we observe, but have no direct effect on
performance. We adopt AJR argumentation in order to validate this exclusion restriction.
Our identification can be expressed as follows:
CInsti = δ0+δ1LogMorti+δXi+ϑR (3.4)
where X is the vector of our explanatory variables as described previously in equation 3.3.
Panel A of table 7 reports the first stage results of our instrumental variable regression whereas
panel B reports the 2SLS estimates of λ1 of equation 3.3. Panel C reports the corresponding ordi-
nary least squared results where equation 3.3 is run alone.The first panel displays a strong negative
relation between log settler mortality and current institutions. The 2SLS estimate of current insti-
tutions on income per capita is 1.51. Similarly to the results found in AJR (2001), this estimate is
highly significant and it is in fact larger than the OLS estimates reported in Panel C. The authors
argue that "measurement error in the institutions variables that creates attenuation bias is likely to be
more important than reverse causality and omitted variables biases". Since we have similar sources
of variables, their explanation is also valid in our case.
We note that our only reverse causality issue is for Equation between institutions and income
per capita in Equation (3.3). It is true that extractive colonial institutions might have created ex-
tractive trade. However, such reverse causality between French imports and the type of colonial
institutions does not affect our results. Our aim in Equation (3.1) is to investigate the correlation14
14A negative one within French colonies and a positive one within the other colonial groups.
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between French imports and colonial institutions. Moreover, Equation (3.2) does not present any
reverse causality issues as we have a time lag of 100 years between colonial and current institutions.
Regarding the third equation, countries’ bio-geographic, characteristics which are time invariant,
are not affected by their income. Furthermore, French imports, human capital, and war variables
are measured in 1900, hence we are sure that the relation with income in 2005 is unidirectional.
3.4.4 The multi-group analysis
After testing our hypotheses on the whole sample, we now investigate whether there are differences
in the results across groups of colonies. We then test Equations (3.1), (3.2) and (3.3) across each
group of colonies (group 1 = French colonies, group 2 = British Colonies, group 3 = Former and
other colonies). Indeed, group comparisons or multigroup analysis, which is a statistical method
incorporated into PLS-SEM, allows to test if pre-defined data groups have significant differences in
their group-specific parameter estimates (e.g., outer weights, outer loadings and path coefficients)
(Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011; Henseler et al., 2015). PLS-SEM is a better fit for group comparisons
because, unlike the traditional CB-SEM that uses a global fit criterion (Chi-square difference test)
to assess differences across the groups, PLS-SEM can compare the path coefficients among groups
on a path by path basis, using multi-group t-test and permutation tests. This approach allows for
the interpretation of the differences in the relationships among the constructs (i.e., estimates for
equations 1, 2, and 3) across the three colonies/samples. The model applies specific tests to see if
there is a difference for each parameter at a time, across the groups. Such technique is incorporated
into XL-STAT versions 2011-2015 (Vinzi and Russolillo, 2013).
Both multi-group test and permutation test check for significant differences among group pa-
rameters. The multi-group test assumes normality of the data15 and presumes that the standard
errors of the path estimators in the groups are equal (Eberl, 2010). Permutation tests, on the other
hand, use bootstrap sampling techniques to generate confidence intervals and p-values. It is argued
that the latter often provides more accurate results than multi-group t-tests, especially in the case of
normality violations and when the standard errors of the path estimators in the groups are dissimilar
(Henseler and Fassott, 2010). Note that, if normality of data is slightly violated and if standard
15After running normality test, we found that our data is normal.
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errors of the path estimators are comparable16, both tests provide similar results and are considered
to be complementary tests. Finally, in both tests, group comparisons were based on standardized
estimations (standardized data).
As Tables 3.8 and 3.9 show, results from both tests revealed significant differences in the esti-
mates of French imports of primary production and of manufactured goods in Equation (3.1) and
in Equation (3.3) among the three groups of colonies—.while the estimates of colonial institutions
in Equation (2) and that of current institutions in Equation (3) show similar results among the three
groups. In particular, French imports have different effects on colonial institutions and on per capita
income depending on the colonial group, while previous institutions and current institutions had
similar effects on respectively current institutions and on GDP across the three colonial groups.
Note that Equation (3) was reduced to smaller number of covariates due to lack of variation
among some of the variables within each group (namely, geographic and climate variables were
removed). This does not overturn our results because the estimates of those constructs were in-
significant under the pooled sample. Moreover, after conducting several regressions, we found that,
at the colonial group level, the regressions estimates were similar whether we controlled or not for
European settlement, hence we decided to report the results including European settlements.
Table 3.8 reports the ordinary least squares regressions of Equations (1), (2) and (3) for the
pooled sample as well as for French, British, and other colonies. Within the French colonies, more
French imports of primary production are associated with worse quality of colonial institutions (col-
umn 2). This result is significantly different from the effect of French imports of primary production
on the quality of colonial institutions among British and other colonies (Columns 3 and 4). Indeed,
while French extraction of resources brought about by imports of primary products from French
colonies is negatively correlated with the quality of colonial institutions, such impact is not sig-
nificant among the British colonies while it is positively correlated with the quality of institutions
in the other and former colonies. With regards to French imports of manufactured goods, only
among other and former colonies such trade contributed to better colonial institutions, as reported
in column 4 of Table 3.9.
Hypothesis 2 is true for all colonial groups: Better quality of colonial institutions is associated
16In the current paper, running the PLS-SEMmodel across each group separately yielded similar standard errors for path coefficients.
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with better quality of current institutions. This result is true for all groups in both Tables 3.8 and
3.9. However, within the French colonies, even though 22% of the variation in the quality of current
institutions is traced back to colonial institutions, French imports of primary products in 1900 caused
a reduction in institutional quality by 31%, as reported in column 2 of Table 3.8. Actually, since
French imports of raw material had a negative impact on colonial institutions, this negative result
was partially transmitted to current institutions.
Panel C of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 presents the results of Equation (3). The direct effect of colonial
exports to France of both primary and industrial goods on GDP per capita today is only statistically
significant among other and former colonies. Krugman (1987), argues that productivity of manu-
facturing is an increasing function of production itself. Moreover, for all the colonial groups, better
quality of current institutions is associated with higher economic performance today across all colo-
nial groups with no significant differences among the groups. Our main result of interest is the
indirect effect of French imports of primary production on economic performance among French
colonies. Actually, 15% of the decline in economic performance today due to institutional quality is
attributed to the effect of French imports of primary production in 1900 on those institutions. Such
negative result is statistically significant, suggesting that low levels of economic performance in the
French colonies today can be partially attributed to the extraction of resources and implementation
of coercive institutions by the French colonizers 100 years ago. This finding is in line with the re-
source curse hypothesis: extraction of resources as defined by French imports of primary production
have the tendency to slow down the economic growth.
3.5 Findings and discussion
Our empirical results shed some light on the relative importance of colonial French imports and in-
stitutions in driving patterns of divergence in per capita income over more than 100 years. Globally,
among all colonies, French imports of rawmaterial and of manufactured goods in the late-nineteenth
and early-twentieth centuries are positively and significantly associated with the quality of colonial
institutions. As Nunn and Trefler (2013) suggest, institutions seem to exert a significantly and eco-
nomically important impact on a country’s comparative advantage as illustrated by its exports, even
after controlling for factor endowments. Those institutions persisted over time and impacted the per
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capita income.
These results convey that colonial French imports can contain different underlying channels
through which they affected economic performance today. Actually, the institutional conditions
and the prevailing types and quality of natural resource endowments within the various groups
of colonies probably had different effects on the economic development of countries and regions
(Badia-Miro et al. 2015). On the one hand, we argue that some regions were exposed to good
institutions during colonization and took advantage of their abundant natural resource endowments
and received the “blessing” of their natural capital. These economies grew from the closing decades
of the nineteenth century until recent days, encouraged by business-enhancing institutional sys-
tem which, in time, promoted innovation, industrialization, property rights, and developed financial
markets, as is the case of British colonies (La Porta et al., 1999; Landes, 1998; North et al., 1998).
On the other hand, in some colonies, extractive institutions encouraged the transfer of the colony’s
resources to the colonizer’s homeland, namely in the form of imports, where revenues would be to-
tally taken away from the colony. That was the case, for instance, of the Spanish and the Portuguese
colonists during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, who set up complex mercantile systems
of monopolies and trade regulations in order to obtain gold and other valuables.
Let us consider the specific example of French colonies. During the period of colonial reign,
colonizers were attracted by both soil and crop, and by the cheap and abundant factor endowment
in the colonies. In order to extract the full rent from this "wealth", colonizers had to impose some
form of coercive institutional system in order to facilitate trade and increase gains. Actually, an
institutional system lacking democracy and giving full authority to the governor would allow France
to exploit the raw material of their colonies (Alvarez et al., 2011, p. 165).
The results found in panel A of Table 8 confirm why the French had low incentive to establish
institutions. Their main role was to impose control in order to facilitate extractive policies. This is
attributed to the notion of "forced trade" developed through the system of authoritarian institutions
that neither promoted the welfare of the colony nor exploited its comparative advantage. So, in
sum, among French colonies, those with worse institutions exported more of raw material to France.
Louis Faidherbe 17 wrote: “In Algeria and Senegal the aim is the same, to dominate the country at
17French general and colonial administrator who created the Senegalese Tirailleurs when he was governor of Senegal.
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as low cost as possible and through this get the highest advantages commerce.” The function of the
French officials was to maintain tranquility so that the natives could work and produce [...].
To provide some additional insights on the negative relation between colonial institutions and
French extraction of resources, it is interesting to look at the export boom in French West Africa
(where the institutional conditions were deplorable)— in Senegal and the Ivory Coast—between
1897 and 1913. Timber exports from the Ivory Coast increased by a factor of six in twenty years
[Frieden, 2006]. In Indochina (which was under French colonial regime), the area of cultivated
land dramatically increased, allowing it to become the third largest producer of rice in the world
(Mitchener and Weidenmier, 2008). Moreover, between 1905 and 1914, 50% of French Dahomey
GDP was extracted by the French [Manning, 1982], and taxation rates in Tunisia were four times as
high as those in metropolitan France [Young, 1994].
Since it was costly for the local elite to switch from extractive institutions to growth-enhancing
ones after independence, the latter preferred to exploit the existing extractive institutions for their
own benefits. This explains the resources curse phenomenon that engender low levels of standard
of living in some of the former colonies today.
Van der Ploeg (2011) presents an interesting argumentation that explains the resource curse of
natural resources. "First, an abundance of natural resources leads to real appreciation of the coun-
try’s currency, the decline of tradeable sectors, the expansion of non-tradeable activities (deindustri-
alization) and production contracts after the initial boom (the Dutch disease). Second, if manufac-
turing rather than agriculture or primary activities is the economic sector that generates processes of
learning by doing and the spillover of human capital, the sudden windfalls derived from natural re-
sources put pressure on the “primarization” of the economy and can hinder economic growth. Third,
the “curse” is conditional upon the existence of weak institutional arrangements in terms of the def-
inition of property rights, contract enforcement, the rule of law and the perpetuation of a reduced
elite in government, and these complicate economic development. Fourth, the empirically observed
resource curse seems to be mostly driven by presidential and non-democratic regimes because these
systems are less accountable and less representative and thus offer more scope for resource rent
extraction. Fifth, resource dependence usually fuels corruption and rent seeking via protection mea-
sures and exclusive licenses so political elites, oligarchs and their cronies can exploit and export
resources and capture wealth and political power. It also crowds out social capital, erodes the legal
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system and can lead to armed conflict or civil war. Sixth, the fact that commodity prices are highly
volatile can lead to sudden booms and busts that harm investment, exports and output. Seventh, the
political economy of massive resource rents combined with badly-defined property rights, imperfect
markets and poorly functioning legal systems, provide ideal opportunities for producers to engage
in rent seeking, and thus divert resources away from more productive activities. Eighth, in general,
a sudden resource bonanza tends to erode politicians’ critical faculties and induces a false sense of
security."
In contrast, among the remaining two groups of colonies, British and other/former colonies,
those with better institutions either exported more to France or the level of their institutional qual-
ity was not related to the trade with France (Table 8, panel A, columns 3-4). Actually, one argues
that those colonies were already experiencing business-enhancing social and political institutions,
designed to develop the economy through production structure, free labor, and integration in interna-
tional markets, rather than being subject to rent extraction in favor of some domestic or foreign elite
(Bertoni and Willebald, 2015). Hence, trade with France will only marginally affect their quality of
institutions. Moreover, whether these economies specialized in exporting primary or manufacturing
goods, they would achieve levels of development close to the “core” because of the strong institu-
tional system they have developed. In terms of the curse/blessing of natural resources, the former
British colonies were more blessed and less damned by their abundance of resources than the other
former colonies (Bertoni, and Willebald, 2015). In particular, colonies with better institutions were
freer to trade more with France and generate the gains from such trade.
It might be impossible to test empirically all of the ways in which French imports affected levels
of income today. However, we note that we were able to account for a significant share of it through
both the direct impact and the one through both colonial and current institutions while controlling
for main variables affecting GDP. The channels we identified account for a significant amount of
the impact of French imports on economic performance in the colonies today.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide some perspective in determining the linkages between resource abun-
dance in the colonies -as represented by French imports of raw material-, and institutional quality on
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one hand, and their effect on growth on the other. We used Partial Least Square Structural Equation
Modeling, which is a combination of both factor analysis and traditional multivariate regression
models. The data set of French imports is newly constructed and contains about 100 colonies for an
averaged sample period of 1880–1912.
Thanks to this method, we were able, first, to create measures of abstract variables (such as
colonial extraction, quality of institutions), and, second, to investigate the direct effect of French
imports of raw material on long run development conveyed from external factors from the one
through colonial and current institutions.
At the pooled sample level, we found strong evidence that better colonial institutions are as-
sociated with higher French imports, emphasizing that colonies exporting relatively more tended
to develop better institutions. Moreover, we found a strong positive correlation between colonial
and current institutions, thus confirming their persistence over time. Finally we found that richer
countries establish better institutions, with no significant direct impact of French imports on per
capita income today. Our bootstrap results suggest that the indirect effect of French imports of both
raw material and of manufactured goods on current institutions through the channel of colonial in-
stitutions is positive and significant effect. This impact through institutions is also transmitted to
per capita income today. Our results appear to be robust to a variety of econometric specifications,
including instrumental variable regressions and additional correlation effects...
We also perform a multigroup analysis to test the differential impacts of our main variables of in-
terest across three different groups of colonies. We find that worse quality of colonial institutions in
the French colonies is associated with increasing levels of extraction through trade with a significant
difference from the estimate of the other groups. This result emphasizes that the French colonizers
perpetuated extractive policies to extract more resources. The negative result is also transmitted in-
directly to current institutions and to today GDP per capita. Within British colonies, no significant
effect was noted between colonial institutions and French imports suggesting that exports to France
do not affect colonial instructions set by the British colonizers. As for the other/former colonies,
better institutions are associated with more French imports. While French imports of manufactured
goods do not affect the quality of colonies institutions in the French colonies they positively affect
that of former/ other colonies.
The results also demonstrate that among the three colonial groups, colonial institutions are pos-
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itively correlated to current ones. Moreover, a higher amount of colonial French imports of raw
material in the French colonies is associated with lower levels of per capita income today.
Our empirical findings shed some light on the relative importance of colonial French imports and
institutions in driving patterns of divergence in per capita income over 100 years. This is embedded
in a larger literature of how the natural resources of colonies affected their institutional quality and
economic performance under the phenomenon of resource curse or blessing (Ross, 1999; Barro,
1999).
In trying to determine the simultaneous relationship between French extraction through trade,
institutions and economic performance, we are constrained with various limitations. First, colonial
extraction and its precise mechanisms are hard to quantify. Second, the gains colonizers extracted
from colonies are not exactly known. In this paper, we tried to investigate those issues by exploiting
a particular structure of trade and colonial institutions. While using a new data set for French
sectoral imports, we were able to shed some new light this complicated process.
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Table 3.1: Factor Matrix, Composite reliability and Eigenvalues with component analysis Extraction
Method
Constructs Variables Factor 1 Cronbach’s α D.G. rho (CR) Critical value
Eigenvalues of
first two factors
French Imports of
primary production
Fr imports of
agricultural goods 0.853 0.627 0.843 1 1.457
Fr imports of raw
material for
industry 0.853 0.543
Institutions in 1900
Constraint on
executive 1900 0.935 0.856 0.933 1 1.744
Democracy 1900 0.935 0.256
Institutions in 2005
Rule of Law 0.969 0.984 0.990 1 2.906
Control for
corruption 0.993 0.094
Voice and
accountability 0.993 0.000
Temperature
Temperature 1 0.993 4.141
Temperature 2 0.966 0.671
Temperature 3 0.744 0.945 0.960 1 0.110
Temperature 4 0.870 0.071
Temperature 5 0.954 0.007
Humidity
Humidity 1 0.844 2.138
Humidity 3 0.956 0.797 0.881 1 0.529
Humidity 4 0.860 0.333
Human Capital
1900
percent of pop
evangelized by
Christian missions 0.879 0.706 0.872 1 1.545
Primary school
enrollment 0.879 0.455
Fertility of soil
Steppe low 0.641
Desert low 0.713
Dry steppe 0.558 - - - -
Mineral Resources
today
Gold reserves 0.500 0.799 0.876 1 2.630
Iron 0.889 0.928
Silver 0.864 0.372
Zinc 0.966 0.070
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Table 3.2: Results of the measurement model: Latent variables with reflective Indicators
Latent
variable
Manifest
variables
Standardized
loadings
Standardized
loadings
(Bootstrap)
Critical
ratio
(CR)a
Lower
bound
(95%)
Upper
bound
(95%)
Cronbach’s
α
population
D.G. rho
(CR) (AVE)
French
Imports of
primary
production
Fr imports of
agricultural
goods
0.661 0.656 2.468 0.176 0.969 0.821 0.843 0.663
Fr imports of raw
material for
industry
0.969 0.958 27.535 0.897 0.999
Institutions
in 1900
Constraint on
executive 1900
0.924 0.928 34.638 0.879 0.964 0.932 0.932 0.873
Democracy 1900 0.943 0.937 37.445 0.887 0.966
Institutions
in 2005
Rule of Law 0.967 0.968 117.760 0.952 0.980 0.980 0.989 0.970
Control for
corruption
0.993 0.993 604.020 0.989 0.995
Voice and
accountability
0.993 0.993 604.020 0.989 0.995
Temperature
Temperature 1 0.992 0.950 11.178 0.748 0.994
Temperature 2 0.967 0.924 10.859 0.669 0.977
Temperature 3 0.705 0.650 4.105 0.376 0.958 0.869 0.960 0.826
Temperature 4 0.897 0.875 5.459 0.539 0.981
Temperature 5 0.953 0.913 8.732 0.715 0.969
Humidity
Humidity 1 0.667 0.668 3.006 0.306 0.965
Humidity 3 1.000 0.843 3.768 0.067 0.998 0.706 0.881 0.548
Humidity 4 0.532 0.585 2.085 0.066 0.931
Human
Capital 1900
percent of pop
evangelized by
Christian
missions
0.729 0.705 5.528 0.492 0.895 0.845 0.869 0.772
Primary school
enrollment
0.969 0.965 35.947 0.910 0.995
Fertility of
soil
Steppe low 0.846 0.625 2.614 0.004 0.956
Desert low 0.284 0.208 0.644 -0.589 0.879
Dry steppe -0.334 -0.322 -1.296 -0.782 0.024 - - -
Mineral
Resources
today
Gold reserves 0.370 0.569 1.326 0.222 0.957 0.746 0.877 0.657
Iron 0.886 0.889 11.109 0.827 0.964
Silver 0.872 0.867 10.323 0.694 0.983
Zinc 0.973 0.975 82.716 0.954 0.991
Note: a Critical ratio is obtained by dividing the co-variance estimate (the loading) by its standard error. A value exceeding 1.96
represents a level of significance.
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Table 3.3: Results of Cross loadings: Latent variable with reflective indicators
Previous
institutions
Current
institutions
French
imports
primary temperature
Human Capital in
1900
Mineral
resources today Humidity
Constraint on
executive 1900
0.928 0.576 0.247 -0.378 0.543 0.418 0.122
Democracy 1900 0.941 0.518 0.321 -0.179 0.579 0.571 0.047
Rule of Law 0.555 0.968 0.208 -0.392 0.592 0.352 0.080
Control for
corruption
0.584 0.993 0.189 -0.458 0.640 0.377 0.149
Voice and
accountability
0.584 0.993 0.189 -0.458 0.640 0.377 0.149
Fr imports of
agricultural goods
0.066 0.068 0.647 -0.015 0.061 0.184 -0.008
Fr imports of raw
material for
industry
0.337 0.211 0.974 0.055 0.278 0.513 -0.106
Temperature 1 -0.285 -0.420 0.063 0.992 -0.335 -0.118 -0.313
Temperature 2 -0.298 -0.432 0.041 0.965 -0.344 -0.122 -0.390
Temperature 3 -0.200 -0.196 0.162 0.706 -0.327 0.098 -0.611
Temperature 4 -0.266 -0.474 -0.013 0.895 -0.270 -0.255 -0.012
Temperature 5 -0.265 -0.418 0.006 0.956 -0.301 -0.103 -0.236
percent of pop
evangelized by
Christian missions
0.395 0.385 0.148 -0.225 0.707 0.135 0.227
Primary school
enrollment
0.586 0.632 0.255 -0.332 0.954 0.471 0.218
Gold reserves 0.186 0.159 0.155 -0.026 0.094 0.350 -0.024
Iron 0.497 0.359 0.419 -0.118 0.356 0.888 -0.146
Silver 0.442 0.299 0.367 -0.139 0.403 0.875 -0.108
Zinc 0.519 0.359 0.540 -0.117 0.410 0.973 -0.128
Humidity 1 0.094 0.046 -0.101 -0.081 0.207 -0.072 0.816
Humidity 3 0.102 0.146 -0.056 -0.311 0.259 -0.142 0.977
Humidity 4 0.024 0.116 -0.130 -0.360 0.183 -0.132 0.854
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Table 3.4: Results of Discriminant validity: Latent variable with Reflective indicators (correlations
for any pair of Latent variables < square root of AVE)
French imports
primary
Previous
institutions
Current
institutions Temperature
Human
Capital
Mineral
resources today Humidity
French imports
primary
0.814*
Previous institutions 0.101 0.934*
Current institutions 0.042 0.338 0.985*
temperature 0.002 0.085 0.198 0.909*
Human Capital 0.225 0.381 0.346 0.063 0.879*
Mineral resources
today
0.248 0.282 0.140 0.018 0.246 0.539*
humidity 0.051 0.004 0.005 0.001 0.004 0.006 0.810*
Mean Communalities
(AVE)
0.663 0.873 0.970 0.826 0.772 0.657 0.548
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Table 3.5: French Imports of primary production - Structural equation model standardized results:
Pooled sample
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS PLS
Equation 1: Dependent variable: Previous Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports raw material 0.335*** 0.082 0.222**
(0.095) (0.089) (0.104)
European Settlements 0.577*** 0.456***
(0.089) (0.116)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.112 0.381 0.346
Equation 2: Dependent variable: Current Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports raw material 0.206** 0.05 0.129**
(0.107) (0.079) (0.065)
European Settlements 0.354** 0.266**
(0.114) (0.084)
Previous Institutions 0.615*** 0.614*** 0.582***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.082)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.379 0.377 0.339
Equation 3: Dependent variable: GDPPC
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports raw material 0.102 0.08** 0.102 0.019 0.288* 0.026*
(0.069) (0.04) (0.069) (0.031) (0.13) (0.014)
European Settlements 1900 0.138** 0.054
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(0.059) (0.036)
Previous Institutions 1900 0.239*** 0.239*** 0.118**
(0.067) (0.061) (0.061)
Current Institutions 2005 0.389*** 0.389*** 0.203**
(0.086) (0.086) (0.103)
Mineral Resources today 0.373*** 0.373*** 0.328**
(0.073) (0.073) (0.153)
Human Capital in 1900 0.229** 0.229** 0.320*
(0.096) (0.096) (0.119)
Temperature 0.04 0.04 0.074
(0.071) (0.071) (0.076)
Humidity 0.075 0.075 -0.082
(0.066) (0.066) (0.062)
War in 1900’s -0.065 -0.065 -0.02
(0.059) (0.059) (0.05)
Fertility of soil -0.036 -0.036 -0.046
(0.065) (0.065) (0.047)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.703 0.703 0.769
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.6: French Imports of manufacured goods - Structural equation model standardized results:
Pooled sample
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS PLS
Equation 1 Dependent variable: Colonial Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports manufactured 0.345*** 0.146* 0.265**
(0.095) (0.085) (0.109)
European Settlements 0.561*** 0.471***
(0.085) (0.119)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.119 0.395 0.382
Equation 2: Dependent variable: Current Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports manufactured 0.211** 0.085 0.162**
(0.109) (0.071) (0.07)
European Settlements 0.327** 0.288**
(0.117) (0.092)
Previous Institutions 0.612*** 0.583*** 0.611***
(0.08) (0.082) (0.073)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.375 0.34 0.375
Equation 3: Dependent variable: GDPPC
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French Imports manufactured 0.199** 0.079** 0.194** 0.036 0.18 0.045**
(0.068) (0.039) (0.069) (0.028) (0.08) (0.017)
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European Settlements 1900 0.137** 0.079**
(0.058) (0.027)
Previous Institutions 1900 0.229*** 0.245*** 0.168***
(0.064) (0.071) (0.026)
Current Institutions 2005 0.374*** 0.419*** 0.275***
(0.083) (0.078) (0.024)
Mineral Resources today 0.328*** 0.358*** 0.246***
(0.071) (0.073) (0.05)
Human Capital in 1900 0.238** 0.153* 0.268***
(0.091) (0.083) (0.021)
Temperature 0.008 0.017 -0.131
(0.069) (0.068) (0.044)
Humidity 0.059 0.067 0.060**
(0.064) (0.063) (0.028)
War in 1900’s -0.101* -0.061 0.017
(0.059) (0.059) (0.04)
Fertility of soil -0.051 -0.031 -0.074
(0.065) (0.063) (0.02)
Observations 100 100 100
R square 0.723 0.716 0.678
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.7: IV regressions
Panel A: First Stage for current Institutions
Log Settler Mortality -0.149**
(0.047)
Observations 100
R-squared 0.27
Panel B: Second Stage least squares
Current institutions 1.51***
(0.159)
Observations 100
R-squared 0.585
Panel C: ordinary least squares
Current institutions 0.663***
(0.137)
Observations 100
R-squared 0.664
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: Panel B reports the two stage least squares estimates with log GDP per capita as the dependent variable and instrumenting for
current institutions scores using log settler mortality; Panel A reports the corresponding first stage. Panel C reports the OLS coefficient
from regressing log GDP per capita on current institutions, with the other control variables (not reported to save space). The correspond-
ing 2SLS estimate of the impact of institutions on income per capita is in fact larger than the OLS estimates as found in AJR (2001).
This suggests that measurement error in the institutions variables that creates attenuation bias is likely to be more important than reverse
causality and omitted variables biases.
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Table 3.8: French Imports of primary production - Structural equation model standardized results: multigroup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled French Colonies British Colonies Other and Former Colonies
Panel A: Dependent variable - Colonial Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French imports raw => Previous Institutions 0.082 -0.691** a, c -0.037a,b 0.27*b,c
(0.089) (0.25) (0.132) (0.151)
European Settlement=> Previous Institutions 0.577*** 0.646** 0.660*** 0.486**
(0.089) (0.25) (0.132) (0.151)
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.381 0.259 0.43 0.44
Panel B: Dependent variable - Current Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French imports raw=> Current Institutions 0.05 -0.314** -0.025 0.167*
(0.079) (0.089) (0.031) (0.096)
European Settlement=> Current Institutions 0.354** 0.294*** 0.451*** 0.30**
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(0.114) (0.072) (0.093) (0.144)
Previous Institutions=> Current Institutions 0.614*** 0.455**a 0.220** 0.682***a 0.618***
(0.08) (0.178) (0.075) (0.124) (0.135)
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.377 0.21 0.47 0.38
Panel C: Dependent variable - GDPPC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French imports raw=> GDPPC 0.102 0.019 -0.055a -0.152* 0.052 -0.012 0.293**a 0.054
(0.069) (0.031) (0.17) (0.056) (0.105) (0.014) (0.147) (0.036)
European Settlement=> GDPPC 0.138** 0.142** 0.209*** 0.097*
(0.059) (0.047) (0.06) (0.05)
Previous Institutions=> GDPPC 0.239*** 0.220** 0.316*** 0.201**
(0.061) (0.075) (0.062) (0.08)
Current Institutions=> GDPPC 0.389*** 0.483** 0.463** 0.325*
(0.086) (0.244) (0.162) (0.172)
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.703 0.463 0.722 0.624
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Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Letter superscripts represent significant differences in path coefficients compared to other two groups
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Table 3.9: French Imports of manufactured good - standardized results: multigroup
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pooled French Colonies British Colonies Other and Former Colonies
Panel A: Dependent variable - Previous Institutions
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French imports man=>
Previous Institutions 0.146* -0.341a,c -0.042a,b 0.361** b ,c
(0.085) (0.243) (0.129) (0.136)
European Settlement=>
Previous Institutions 0.561*** 0.362 0.653*** 0.473***
(0.085) (0.243) (0.129) (0.136)
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.395 0.1 0.43 0.44
Panel B: Dependent variable - Current Institutions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
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French imports man=>
Current Institutions 0.085 -0.146 -0.029 0.223**
(0.071) (0.063) (0.03) (0.072)
European Settlement=>
Current Institutions 0.327** 0.154** 0.447*** 0.292**
(0.117) (0.063) (0.091) (0.101)
Previous Institutions=>
Current Institutions 0.583*** 0.427**a 0.220** 0.683***a 0.618***
(0.082) (0.181) (0.075) (0.123) (0.135)
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.34 0.18 0.47 0.38
Panel C: Dependent variable - GDPPC
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect Direct Indirect
French imports man=>
GDPPC 0.194** 0.036 0.096a,c -0.089 0.053a,b -0.014 0.47**b,c 0.067**
(0.069) (0.028) (0.16) (0.043) (0.102) (0.014) (0.143) (0.031)
C
hapter3
171
T
hree
essays
on
French
colonialtrade
European Settlement=>
GDPPC 0.137** 0.094** 0.219*** 0.088*
(0.058) (0.046) (0.061) (0.046)
Previous Institutions=>
GDPPC 0.245*** 0.261** 0.335*** 0.186**
(0.071) (0.085) (0.058) (0.073)
Current Institutions=>
GDPPC 0.419*** 0.611**a 0.490** 0.302*a
(0.078) (0.251) (0.161) (0.157)
Covariates YES YES YES YES
Observations 100 27 37 36
R square 0.716 0.497 0.722 0.686
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Letter superscripts represent significant differences in path coefficients compared to other two groups
C
hapter3
172
Bibliography
(1880-1920). Tableau décennal du commerce de la france.
(1880-1922). Tableau général du commerce de la france.
(2005). Quantifying the international bilateral movements of migrants.
Acemoglu, D., F. A. Gallego, and J. A. Robinson (2014, February). Institutions, human capital and
development. NBER Working Papers 19933, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Acemoglu, D., M. Golosov, A. Tsyvinski, and P. Yared (2011). A dynamic theory of resource wars.
Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. Robinson (2005, June). The rise of europe: Atlantic trade, insti-
tutional change, and economic growth. American Economic Review 95(3), 546–579.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2001, December). The colonial origins of compara-
tive development: An empirical investigation. American Economic Review 91(5), 1369–1401.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2002). Reversal of fortune: Geography and in-
stitutions in the making of the modern world income distribution. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117(4), 1231–1294.
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, and J. A. Robinson (2011, April). Hither thou shalt come, but no further:
Reply to &quot;the colonial origins of comparative development: An empirical investigation:
Comment&quot;. NBERWorking Papers 16966, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Acemoglu, D. and T. Verdier (1998). Property rights, corruption and the allocation of talent: a
general equilibrium approach. The Economic Journal 108(450), 1381–1403.
173
Three essays on French colonial trade
Alam, M. S. (1994, June). Colonialism, decolonisation and growth rates: Theory and empirical
evidence. Cambridge Journal of Economics 18(3), 235–57.
Albouy, D. (2006, May). The colonial origins of comparative development: An investigation of the
settler mortality data. Center for International and Development Economics Research, Work-
ing Paper Series qt8kt576x8, Center for International and Development Economics Research,
Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
Alesina, A. (2002). The size of countries: Does it matter? Harvard Institute of Economic Research
Working Papers 1975, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
Alexeev, M. and R. Conrad (2009). The elusive curse of oil. The Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 91(3), 586–598.
Alvarez, J., H. Willebald, et al. (2011). Agrarian income distribution, land ownership systems, and
economic performance: settler economies during the first globalization. In 5th Uruguayan
Economic History Meeting. University of the Republic, Uruguay. Session: Institutions and
Development. Montevideo, pp. 23–25.
Amin, S. (1972). Underdevelopment and dependence in black africa: Historical origin. Journal of
peace research 9(2), 105–119.
Anderson, J. E. and D. Marcouiller (2002). Insecurity and the pattern of trade: An empirical inves-
tigation. Review of Economics and statistics 84(2), 342–352.
Aragona, F. M., P. Chuhan-Pole, and B. C. Land (2015). The local economic impacts of resource
abundance: What have we learned? Technical Report 7263, SSRN.
Arezki, R. and R. Van der Ploeg (2007). Can the natural resource curse be turned into a blessing?
the role of trade policies and institutions. IMF Working Papers -, 1–34.
Arroyo Abad, L. and J. L. van Zanden (2014). Growth under extractive institutions? latin ameri-
can per capita gdp in colonial times. Technical report, Utrecht University, Centre for Global
Economic History.
174
Three essays on French colonial trade
Ashraf, Q. and O. Galor (2011). Dynamics and stagnation in the malthusian epoch. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Assaker, G., S. Huang, and R. Hallak (2012). Applications of partial least squares structural equation
modeling in tourism research: A methodological review. Tourism Analysis 17(5), 679–686.
Auty, R. M. (2001). The political economy of resource-driven growth. European economic re-
view 45(4), 839–846.
Badia-Miro, M., V. Pinilla, and H. Willebald (2015). Natural Resources and Economic Growth:
Learning from History. Routledge.
Bairoch, P. (1971). Le Tiers-monde dans l’impasse. Gallimard.
Bairoch, P. (1988). Jacques marseille, empire colonial et capitalisme français. histoire d’un divorce.
Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations 43, 144–147.
Bairoch, P. (1989). The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Volume 8, Chapter European
Policy 1815-1914. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bairoch, P. (1999). Mythes et paradoxes de l’histoire économique. Paris: edition de la decouverte.
Balassa, B. (1965, may). Trade liberalisation and "revealed" comparative advantage. The manch-
ester school 33(2), 99–123.
Balassa, B. and L. Bauwens (1988). Inter-industry and intra-industry specialization in manufactured
goods. Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 124(1), 1–13.
Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political economy 107(S6), S158–S183.
Bates, R. H. and S. Block (2010). Agricultural trade interventions in africa. The Political Economy
of Agricultural Price Distortions -, 304–331.
Bauer, P. (1976). Dissent and Development. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
Becuwe, S., B. Blancheton, and K. Onfroy (2015). Données du commerce extérieur de la france
entre 1836 et 1938 base montesquieu. Cahiers du GREThA 35, –.
175
Three essays on French colonial trade
Benavot, A. and P. Riddle (1988). The expansion of primary education, 1870-1940: Trends and
issues. Sociology of Education Jstor, 191–210.
Bertocchi, G. and F. Canova (2002, December). Did colonization matter for growth?: An empir-
ical exploration into the historical causes of africa’s underdevelopment. European Economic
Review 46(10), 1851–1871.
Bertoni, R. and H. Willebald (2015). Do energy natural endowments matter? new zealand and
uruguay in a comparative approach (1870-1940). Technical report, Universidad de la republica.
Betts, R. F. (1961). Assimilation and association in French colonial theory, 1890-1914. Number
604 in Columbia studies in the social sciences,. New York, Columbia University Press.
Bollen, K. A. (1990). Political democracy: Conceptual and measurement traps. Studies in Compar-
ative International Development 25(1), 7–24.
Bollen, K. A. and R. W. Jackman (1985). Political democracy and the size distribution of income.
American Sociological Review -, 438–457.
Bollen, K. A. and R. W. Jackman (1989). Democracy, stability, and dichotomies. American Socio-
logical Review -, 612–621.
Bouteville, H. (1913). préface de l’ouvrage d’H. Paulin, L’outillage économique des colonies
françaises. paris.
Briant, A., P.-P. Combes, and M. Lafourcade (2009, February). Product complexity, quality of
institutions and the pro-trade effect of immigrants. PSE Working Papers halshs-00566772,
HAL.
Brunnschweiler, C. N. (2008). Cursing the blessings? natural resource abundance, institutions, and
economic growth. World development 36(3), 399–419.
Brunschwig, H. (1966). French Colonialism, 1871-1914: Myths and Realities. Frederick A. Praeger,
France.
Cain, P. J. and A. G. Hopkins (1993). British imperialism: Innovation and expansion 1688-1914.
New York: Longman.
176
Three essays on French colonial trade
Callis, H. G. (1976). Foreign capital in Southeast Asia. New York : Arno Press.
Canavire Bacarreza, G. J. and L. Ehrlich (2006, January). The impact of migration on foreign trade:
A developing country approach. MPRA Paper 1090, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Caselli, F., M. Morelli, and D. Rohner (2013). The geography of inter-state resource wars. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Chailley-Bert, J. (1894). The colonisation of Indo-China. London, A. Constable & Co.
Chenery, H. (1960). Patterns of industrial growth. The American Economic Review JSTOR, 624–
654.
Chin, W. W. (1998). The partial least squares approach to structural equation modeling. Modern
methods for business research 295(2), 295–336.
Chin, W. W. (2010). How to write up and report pls analyses. In Handbook of partial least squares,
pp. 655–690. Springer.
Cohen, W. B. (1968). French colonialism, 1871-1914. myths and realities by henri brunschwig.
African Historical Studies 1(1), 137–139.
Cohen, W. B. (1971). Rulers of empire: the French colonial service in Africa. Hoover Institution
Press.
Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. (1970). De l’imperialisme Britannique a l’imperialisme Europeen:
L’avatar colonial. Number 18. L’Homme de la Société.
Crosby, A. (1986). Ecological imperialism: The biological expansion of Europe 900-1900. New
York: Cambridge University Press,.
Crowder, M. (1968). West Africa under colonial rule. Chicago: Northwestern University Press.
De Dampierre, E. (1960). Coton noir, café blanc. Cahiers d’études africaines 1(2), 128–147.
de Medeiros Costa, H. K. and E. M. dos Santos (2013). Institutional analysis and the resource curse
in developing countries. Energy Policy 63, 788–795.
177
Three essays on French colonial trade
Dedinger, B. (2012). The franco-german trade puzzle: an analysis of the economic consequences
of the franco-prussian war1. The Economic History Review 65(3), 1029–1054.
Denoon, D. (1983). Settler Capitalism: The dynamics of dependent development in the southern
hemisphere. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Dippel, C., A. Greif, and D. Trefler (2015). The rents from trade and coercive institutions: Remov-
ing the sugar coating. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2003). Institutions, trade, and growth. Journal of monetary eco-
nomics 50(1), 133–162.
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2003). Tropics, germs, and crops: how endowments influence economic
development. Journal of monetary economics 50(1), 3–39.
Easterly, W. and R. Levine (2012, June). The european origins of economic development. NBER
Working Papers 18162, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Eberl, M. (2010). An application of pls in multi-group analysis: the need for differentiated
corporate-level marketing in the mobile communications industry. In Handbook of partial
least squares, pp. 487–514. Springer.
Egger, P., M. V. Ehrlich, and D. R. Nelson (2011). Migration and trade. CESifo Working Paper
Series 3467, CESifo Group Munich.
El Kallab, T. The french colonial trade patterns: Facts and impacts. Chapter 1 of PhD thesis.
Engerman, S. L. and K. L. Sokoloff (1997, December). Factor endowments: Institutions, and
differential paths of growth among new world economies: A view from economic historians
of the united states. NBER Historical Working Papers 0066, National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc.
Esposito Vinzi, V. and G. Russolillo (2013). Partial least squares algorithms and methods. Wiley
Interdisciplinary Reviews: Computational Statistics 5(1), 1–19.
Estevadeordal, A., B. Frantz, and A. M. Taylor (2002, November). The rise and fall of world trade,
1870-1939. NBER Working Papers 9318, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
178
Three essays on French colonial trade
Esteves, R. P. (2007). Between imperialism and capitalism. european capital exports before 1914.
Technical report, University of Oxford, Mimeo.
Ferguson, N. and M. Schularick (2006, June). The empire effect: The determinants of country risk
in the first age of globalization, 1880 1913. The Journal of Economic History 66(02), 283–312.
Ferry, J. F. C. (1987). Discours et Opinions de Jules Ferry, Chapter "Speech Before the French
Chamber of Deputies, March 28, 1884", pp. pp. 199–201, 210–11, 215–18. Paris: Armand
Colin & Cie.
Frankel, J. A. and D. Romer (1999, June). Does trade cause growth? American Economic Re-
view 89(3), 379–399.
Frieden, J. A. (1994). International investment and colonial control: A new interpretation. Interna-
tional Organization 48(4), 559–593.
Frieden, J. A. (2006). Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company.
Gallagher, J. and R. Robinson (1953). The imperialism of free trade. The Economic History Re-
view 6(1), 1–15.
Gallego, F. A. (2010). Historical origins of schooling: The role of democracy and political decen-
tralization. Review of Economics and Statistics 92, 228–243.
Galor, O. (2005). From stagnation to growth: unified growth theory. Handbook of economic
growth 1, 171–293.
Gelb, A. H. (1988). Oil windfalls: Blessing or curse? Oxford University Press.
Ginsburgh, V. A., J. Melitz, and F. Toubal (2014). Foreign language learning: An econometric
analysis. Technical report, CEPR discussion paper.
Glaeser, E. L., R. L. Porta, F. L. de Silanes, and A. Shleifer (2004, 09). Do institutions cause
growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9(3), 271–303.
Glick, R. and A. Rose (2002). Does a currency union affect trade? European Economic Review 46,
1125–1151.
179
Three essays on French colonial trade
Grier, R. M. (1999). Colonial legacies and economic growth. Public choice 98(3-4), 317–335.
Griffin, K. and J. Gurley (1985). Radical analysis of imperialism, the third world, and te transition
to socialism: A survey. Journal of Economic Literature 23, 1087–1143.
Griffiths, I. (1993). The Atlas of African Affairs. 2nd ed., Routledge, London.
Groot, H. D., G.-J. Linders, P. Rietveld, and U. Subramanian (2004, 02). The institutional determi-
nants of bilateral trade patterns. Kyklos 57(1), 103–123.
Guinot, C., J. Latreille, and M. Tenenhaus (2001). Pls path modelling and multiple table analysis.
application to the cosmetic habits of women in ile-de-france. Chemometrics and Intelligent
Laboratory Systems 58(2), 247–259.
Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. European economic
review 45(4), 847–859.
Hair, J. F., C. M. Ringle, and M. Sarstedt (2011). Pls-sem: Indeed a silver bullet. Journal of
Marketing Theory and Practice 19(2), 139–152.
Hair, J. F., M. Wolfinbarger, A. H. Money, P. Samouel, and M. J. Page (2015). Essentials of business
research methods. Routledge.
Hausmann, R., J. Hwang, and D. Rodrik (2007). What you export matters. Journal of economic
growth 12(1), 1–25.
Hausmann, R. and R. Rigobon (2003). An alternative interpretation of the’resource curse’: Theory
and policy implications. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Head, K., T. Mayer, and J. Ries (2010, May). The erosion of colonial trade linkages after indepen-
dence. Journal of International Economics 81(1), 1–14.
Helpman, E. and P. R. Krugman (1985). Market structure and foreign trade: Increasing returns,
imperfect competition, and the international economy. MIT press.
Henseler, J. and G. Fassott (2010). Testing moderating effects in pls path models: An illustration of
available procedures. In Handbook of partial least squares, pp. 713–735. Springer.
180
Three essays on French colonial trade
Henseler, J., C. M. Ringle, and M. Sarstedt (2015). A new criterion for assessing discriminant
validity in variance-based structural equation modeling. Journal of the Academy of Marketing
Science 43, 1–21.
Henseler, J., C. M. Ringle, and R. R. Sinkovics (2009). The use of partial least squares path model-
ing in international marketing. Advances in International Marketing (AIM) 20, 277–320.
Henseler, J., M. Sarstedt, C. M. Ringle, and J. F. Hair (2014). On the emancipation of pls-sem: A
commentary on rigdon (2012). Long range planning 47(3), 154–160.
Hilferding, R. (1970). Le capital financier, étude sur le développement récent du capitalisme, traduit
de l’allemend par M. Ollivier. Première édition, Paris, Ed. de Minuit.
Hopkins, A. G. (1973). Economic History of West Africa. Longman.
Hughes, R. (1987). The fatal shore. London: Collins Harvill.
Huillery, E. (2011, March). The impact of european settlement within french west africa: Did
pre-colonial prosperous areas fall behind? Journal of African Economies 20(2), 263–311.
Huillery, E. (2014). The black man’s burden: The cost of colonization of french west africa. The
Journal of Economic History 74(01), 1–38.
Jones, P. (2013, february). History matters: New evidence on the long run impact of colonial rule
on institutions. Journal of Comparative Economics 41(1), 181–200.
Kaufmann, D., A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2011). The worldwide governance indicators: method-
ology and analytical issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 3(02), 220–246.
Kleiman, E. (1976, September). Trade and the decline of colonialism. The Economic Jour-
nal 86(343), 459–480.
Kremer, M. (1993). Population growth and technological change: one million bc to 1990. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics -, 681–716.
Kwon, R. (2011). How the legacy of french colonization has shaped divergent levels of economic
development in east asia: A time-series cross-national analysis. The Sociological Quarterly 52,
56–82.
181
Three essays on French colonial trade
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de Silanes, A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (1999, April). The quality of govern-
ment. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15(1), 222–79.
Lal, D. (2004). Praise of Empires: Globalization and Order. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Landes, D. S. (1998). The wealth and poverty of nations: Why some are so rich and some so poor.
New York: W.W. Norton & Co.
Lange, M., J. Mahoney, and M. Vom Hau (2006). Colonialism and development: A comparative
analysis of spanish and british colonies. American Journal of Sociology 111(5), 1412–1462.
Larsen, E. R. (2006). Escaping the resource curse and the dutch disease? when and why nor-
way caught up with and forged ahead of its neighbors. American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 65, 605–645.
Lavallée, E. and J. Lochard (2012). Independence and trade: the specic effects of french colo-
nialism. Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine urn:hdl:123456789/9564,
Université Paris-Dauphine.
Leamer, E. E. (1984). Sources of international comparative advantage: Theory and evidence. MIT
press Cambridge, MA.
Levchenko, A. A. (2007). Institutional quality and international trade. The Review of Economic
Studies 74(3), 791–819.
Lewis, G. K. (1983). Main currents in Caribbean thought: the historical evolution of Caribbean
society in its ideological aspects, 1492-1900. U of Nebraska Press.
Linders, G.-J. (2004, August). The effect of domestic institutions on international trade flows: A
sectoral analysis. ERSA conference papers ersa04p357, European Regional Science Associa-
tion.
Lénine, V. (1917-1971). L’Impérialisme, stade suprême du capitalisme, (essai de vulgarisation).
Paris, Editions Spéciales.
Lohmoeller, J.-B. (1989). Latent variable path analysis with partial least squares.
182
Three essays on French colonial trade
Lopez-Cordova, J. E. and C. M. Meissner (2003). Exchange-rate regimes and international trade:
Evidence from the classical gold standard era. American Economic Review JSTOR, 344–353.
Lévy-Leboyer, M. (1968). La croissance économique en france au xixe siècle. résultats prélimi-
naires. Annales. Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations. 23e année 4, 788–807.
Maddison, A. (1989). The World Economy in the Twentieth Century. Paris, OECD Development
Center.
Maddison, A. (2006). The World Economy. Paris: Development Center of the organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development.
Manning, P. (1982). Slavery, colonialism, and economic growth in Dahomey, 1640-1980. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Markovitch, T. J. (1966, juin). L’industrie Française de 1789 à 1964, Volume 6. Cahiers de
l’I.S.E.A, AF.
Marseille, J. (1984). Empire Colonial et Capitalisme Francais. Histoire D’un divorce. Paris: Albin
Michel.
Martin, P., T. Mayer, and M. Thoenig (2008, 07). Make trade not war? Review of Economic
Studies 75(3), 865–900.
Mayer, T. and S. Zignago (2011). Notes on cepii distances measures: The geodist database. Tech-
nical report, CEPII.
Mehlum, H., K. Moene, and R. Torvik (2006). Institutions and the resource curse. The Economic
Journal 116(508), 1–20.
Meon, P.-G. and K. Sekkat (2008). Institutional quality and trade: which institutions? which trade?
Economic Inquiry 46(2), 227–240.
Mikesell, R. F. (1997). Explaining the resource curse, with special reference to mineral-exporting
countries. Resources Policy 23(4), 191–199.
Mitchell, B. (2007a). International Historical Statistics: Africa, Asia and Oceania, 1750-2005.
Palgrave Macmillan.
183
Three essays on French colonial trade
Mitchell, B. (2007b). International Historical Statistics: The Americas, 1750-2005. Palgrave
Macmillan.
Mitchener, K. J. and M. Weidenmier (2008, November). Trade and empire. The Economic Jour-
nal 118, 1805–1834.
Morris, H. C. (1900). The history of colonization from the earliest times to the present day (1900).
New York, London, The Macmillan company.
Myrdal, G. (1957). Economic theory and under-developed regions. G. Duckworth.
Naritomi, J., R. R. Soares, and J. J. Assunção (2012). Institutional development and colonial her-
itage within brazil. The journal of economic history 72(02), 393–422.
North, D., W. Summerhill, and B. Weingast (1998). Order Disorder and Economic change Latin
America vs. North America. Hoover Institution Publications, Stanford University.
North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge
university press.
North, D. C. and R. P. Thomas (1973). The rise of the western world: A new economic history.
Cambridge University Press.
Nunn, N. (2008, 02). The long-term effects of africa’s slave trades. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123(1), 139–176.
Nunn, N. and D. Puga (2007, March). Ruggedness: The blessing of bad geography in africa. Work-
ing Papers 2007-09, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
Nunn, N. and N. Qian (2011). The potato’s contribution to population and urbanization: Evidence
from a historical experiment. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126(2), 593–650.
Nunn, N. and D. Trefler (2013). Domestic institutions as a source of comparative advantage. Tech-
nical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nunn, N. and L. Wantchekon (2011, December). The slave trade and the origins of mistrust in
africa. American Economic Review 101(7), 3221–52.
184
Three essays on French colonial trade
OECD (2011). Oecd indicators stan.
Oyinlola, M. A., O. A. Adeniyi, and I. D. Raheem (2015). Natural resource abundance, institu-
tions and economic growth in africa. African Journal of Economic and Sustainable Develop-
ment 4(1), 34–48.
Pakenham, T. (1992). Scramble for Africa... Harper Collins.
Pilat, D. (2009). OECD science, technology and industry scoreboard, Chapter Manufacturing trade
balance by technology intensity. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Proudman, J. and S. Redding (2000, August). Evolving patterns of international trade. Review of
International Economics 8(3), 373–96.
Puga, D. and D. Trefler (2012). International trade and institutional change: Medieval venice’s
response to globalization. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Rauch, J. E. (1999, June). Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of International
Economics 48(1), 7–35.
Robinson, R. and J. A. Gallagher (1961). Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperial-
ism. Humanities Press Intl.
Rocha, R., C. Ferraz, and R. R. Soares (2015). Human capital persistence and development. Tech-
nical report, IZA Discussion Papers.
Rose, A. (1999, October). One money, one market: Estimating the effect of common currencies on
trade. Seminar Papers 678, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
Rose, A. K. (2000). One money, one market: the effect of common currencies on trade. Economic
policy 15(30), 7–46.
Rose, A. K. (2004). Do wto members have more liberal trade policy? Journal of international
Economics 63(2), 209–235.
Ross, M. (1999). The political economy of the resource curse. World Politics 51(2), 297–322.
Rostow, W. W. (1956). The take-off into self-sustained growth. The Economic Journal 66, 25–48.
185
Three essays on French colonial trade
Rungi, A. (2010). From export dependency to dynamic comparative advantages. Technical report,
POLINARES working paper.
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner (1995). Natural resource abundance and economic growth. Technical
report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Sachs, J. D. and A. M. Warner (2001). The curse of natural resources. European economic re-
view 45(4), 827–838.
Sandberg, H. M. and J. Seale, James L. (2012, February). The Impact of Historical and Regional
Networks on Trade Volumes within the Western Hemisphere: A Gravity Analysis across Sec-
tors. 2012 Annual Meeting, February 4-7, 2012, Birmingham, Alabama 120071, Southern
Agricultural Economics Association.
Sellers, C. (1992). The Market Revolution: Jacksonian America, 1815-1846. Oxford University
Press.
Sousa, J. D. and J. Lochard (2012, June). Trade and colonial status. Journal of African
Economies 21(3), 409–439.
Svedberg, P. (1981). Colonial enforcement of foreign direct investment. The manchester school 49,
21–38.
Tadei, F. (2013). Extractive institutions and gains from trade: Evidence from colonial africa. Tech-
nical report, Working Paper, California Intitute of Technology.
Terra, C. and E. Vasconcelos (2010). Credit market quality, innovation and trade. Technical report,
THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications) working papers, Université de
Cergy-Pontoise.
Trefler, D. (1995). The case of the missing trade and other mysteries. The American Economic
Review -, 1029–1046.
Tsui, K. K. (2011). More oil, less democracy: Evidence from worldwide crude oil discoveries*.
The Economic Journal 121(551), 89–115.
186
Three essays on French colonial trade
Vinzi, V. E., W. W. Chin, J. Henseler, and H. Wang (2010b). Handbook of partial least squares.
ISBN.
Vinzi, V. E., L. Trinchera, and S. Amato (2010a). Pls path modeling: from foundations to recent
developments and open issues for model assessment and improvement. In Handbook of partial
least squares. Springer.
Walmsley, T., S. A. Ahmed, and C. Parsons (2005). The impact of liberalizing labor mobility in the
pacific region. GTAP Working Papers 1874, Center for Global Trade Analysis, Department of
Agricultural Economics, Purdue University.
Wold, H. (1982). Soft modelling: the basic design and some extensions. Systems under indirect
observation, Part II -, 36–37.
Wold, H. et al. (1966). Estimation of principal components and related models by iterative least
squares. Multivariate analysis 1, 391–420.
Woodberry, R. D. (2004). The Shadow of Empire: Christian Missions, Colonial Policy, and Democ-
racy in Postcolonial Societies. Phd thesis, Department of Sociology, University of North Car-
olina.
Woodberry, R. D. (2012). The missionary roots of liberal democracy. American Political Science
Review 106(02), 244–274.
Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press.
187
